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In the Twelve Years of NAFTA,
the Treaty Gave to Me. . . What, Exactly?:
An Assessment of Economic, Social, and
Political Developments in Mexico
Since 1994 and Their Impact on
Mexican Immigration into the United States
Ranko Shiraki Oliver*
PROLOGUE
The term "globalization" represents one of the most contentious po-
litical issues facing the modern world.1 While most governments seem
committed (or, perhaps more accurately, resigned) to an ever-shrinking
globe in which goods, services, transnational investments, and jobs move
freely across the globe, some groups have met these policies with deter-
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'Statements made by experts in the fields of international trade, global economics, and
international relations demonstrate this. In a 2000 interview, Michael Moore, a former director
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") stated that "[gilobalization is the new 'ism' that
everyone loves to hate." Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Charting the Transnational Dimension of
Law: U.S. Free Trade Agreements as Benchmarks of Globalization, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L.
47, 50 (2004). In his 2002 book Globalization and its Discontents, renowned economist
and Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz said that "globalization has become the most press-
ing issue of our time." Id. at 50 (quoting JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 4 (2002)). In his 2002 book Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, former
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that "[flor the first time in history, a single
worldwide economic system has come into being .... [Bly basing growth on interdepend-
ence, globalization has served to undermine the role of the nation-state as the sole deter-
minant of a society's well-being .... " Id. at 50 (quoting HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMER-
ICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? 211 (2002). Finally, in 2002, former President William J.
Clinton said that "[t]he great question of this new century is whether the age of interde-
pendence is going to be good or bad for humanity." Id. at 50; see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
& ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT
53-54 (2005) (describing protests at the November 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, Wash-
ington).
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mined, and sometimes violent, opposition.2 This opposition has been suffi-
ciently intense that the heads of government who represent the Group of
Eight ("G8")3 frequently meet in remote locations protected by an army
of police, if not by a literal army.
4
While transnational investment and technology are important com-
ponents of globalization, free trade agreements embody the terms under
which globalization is to be accomplished.5 In the United States, recent
Democratic and Republican administrations have favored freer trade and,
with difficulty, have generally succeeded in convincing a closely divided
Congress to ratify and implement free trade agreements. This Article fo-
cuses on one of those agreements: the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").6
2 Opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA") by 29 of the 34 Latin
American countries to become members of the FTAA has continued to delay negotiations.
The Summit of the Americas, held in Argentina in November 2005, did not help win sup-
port for the FTAA. Brazil and Venezuela are two of the most vociferous opponents of the
FTAA, and they made their objections known at the Summit. Bolivia's former President
Eduardo Rodrfguez Veltz6 vehemently opposed the FTAA and the idea of a free market
economy, which he blamed for the poverty in Bolivia. On his way to attend the Summit,
President Bush met with the Brazilian president to discuss the FTAA and was greeted by
major demonstrations. Democrat-Gazette Press Services, Bush Pitches Goal of Free Trade
Zone in Brazil Stopover, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Nov. 7, 2005, at A1, A3; see also U.S.
Dep't of State, U.S.-Brazil Cooperation on Trade is Crucial, Says U.S. Official, Jan. 27,
2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2006/Jan/27-588350.html. The WTO meeting in
Hong Kong in December 2005 was also met by protests from anti-globalization activists,
including a march by 5000 demonstrators outside the convention center where the meeting
took place. Elaine Kurtenbach, Farmer Aid In the U.S., EU to End, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 2005, at A1, A2.
3 The Group of Eight ("G8") is a group of leaders of eight industrialized nations,
which produce two-thirds of total global economic output, that meets annually to discuss
global, economic, and political issues. U.S. Dep't of State, Group of 8 (G8), http://usinfo.
state.gov/ei/economic-issues/group-of_8.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). The G8 is com-
posed of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Id.
4 In early July 2005, police and politicians in Scotland prepared for a G8 summit that
was held in a resort near Edinburgh. Scottish police faced a number of violent protests.
These protests included the "Long Walk to Justice" march on Edinburgh, in which organiz-
ers called on "millions" to participate. Richard W. Stevenson, Facing Differences with
Major Allies, Bush Arrives in Europe for Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A6. Edinburgh
police arrested about 60 people and fought several hundred other anti-globalization pro-
testers of the summit, in which global trade was anticipated to be one of the most difficult
issues. Alan Cowell, Summit Leaders Still Differ and Protesters Still Protest, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2005, at A6.
I Murphy, supra note 1, at 49-50.
6 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA was approved by Congress by means of the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057,
19 U.S.C. § 3311 [hereinafter NAFTA IA]. NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994.
Exec. Order No. 12889, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,681 (Dec. 27, 1993).
Although free trade agreements are frequently referred to as "treaties," a shorthand us-
age often adopted in this Article, they are not technically treaties under U.S. law. Rather,
free trade agreements are "Congressional-[E]xecutive agreements" whose congressional
approval is conditioned on the statutory requirement that any provision of the free trade
agreement that is inconsistent with any U.S. law will have no effect. Murphy, supra note 1,
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NAFTA is extremely important to the United States7 for more than
just its direct economic impact on the United States. Mexico and Canada
are the United States' closest neighbors, and the social and political con-
sequences of the decision to tie their interests to those of the United States,
even more than geography and modern realities would require, is of enor-
mous importance. 8 Of the two countries that would join the United States
in NAFTA, by far the more critical decision related to Mexico because
Americans have long felt comfortable about a close association with Can-
ada, a NATO military ally and a country closely comparable to the United
States in terms of political stability and freedom, economic development,
culture, and language. However, Americans have always been much less
comfortable about a close relationship with Mexico. Therefore, what
happens in Mexico is of enormous importance to the United States.
Certainly, Americans and American government representatives can
be expected to evaluate NAFTA or any other international agreement pri-
marily in terms of its direct effects on the United States, but it may be
that even an American concerned only with the well-being of the United
States will conclude that the direct effect of NAFTA on Mexico should be
the primary measuring stick for assessing the value of NAFTA to the
United States. One of the most obvious reasons that the economic and po-
litical health of Mexico matters to the United States is that Mexicans who
are discontented with conditions at home are likely to relocate to the United
States. Mexican citizens have always been interested in emigrating to the
United States, but in the last decade or so they have come by the millions,9
at 55; see also North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3312(a)(1) (2000).
7 The United States' membership in the WTO and its free trade agreements with the
European Union and others are all important. However, NAFTA is unique because it is consid-
ered to be a model for subsequent free trade agreements between the United States and
other Western Hemisphere nations. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 64.
8 Of the two countries that would join the United States in NAFTA, by far the more
critical decision related to Mexico, because Americans have always been much less com-
fortable about a close relationship with Mexico. Americans have long felt comfortable
about a close association with Canada, a NATO military ally and a country closely compa-
rable to the United States in terms of culture, language, economic development, and politi-
cal stability and freedom.
9 U.S. government figures indicate that from 1991 to 2000, almost 2.25 million Mexi-
cans immigrated into the United States legally. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, tbl.2 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbookl2004/Yearbook2O04.pdf. With
regard to undocumented Mexican immigrants, it is difficult to provide an accurate figure,
but U.S. government estimates from January 2005 are that 6.0 million Mexicans reside in
the United States illegally. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2005 6 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publicationsllLL -PE-2005.pdf. Unofficial estimates based on the
March 2005 Current Population Survey indicate that the number rose to 6.2 million in
2005, or 56% of the total undocumented population of 11.1 million. JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf; see also
2007]
Harvard Latino Law Review
legally and illegally.' Illegal immigration has increasingly become a
relatively easy endeavor because the United States has found it challeng-
ing to enforce its immigration laws effectively. " And, as the Mexican popu-
lation in the United States increases, and more Mexican Americans be-
come voters, it is difficult to envision significantly more effective enforce-
ment of U.S. immigration laws. 2 Thus, Mexico is critically important to
the United States, and, therefore, the effects of NAFTA in Mexico become
doubly important.
NAFTA has been in effect for twelve years, and it is time to make at
least preliminary judgments. Such judgments must remain very tentative,
for at least two reasons. First, the time frame for evaluation is still fairly
short; changes as sweeping as those ushered in by NAFTA may require
considerably more time to take full effect, and still more time for the ef-
fect to be clear. Second, while one can say with confidence that changes
have occurred while NAFTA has been in effect, it is more difficult to say
that the changes have occurred because NAFTA has been in effect. Im-
portant as it is, NAFTA is only one factor among many that have shaped
events in Mexico since 1994. Nonetheless, now seems to be a good time
to assess the impact of NAFTA on Mexico because NAFTA is the proto-
type for other agreements between the United States and other countries
in the Western Hemisphere 3 which are at a level of development similar
to that of Mexico. Specifically, since NAFTA, the United States has ratified
the United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agree-
ment ("DR-CAFTA")14 and the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement
("USCFTA"). 5 Potentially more importantly, negotiations are underway
Leigh Binford, A Generation of Migrants: Where They Leave, Where They End Up, 39:1 N.
AM. CONG. ON LATIN AM. 31 (2005).
10 The terms "legal" and "illegal" to denote the status of immigrants are sometimes
considered to be politically insensitive. However, alternative terms, such as "documented"
and "undocumented" or "authorized" and "unauthorized" may not necessarily be under-
stood by readers unfamiliar with the legal effect of those terms in immigration law. There-
fore, without intending to take a position in the cultural and political "wars," the author
will use the terms "legal" and "illegal" in this Article.
11 Although the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006),
may help enhance border security, immigration authorities likely continue to face
significant challenges in controlling illegal immigration.
12 It is not the purpose of this Article to argue whether the United States should restrict
immigration or embrace it as a needed source of new workers to offset the effects of the
declining birth rate in the United States and the anticipated decline in the workforce caused by
the retirement of the "baby boomer" generation.
'3 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. It should be noted that U.S. expansion of
free trade is not limited to the Western Hemisphere. A few examples are the 2001 U.S.-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement; the 2004 U.S.-Singapore Free Trade; and the 2004 U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement.
14 President Bush signed the implementing U.S. legislation, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 199
Stat. 462 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.), on Aug. 2, 2005.
15 On September 3, 2003, the U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment Implementation Act, Pub. L. No, 108-77, 117 Stat. 909; 19 U.S.C. § 2805, (Cum.
Supp. 2004). It was implemented effective January 1, 2004 by Proclamation No. 7746, 68
Fed. Reg. 75,789-90 (Dec. 30, 2003).
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to implement the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"). 6 CAFTA
has been the subject of much criticism and skepticism. Some CAFTA oppo-
nents have meant to convey both their negative assessment of NAFTA
and what they anticipate will be problems resulting from CAFTA by say-
ing, with sarcastic meaning: "Hate NAFTA? You'll love CAFTA!'
' 7
It is fair to ask, without any predetermined answer, whether we should
love NAFTA, loath it, or be somewhere in between. The answer depends
primarily on how NAFTA has affected and will affect Mexico. However,
it is difficult to concretely determine what that effect has been and will be.
This Article will present a tentative answer based on examination of the
available literature and other data about socio-economic and political devel-
opments in Mexico in the last twelve years.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, NAFTA between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico entered into force."8 As its name implies, NAFTA was designed
to establish a North American free trade zone, which made it the largest
16 When and if implemented, the FTAA will include Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domin-
ica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Links to FTAA Coun-
tries, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/busfac/clist-e.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). Negotiations
have been delayed due to the opposition by a number of its potential members. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
17 Pat Choate, Editorial, Hate NAFTA? You'll Love CAFTA!, PENNY PRESS (Las Vegas,
Nev.), June 9, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.pennypresslv.com/Penny%20Press%206-
9-5.pdf.
81 NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2203. To become binding, international agreements usu-
ally go through a three-stage process: signature, domestic implementation, and the deposit
of the instrument of implementation. Countries' initial assent is indicated by their signa-
ture, which indicates that the governments are prepared to accept the agreement, but their
signature does not normally give the agreement binding force. The agreement must subse-
quently be ratified pursuant to the domestic law of each country involved. Ratified agree-
ments must then be given the force of law under the law of each signatory. Once the proc-
ess of domestic implementation is complete, each country will take the final step of "de-
positing" an "instrument of ratification," which indicates that the country is committing to
undertake the obligations of the agreement. The agreement itself usually contains this re-
quirement. NAFTA, for example, states that it came into force "on January 1, 1994 on an
exchange of written notifications certifying the completion of necessary legal procedures."
Id. Differences in the distribution of constitutional authority between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico made it necessary for each country to follow a different procedure to
implement NAFTA. BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA, A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 8 (1994).
Because NAFTA had been negotiated under the "fast-track authority," it was presented
to the U.S. Congress for a vote in favor of or against NAFTA without the option of consid-
ering any amendments. The "fast-track authority" comes from the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1988); Katherine A. Hagen, Fundamentals of Labor
Issues and NAFTA, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 917 n.2 (1994).
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free trade zone in the world, 9 then covering a population of over 384 mil-
lion people.2" NAFTA represented a major step in the gradual process of
economic integration of the region that had started before 1990, when the
NAFTA negotiations began. For example, in 1989, the United States and
Canada entered into a free trade agreement, 2' which was superseded by
NAFTA. 2 Similarly, the United States entered into three major free trade
agreements with Mexico between 1985 and 1989.23 NAFTA carried for-
ward the principle of these previous bilateral agreements by consolidat-
ing them into a unified free trade agreement that would integrate the
three economies.24 The signatories hoped that, over time, the regional
economic integration established by NAFTA would create a market simi-
lar to that of the European Union and the European Free Trade Associa-
tion combined, and that it would permit the economies of the three coun-
tries to work together with the goal of increasing international competi-
tiveness, employment, and income throughout the region.25
Membership in NAFTA was particularly significant for Mexico. Do-
mestically, NAFTA represented the culmination of a process of liberaliza-
tion of the Mexican economy, which had started in the early to mid-1980s.26
Internationally, NAFTA was also good for Mexico because its member-
ship in NAFTA represented international recognition that Mexico's so-
cioeconomic and political positions were sufficiently stable, and perhaps
even sufficiently strong, to be worthy of such an important economic in-
tegration.
19 See infra notes 86 to 90 and accompanying text.
20 The combined population of the United States, Mexico, and Canada in 1994 was
384,036,041. The breakdown is as follows: U.S. 263,435,673, Mexico 91,337,896, Canada
29,262,472. U.S. Census, International Data Base, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbprint.
html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). For current statistics, see CIA, Field Listing-Population,
in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/fact
book/fields/2119.html.
2 1 The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement was approved in the United States
in 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (noted at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2000)). It was
implemented effective December 14, 1988 by Exec. Order No. 5923, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,638
(Dec. 14, 1988).
22 "By Public Law No. 103-182, § 107, 107 Stat. 2065 (1993) the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement is suspended while NAFTA is effective between Canada and
the United States." Murphy, supra note 1, at 58 n.56.
23 The Understanding of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (1985) (relating to Mex-
ico's participation in the subsidies code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-
GATT); The Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade
and Investment Relations (1987) (relating to consultation and dispute settlement mecha-
nisms for bilateral trade problems); and The Understanding Regarding Trade and Invest-
ment Facilitation Talks (1989) (relating to bilateral negotiations about a wide spectrum of
issues, including intellectual property questions). GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3-4 (1992).
24 Id. at 3.
251 Id. at 4.
26 Government of Mexico, Trade Policy Review: Mexico 6 (World Trade Org. Publ'n
No. 02-1222, 2002).
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While the prospect of an integrated regional economy was appealing
to many, NAFTA was highly controversial in the United States, most
significantly due to the gross disparity between the economies of the
United States and Mexico.27 Generally speaking, economists and business
interests on the conservative side of the political spectrum strongly en-
dorsed NAFTA because they viewed a free trade agreement as being eco-
nomically beneficial to all three nations. 28 By contrast, the left of the po-
litical spectrum, such as labor and environmental groups, and those seg-
ments of agriculture and manufacturing whose business interests were
threatened by NAFTA, strongly opposed NAFTA. They argued that (a) the
agreement would encourage employers to establish their operations in
Mexico, which would mean a loss of American jobs; (b) the United States
would be flooded with foreign agricultural products and manufactured
goods; and (c) the environment in the United States would be polluted by
Mexican trucks allowed on U.S. highways as well as by Mexican manu-
facturing companies located on the border.
29
Politicians, of course, also participated in the debate about NAFTA.
While President Clinton and the Republican leadership supported NAFTA,
many others opposed it. Ross Perot, for example, argued that the United
States would not benefit from entering into a free trade agreement with
Mexico because "people who don't have anything can't buy anything,"3
and during a presidential debate in 1993 he warned of a "giant sucking
sound" that would be heard in America, a metaphor he used to describe
the significant number of jobs that he feared would be lost to Mexico under
NAFTA.31
The "giant sucking sound" has not been heard in the United States.
In its first twelve years of existence, NAFTA has not brought about either
the disasters or the successes anticipated. It has, however, certainly brought
about, directly and indirectly, broad changes in the economies of all three
countries. Mexico, in particular, is most significantly affected because its
level of economic development and other significant variables (culture,
27 See id. at 22 (identifying the disparities between all three country participants as a
catalyst for controversy over NAFTA).
25 Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigra-
tion to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 939 (1994) (citing David Rosenbaum,
Good Economics Meet Protective Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at D5) (noting that
300 economists had signed a letter to President Clinton in which they expressed their sup-
port for NAFTA).
29 Id. See generally Hagen, supra note 18, at 917-20; Timothy Whitehouse, Interna-
tional Trade and the Environment, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 243, 244-45 (2006).
3 0 Gore, Perot Challenge Each Other on NAFTA, Money, Facts, BLOOMBERG NEWS
WIRE, Nov. 19, 1993, cited in Christian Stracke, The Sick Man of NAFTA, 20:2 WORLD
POLICY J. 29, 29 (2003), available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/joumal/articles/wpj03-
2/stracke.pdf.
1' Johnson, supra note 28, at 951 n.55 (citing Ross Perot & Pat Choate, SAVE YOUR
JoB, SAVE YOUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED Now! 41 (1993)); see also
Dan Griswold, NAFTA at 10: An Economic and Foreign Policy Success, FREE TRADE BULL.,
Dec. 17, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-001 .pdf.
20071
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language, and government) differ sharply from those of its two partners,
which in these respects are roughly comparable to each other.
NAFTA established fewer restrictions on trade to facilitate freer trade
in goods and services, increased opportunities for foreign direct invest-
ment, and established two separate supplemental agreements that address
environmental and labor issues,32 but it did not include broad provisions
addressing the movement of labor between the three countries. Surprisingly,
the important issue of Mexican immigration into the United States was
never discussed in any comprehensive fashion during the NAFTA nego-
tiations. 33 Although the issue of Mexican immigration was not used as a
bargaining tool or even discussed in detail, NAFTA does contain provi-
sions concerning temporary immigration. Chapter 16 of NAFTA, entitled
"A Temporary Entry of Business Persons,"34 reflects the preferential trad-
ing relationship between the parties to NAFTA and the goal of facilitat-
ing temporary entry on a reciprocal basis. While Chapter 16 discusses the
need to secure national borders and to protect the labor forces of the three
countries, the most concrete provisions spell out simplified procedures
allowing for temporary entry into the United States of four categories of
temporary non-immigrants: business visitors, traders and investors, intra-
company transferees, and professionals." These visa holders are permit-
ted to remain in the United States temporarily to conduct business, engage in
trade and transnational investment ventures, work as employees of multi-
32 Some of the more important provisions of NAFTA called for (a) reduction or elimi-
nation of import tariffs on manufactured goods and agricultural products traded among the
three countries; (b) reduction or elimination of tariffs on agricultural products over a ten-
year period; (c) reduction or elimination of tariffs on textiles and apparel over a ten-year
period, so long as the manufacture of those products complied with the rules prescribed by
NAFTA; (d) opening of the automobile industry and market over a ten-year period; (e) requir-
ing Petroleos Mexicanos ("PEMEX"), Mexico's state-owned oil company, to permit for-
eign companies to bid for drilling, exploration, and service contracts, but allowing foreign
interests neither ownership of Mexico's oil reserves nor a guarantee of a specific annual
allotment of oil (see infra note 226 and accompanying text); (f) requiring each NAFTA
country to provide foreign companies from the other NAFTA countries the same rights as
domestic companies; (g) requiring each NAFTA country to permit the operation of foreign
banks and insurance companies from the other NAFTA countries; and (h) continuation of
national and state/provincial environmental, health, and safety standards, which were not
to be superseded by NAFTA. Dolores Acevedo & Thomas J. Espanshade, Implications of a
North American Free Trade Agreement for Mexican Migration to the United States, 18 no.
4 POPULATION AND DEv. REV. 729-30 (1992).
11 Some commentators have argued that the U.S. trade representatives should have
used the issue of Mexican immigration into the United States as a bargaining tool in their
negotiations with Mexico. See, e.g., F. RAY P. MARSHALL, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FOR WORKERS (1993),
http://www.cis.org/articles/1993/back293.html; see also Johnson, supra note 28, at 940-42
(stating that the anomaly and inconsistency of NAFTA's objective of promoting free trade,
while restricting immigration, went largely unnoticed until Congress was considering whether
to ratify NAFTA); id. at 960-62.
34 NAFTA IA, supra note 6. Chapter 16 of NAFTA is discussed infra notes 352-373
and accompanying text.
35 Eliminating the Numerical Cap on Mexican TN Immigrants, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,287,
11,287 (Mar. 10, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 214 pt. 6 (2006)).
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national corporations, and practice in any of sixty-three specified profes-
sions."
Although NAFTA is not a treaty about immigration, it has been, and
will continue to be, a meaningful factor affecting immigration. Regarding
immigration, this Article draws two broad conclusions. First, NAFTA has
significantly contributed to the wave of (mostly illegal) Mexican immigra-
tion in the United States in the last twelve years, although the agreement
may be laying the foundation for long-term economic and political gains
that may ultimately reduce the number of illegal immigrants. Second,
NAFTA's temporary immigration provisions can be expected to result in
an increased number of Mexican professionals immigrating legally into
the United States, as they too attempt to escape the serious economic, social,
and political problems Mexico faces. At all socioeconomic levels, people
in Mexico have been affected by economic, social, and political problems
over the past twelve years (directly and indirectly propitiated by NAFTA),
the most significant of which has been a poor economy that has been un-
able to supply jobs for the growing number of unemployed Mexicans. Un-
employment and underemployment have been the major forces behind the
unprecedented magnitude of illegal immigration from Mexico in the last
decade or so. Because the problems of unemployment and underemploy-
ment also affect workers at the professional level ("skilled workers"),37
and because the process for Mexican professionals to temporarily immi-
grate under NAFTA became considerably easier in January 2004, it is
reasonable to anticipate that Mexican professionals will avail themselves
of these provisions to escape the economic, social, and political problems
they face in Mexico.
To set the proper context, Part II gives a more comprehensive back-
ground on NAFTA than in this introductory Part. Part III assesses NAFTA's
impact on Mexico by discussing a number of important economic indica-
tors. Part IV assesses NAFTA's role in the wave of Mexican migration to
the United States in the last twelve years. Part V summarizes the conclu-
sions.
36 NAFTA, supra note 6, app. 1603.D.1; 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(c) (2006).
37 A skilled worker is one who has 13 or more years of formal education. An unskilled
worker is one who has up to 12 years of formal education. Sandra Polaski, Jobs, Wages,
and Household Income, in NAFTA's PROMISE AND REALITY 11, 36 n.12 (Carnegie Endow-
ment for Int'l Peace 2003) available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/naftal.pdf
[hereinafter Polaski].
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Objectives Sought from NAFTA
In negotiating and implementing NAFTA, the governments of Mex-
ico and the United States 8 believed that NAFTA would advance their
national interests. Interestingly, however, it seems that for both countries
the effect of NAFTA on Mexico was crucial.39 Moreover, despite the fact
that the direct effect of NAFTA was, as the name implies, movement to-
ward a free trade zone, neither country viewed NAFTA's desired effects
solely, or perhaps even principally, in narrow economic terms.
The United States sought to accomplish several objectives by enter-
ing into a free trade agreement with Mexico. From the American perspec-
tive, the most obvious motivation was U.S. economic growth. Although
in 1994 Mexico was already the United States' third-largest trading part-
ner after Japan and Canada,' the United States saw NAFTA as a means
of further opening the Mexican market to U.S. producers and thereby utiliz-
ing natural and human resources to enable American business and work-
ers to become more competitive in world markets. But other U.S. objec-
tives for NAFTA centered on the agreement's effect on Mexico. The United
States saw NAFTA as a means of promoting economic growth, political
stability, and democratic principles in Mexico, 4' all of which would reduce
the risk of instability in a country with which the United States shares a
1952-mile border.42 Economically, American proponents of NAFTA viewed
it as a win-win proposition because they expected NAFTA to stimulate
economic growth in Mexico, which, in turn, would lead to increased Mexi-
can demand for American products and services. 43 Perhaps the most im-
portant long-term American objective in pursuing NAFTA, however, re-
lated to immigration. If, as hoped,' NAFTA strengthened the Mexican
3 This Article will not discuss Canadian attitudes toward NAFTA or the effects of
NAFTA on Canada. Its focus is Mexico and the indirect effects on the United States due to
NAFTA's effects on Mexico. The United States' impact on Mexico must be taken into ac-
count far more than that of Canada, given the dominant position of the United States as a
trading partner of Mexico and as the destination of the overwhelming majority of Mexican
immigrants.
39 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has stated: "Doing what little America could do to
enhance growth in Mexico would be good for Mexico, and good for America; and it was
the right thing to do for our neighbor to the south." Joseph E. Stiglitz, Editorial, The Bro-
ken Promise of NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A23.
40 Susan Fleck & Constance Sorrentino, Employment and Underemployment in Mex-
ico's Labor Force, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1994, at 3.
41 Gerald R. Ford, Editorial, Full Court Press: The Administration Must Go All Out for
NAFTA, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at C7.
42 See CIA, United States, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2005), available at https://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (describing the U.S.-Mexico border as 3141 kilo-
meters long).
43 Ford, supra note 41.
44 See Keith Bradsher, The Free Trade Accord: NAFTA: Something to Offend Everyone,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at A14 ("The Clinton Administration contends the pact would
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economy through free trade in goods and services and through foreign
direct investment, and this improvement resulted in new jobs, increased
wages, reduced consumer prices, and improved the standard of living in
Mexico, the improved economic conditions might significantly lessen the
"push" factors45 that fuel Mexican immigration, both legal and illegal, into
the United States.46
From the Mexican perspective, membership in NAFTA was a sig-
nificant turning point in its relationship with the United States for at least
two important reasons. First, becoming a signatory of NAFTA eased some
of Mexico's concerns about its perception throughout much of its history
(correctly or incorrectly) as being subservient to the United States.47 Sec-
ond, through NAFTA, Mexico entered into a permanent economic rela-
tionship with the United States, meaning that the Mexican economy would
be greatly affected (favorably and unfavorably) by the swings of the U.S.
economy.48
also discourage illegal immigration from Mexico by creating jobs there.").
41 People need a strong reason to undertake such a significant change in their lives as
moving to a foreign country. These reasons are generally referred to as "push" factors-
reasons to leave the home country ("the sending state")-and "pull" factors-reasons to go
to a particular new country ("the receiving state"). Classic push factors are poverty, war,
and official oppression. Pull factors are attractive conditions in a different country, such as
peace, prosperity, and freedom. The economy of the United States has been a strong "pull"
factor throughout its history. The U.S. economy's relative prosperity and openness has
offered the opportunity for those at the bottom, or at least their children, to achieve pros-
perity in the new land. Historically, the vast untapped resources of the United States played
a key role, as millions of immigrants were attracted by the prospect of cheap land, and signifi-
cant numbers were lured by short-term phenomena such as the gold rushes in California
(1849) and Alaska (1898).
For Mexicans coming to the United States at present, the primary push factor is Mex-
ico's stagnant economy, though domestic crime rates are also significant, particularly for
Mexicans in the middle and upper classes. The primary pull factors are geographic prox-
imity, the availability of high-paying jobs, a society traditionally open to immigrants, and
strong networks of family and friends in the United States, all of which are made significantly
more attractive to Mexicans by the broadening use of the Spanish language in the United
States.
An additional important push factor for Mexicans could be uncertainty about Mexico's
future and the feeling of unease in the wake of the controversial 2006 presidential election.
The tone of the campaign, in which the candidate of the incumbent, conservative party was
declared the winner but the liberal challenger demanded a ballot-by-ballot vote and held
nation-wide protests, split the country. See Voting was Rigged, Leftist Tells Mexico Mass
Protest, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 9, 2006, at Al. The poor southern states supported
the challenger while the more prosperous northern states supported the conservative candi-
date. Id. The tension carried with it an economic toll as well, estimated to be in the mil-
lions of dollars, as blockades prevented workers from reaching their jobs, tourists can-
celled reservations in hotels, and restaurants and other commercial establishments closed
because the major thoroughfares where they are located were closed to the public. Id.; Richard
Bourdreaux, Mexico's Runner-Up Remains Unbowed, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at Al; see
also Noticiero con Joaquin L6pez D6riga (Galavision/Univision television broadcast Aug.
14, 2006); Jos6 de C6rdoba, Mexico Ratifies Presidential Win for Conservative, WALL ST.
J., July 7, 2006, at Al.
46 See generally Hufbauer & Schott, supra note 23, at 10-12.
47 STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 38 (2004).
48 Id.
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Mexico's most direct motivation to join NAFTA was to secure and
improve access to the vital American market. In 1992, the year in which
NAFTA negotiations began, the United States already purchased approxi-
mately three-fourths of Mexico's exports, or over $35 billion.49 Less ob-
viously, but no less importantly, the Mexican government expected NAFTA
to secure and promote the internal process of liberalization of the Mexi-
can economy initiated during the early 1980s. These liberalization meas-
ures had included such steps as reducing or altogether eliminating licens-
ing requirements on a significant number of goods, liberalizing regulations
applicable to transactions involving issues of intellectual property, for-
eign investment, and transfer of technology, and significant deregulation
and privatization of important Mexican industries, including banking,
telecommunications, and transportation.5" These policies culminated with
the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA, which solidified Mex-
ico's commitment to open transnational trade and investment.51
Thus, although in 1994 Mexico had the world's thirteenth-largest econ-
omy and was already a major participant in world trade,5" it hoped that
NAFTA would help reinforce domestic economic reforms already in exis-
tence, bring about further reforms, and convey to its two partners-and
the world-that Mexico had matured into a strong and modern economy
ready for increased trade in goods and services and an attractive site for
foreign direct investment.53 Concrete benefits expected in the short to me-
dium term included the return of "flight capital" (capital owned by Mexi-
49Figures are for merchandise trade. See World Trade Organization, Statistics Data-
base: Time Series, http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramSeries.aspx?
Language=E (select "Total merchandise trade" from available data sets; then add "Total
merchandise" from available indicators; then add "Mexico" and "United States" from avail-
able reporters; then add "World" from available partners; then add "Exports" and "Im-
ports" from available trade flow; then add "US dollar at current prices"; then add "1992"
from available years) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
50 See generally HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 23, at 12-15. Although the liberali-
zation of the Mexican economy began during the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid
(1982-1988), President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), a Harvard-trained econo-
mist, strongly pushed for more liberalization through his "apertura econ6mica" [economic
opening] campaign. Salinas hoped that this campaign would change Mexico from a cen-
trally controlled economy to an economy open to foreign trade and transnational invest-
ment, and one run by free market rules. ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 38; see also
infra notes 225 and accompanying text.
51 ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 38.
52 Fleck & Sorrentino, supra note 40, at 3.
53 In addition to its accession and membership to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in 1986 and the WTO in 1995, Mexico has entered into a number of regional free
trade agreements, the most of important of which being NAFTA. After NAFTA, Mexico
entered into free trade agreements with Chile, Venezuela and Colombia, Uruguay, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. ZAMORA ET AL., supra
note 47, at 385. Mexico has also entered into free trade agreements with countries outside
the Western Hemisphere, such as Israel, the European Free Trade Association (Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland), and the European Union. Id.
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cans but invested abroad due to economic uncertainty within Mexico)
and the procurement of loans from international financial institutions. 4
B. The Ratification Debate in the United States
While NAFTA generated concern and opposition in Mexico,"5 formal
ratification by the Mexican Congress was a foregone conclusion.16 In the
United States, by contrast, the ratification debate (which included imple-
menting legislation, and thus required action by the House of Representa-
tives as well as the Senate 7) was intense. 8
It is interesting to consider the arguments for and against NAFTA
during the U.S. ratification debate and to attempt to evaluate the accuracy
of these arguments with the benefit of twelve years of experience. How-
ever, the impact of NAFTA is sufficiently unclear that, even with the benefit
of a dozen years of hindsight, it is likely that both supporters and oppo-
nents of NAFTA would contend that they have been proven correct.5 9
1. Arguments in Support of U.S. Ratification
First, supporters of NAFTA ratification argued that because the econo-
mies of the United States and Mexico were already significantly inte-
grated-and that such integration would continue to grow even without
NAFTA-a free trade agreement would be beneficial to both countries and
would constitute the formal recognition of a fait accompli.6° To the de-
s See generally HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 23, at 16.
55 See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
56 Under Mexican law, the President can negotiate treaties, but they must be ratified by
a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate and by a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
APPLETON, supra note 18, at 14-15. Both bodies overwhelmingly approved NAFTA in
November 1993. Id. at 15. Under Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution, no subsequent
domestic implementation was required. Id.
57 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
"I Congressional deliberations officially began in the fall of 1992 and culminated in the
approval of NAFTA in December 1993. Hagen, supra note 18, at 918. It is ironic that two
of President Clinton's biggest legislative victories-NAFTA and welfare reform-owed
more to congressional Republicans than to members of his own party. In the case of NAFVA,
ratification by the Senate resulted from 61 votes in favor and 38 against (Democrats: 27 in
favor and 28 against; Republicans: 34 in favor and 10 against; and I Democrat not voting).
See 139 CONG. REC. S16712-13 (1993). In the House of Representatives, the vote was 234
in favor and 200 against (Democrats: 102 in favor and 156 against; Republicans: 132 in
favor and 43 against; and 1 Independent vote against). See 139 CONG. REC. H10047-48
(1993), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/rol1575.xml.
59 For example, NAFrA has not yet produced economic gains in Mexico. See infra notes
116-270 and accompanying text. However, as argued below, see infra note 330 and ac-
companying text, it is entirely reasonable to argue that NAFTA is forcing the Mexican
economy to make the adjustments that will make it competitive in the global economy. Simi-
larly, while NAFTA seems to be leading more Mexicans to immigrate into the United States,
see supra note 9 and accompanying text, the treaty may be laying the foundation for de-
creased levels of emigration in the future. See infra notes 342-350 and accompanying text.
6°MARSHALL, supra note 33, at 1.
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gree that NAFTA changed the economic landscape, the change would be
favorable because such an agreement would permit the United States to
take advantage of the liberalization of the Mexican economy from the mid-
1980s. In addition, the increased trade between the two countries would
improve the conditions of most citizens in both countries.6
Second, NAFTA supporters argued, in effect, that it was "safe" to
enter into a free trade agreement with Mexico because the liberalization
of the Mexican economy had helped Mexico move toward economic and
political stability. Accordingly, NAFTA would not expose the United
States to great economic risk.
62
Third, NAFTA supporters urged the classic economic theory of
"comparative advantage," which underlies free trade and free trade agree-
ments. Comparative advantage argues that two parties-whether individuals
or nations-can improve joint production and consumption through spe-
cialization, even when one party is more efficient than the other in all
lines of production. 63 For example, even assuming that an attorney can pre-
pare routine legal documents more quickly than a legal assistant, when
one takes into account different pay scales, one finds that it is more efficient
to have such documents prepared by the paralegal rather than the attor-
ney. The attorney, legal assistant, and the clients are better off for having
allowed some work to be done by the paralegal, who may be slower but
whose work is billed at a cheaper hourly rate than that of the attorney.
This arrangement leaves the attorney to perform work that adds greater
value. When the theory of comparative advantage is applied to international
economies at significantly different levels of development, such as the
economies of the United States and Mexico, this theory suggests that while
the United States would lose some low-wage jobs to Mexico, it would gain
in terms of highly paid jobs performed by skilled American workers that
Mexico's relatively unskilled workforce would be unable to perform as effi-
ciently.' The theory of comparative advantage, therefore, supports the thesis
that, in the context of competitive markets, trade encourages specializa-
tion, and thereby produces mutually beneficial outcomes.
Fourth, NAFTA supporters in the United States viewed Mexico as a
growing market for U.S. exports. They argued that NAFTA would help
increase productivity in Mexico, which, in turn, would raise Mexican wages.
61 Id. This view is consistent with classic economic theory, especially the theory of
comparative advantage discussed infra at notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 33 (discussing arguments made by supporters of
NAFTA and arguing that, in view of the reality that the economies of the United States and
Mexico would continue to be highly integrated, regardless of the ultimate impact of
NAFTA, the United States should take advantage of the liberalization of the Mexican economy
to expand trade between the two nations to improve conditions for most North Americans).
63 See generally N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 50-56 (3d
ed. 2004).
6 MARSHALL, supra note 33, at 1.
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Consequently, Mexicans would be able to buy more American goods and
services with their increased wealth.
65
Finally, the same reasoning led NAFTA supporters to argue that the
treaty would slow the pace of Mexican immigration into the United States.
They asserted that the overall positive impact of NAFTA on the Mexican
economy would create new jobs, increase wages, and provide Mexican
workers with more disposable income. Once Mexicans achieved this im-
proved standard of living, they would not want to immigrate into the United
States because the "push" factor encouraging large numbers of legal-and,
more importantly, illegal-immigrants to leave Mexico would be neutral-
ized.
2. Arguments in Opposition to U.S. Ratification
The central basis66 for opposition to the U.S. ratification of NAFTA
arose from the belief that linking the United States to Mexico would harm
the United States because of Mexico's relatively low level of economic de-
velopment. American opponents of NAFTA ratification argued that Mex-
ico's low wages would limit productivity in all three countries. Answer-
ing proponents who cited the economic theory of comparative advantage,
opponents asserted that economic theory supported the argument that
free-trade ideologies were directly related to low-wage strategies, which
would lead to lower wages in the United States and Canada, thereby stifling
productivity and income levels.67 NAFTA opponents reasoned that just as
labor is most valuable where capital is plentiful-this fact accounting for
much of the differential between wage rates in Bangladesh and Western
Europe, for example-so is capital most valuable where labor is abundant.
Thus, free trade and free movement of capital can be expected to lead
owners of capital to move investments to countries where labor is plenti-
ful and cheap, a tendency NAFTA opponents saw borne out in the in-
creasing tendency of American companies to "export jobs" to the Third
World over the past two decades.68 To the degree that free trade and freely
65 Id. at 1-2.
66 Detailed consideration of all the arguments that were raised against NAFTA is be-
yond the scope of this Article. One set of concerns was that economic pressures would tend
to force all three countries to the "lowest common denominator." For example, American
opponents of NAFTA contended that the U.S. environment would suffer as a result of Mex-
ico's weaker environmental laws and enforcement because competitive pressures opened
by NAFTA would lead American producers to pressure Congress for more lax U.S. envi-
ronmental protection. By the same reasoning, it was urged that lesser governmental protec-
tion of workers' rights in Mexico would result in reduced rights for U.S. workers as well.
See, e.g., Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and Labor Issues: Accom-
plishments and Challenges, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 449 (1993); Hagen, supra note
18.
67 MARSHALL, supra note 33, at 1.
68 For example, Ross Perot issued the famous catch phrase, "giant sucking sound," to
symbolize the movement of U.S. jobs to Mexico. See text accompanying note 31.
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flowing capital result in American workers having less capital, they can
be expected to experience stagnation in real wages and in rates of pro-
ductivity.
Ratification opponents also disputed the claim that NAFTA would
improve conditions for Mexican workers. They asserted that despite the
increased trade between the United States and Mexico in the 1980s, wages
in Mexico fell by 40% to 50% and working conditions in the maquilado-
ras69 had continued to be rather poor. NAFTA would intensify this poor
performance, they argued, because competitive pressures on Mexican pro-
ducers would induce them to exert political pressure to prevent mandated
improvements in working conditions.7 °
Next, because the theory of comparative advantage could be ex-
pected to push low-skill/low-wage jobs toward Mexico and high-skill/high-
wage jobs toward the United States,7" NAFTA opponents argued that the
agreement would cause many low-skilled Americans to lose their jobs.
The only American workers who stood to gain from NAFTA, they as-
serted, would be those with the highest skills.7" In other words, NAFTA
would tend to bring about what might be termed a "reverse Robin Hood"
effect in the United States-taking relatively good jobs from those toward
the bottom of the economic totem pole in order to give even greater eco-
nomic benefit to those already at the top.
Finally, on the crucial question of the effect on the flow of illegal Mexi-
can immigration into the United States, opponents of ratification took issue
with the optimistic forecast that NAFTA would curtail the flow. Even if
Mexico enjoyed modest economic growth as a result of NAFTA, they ar-
gued, it was unrealistic to think that such growth would be sufficient to cre-
ate jobs for Mexico's growing workforce. Moreover, opponents argued
that certain aspects of Mexico's economy could be expected to falter in
the face of American competition propitiated by NAFTA, and that the result-
ing unemployment of displaced Mexican agricultural and industrial workers
69 Maquiladoras are export assembly plants located in Mexico, primarily along the
U.S. border. In 1965, the United States and Mexico created the maquiladora program to
allow tariff-free imports of materials and components into Mexico for assembly and re-
export to the United States. This program focuses on auto parts, electronics, and apparel.
Polaski, supra note 37, at 15. The maquiladora industry was aided also with the implemen-
tation of the Mexican government's Program for Border Industrialization, which sought to
address the problem of emigration to the United States caused by unemployment in the
northern states after the Bilateral Convention on Guest Workers (commonly known as the
"Bracero Program") was discontinued. Pastoral Juvenil Obrera, The Struggle for Justice in
the Maquiladoras: The Experience of the Autotrim Workers, in CONFRONTING GLOBALIZA-
TION: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND POPULAR RESISTANCE IN MEXICO 173 (Timothy A.
Wise et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION].
70 MARSHALL, supra note 33, at 2; see also Obrera, supra note 69 (documenting low
wages, dangerous health and safety conditions, persistent health problems, deterioration of
the surrounding environment, and violation of labor rights in the maquiladora industry in
Matamoros, in the State of Tamaulipas, across the border from Brownsville, Texas).
71 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
72 MARSHALL, supra note 33, at 2.
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would increase this "push" factor fueling illegal immigration into the United
States.3
C. Early Indications of Mexican Grassroots Opposition to NAFTA
From the moment NAFTA was signed, it was clear that the Mexican
government would ratify the agreement,74 but this political reality should
not lead one to conclude that all Mexicans relished the prospect of open-
ing themselves up to competition against the American producers who had
built the world's most powerful economy. While the leaders of the Mexi-
can political and business communities welcomed NAFTA, American
competition appeared daunting to many inefficient Mexican producers.
Nowhere was this attitude more prevalent than in the labor-intensive ag-
ricultural sector central to the lives of so much of Mexico's rural popula-
tion-in particular, the communally owned ejidos.75 Thus, it may not be
entirely coincidental that a significant armed rebellion 6 in Mexico's south-
ern state of Chiapas broke out on January 1, 1994, the day NAIFTA entered
into force. While the rebellion was not tied solely to NAFTA, the rebels
strongly opposed the new trade agreement. They argued that the mass
production of fruits and vegetables in the United States and Canada for
export to Mexico would put Mexican farmers out of business, because
Mexican farms were operating without sufficient government support and
without modern technology, and were, therefore, producing meager crops.
In March 1994, the leaders of the movement provided the federal gov-
ernment of Mexico with thirty-four specific demands in a formal docu-
73 Id. at 3.
74 See supra notes 48 to 54 and accompanying text.
71 Ejidos have existed in various forms since colonial times. Over the centuries, the
governments of Spain and subsequently of Mexico supported the development and survival
of these communally owned farms, which are almost always worked by Indian campesinos
(rural agricultural workers). Like the collective farms of the former Soviet Union, ejidos
have never been particularly productive enterprises, an inherent problem compounded by
the low-capital/labor-intensive methods of production typically employed. For a brief dis-
cussion of the ejidos through history, see JAN BAZANT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF MEXICO
FROM HIDALGO TO CARDENAS, 1805-1940 74-75, 89, 180, 185-86 (1977). See also infra
note 181 and accompanying text.
76 The movement was named Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional ("EZLN")
[Zapatista National Liberation Army] in honor of Emiliano Zapata, the Mexican revolu-
tionary hero whose motto, "Tierra y Libertad" [Land and Freedom], reflected his political
philosophy and his zealous protection of the rights of the Mexican indigenous population.
Jorge A. Vargas, NAFTA, The Chiapas Rebellion, and the Emergence of Mexican Ethnic
Law, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
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ment.77 One of the most significant of these demands was that NAFTA be
revised to protect the interests of the indigenous peoples of Mexico."
III. NAFTA's IMPACT ON MEXICO
One cannot say that NAFTA has been unquestionably "good" or
"bad" for Mexico, for at least four reasons. First, important developments
in the life of a nation, as in the life of an individual, bring about favor-
able and unfavorable consequences, and the important development of
NAFTA is no exception, particularly for Mexico. Second, it is difficult to
assess which changes should be attributed to NAFTA rather than to other
factors. Unlike a scientific experiment in which all variables can be held
constant except the one under consideration, Mexico and its NAFTA part-
ners have been affected by countless changes over the past twelve years,
making it difficult to isolate the effects of NAFTA.
Third, the economic data necessary to assess NAFTA's effects are not
entirely reliable. Even in the United States, macroeconomic data are some-
times suspect, 79 and this is a more significant problem in Mexico because
the composition of the Mexican economy, in which large segments of the
employment and economic production sectors are in the off-the-books in-
formal economy,80 makes data collection and analysis difficult.
Fourth, it is too early to assess the long term effects of NAFTA. Most
major changes are disconcerting in the short term, and it is undeniable that
NAFTA is less popular with Mexicans today than in 1994. Yet, although a
minority, some optimistic and hopeful Mexicans view the first twelve years
of NAFTA as a gestation period that will culminate with the birth of a
new Mexico, one with a strong economy and a stable sociopolitical sys-
tem, as was envisioned by NAFTA proponents. 8' While this may be only
7 The rebel group was composed of poor and uneducated Mayan Indians, who de-
manded an immediate response to their problems from the Mexican government. They
asked for better living conditions, better education for their children, access to medical care,
land ownership, respect for their ethnicity, fair political elections, and a truly democratic
system. Id. at 2, 4-5.
11 Id. at 4-5; see also NEIL HARVEY, THE CHIAPAS REBELLION: THE STRUGGLE FOR
LAND AND DEMOCRACY 2, 8, 170, 181-82 (1998); Adolfo Gilly, Chiapas and the Rebellion
of the Enchanted World, in RURAL REVOLT IN MEXICO: U.S. INTERVENTION AND THE Do-
MAIN OF SUBALTERN POLITIcs 261, 328 (Daniel Nugent ed., 1998).
79 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 136.
SI See Telephone Interview with Sumireko Shiraki de Alonso, CPA, Supervisor, Fraud
Control Department, American Express-MEXICO, in Mexico City, Mex. (Aug. 5, 2006).
Experts writing about NAFTA's effects share this assessment and believe that things will
get worse before they get better. Specifically, they argue that as Mexico industrializes and
modernizes its agriculture, poor economic conditions, increased inequalities, and more
migration will be seen in the short run and that, paradoxically, divergence in development
patterns is a necessary prelude to the convergence involving the United States, Canada, and
Mexico that will follow. The crucial questions, of course, are how many years (or decades)
the difficult transition phase will last and whether political support for NAFTA will con-
tinue, particularly in Mexico. See, e.g., James F. Hollified & Thomas Osang, Trade and
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a subconscious attempt to make sense of the significant problems Mexico
has been facing for years, it is entirely possible that short-term disloca-
tions are masking the fact that the agreement is in the early stages of
shaping structural changes in Mexico's economic, social, and political sys-
tems that will prove markedly favorable over the long term. The situation
Mexico is experiencing is reminiscent of the economic chaos that fol-
lowed the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, where, not surprisingly,
many Russians long for the stability and strength of the "Evil Empire." It
does not necessarily follow that Russia is worse off for having discarded
the Soviet Union and the system of communism, and having undergone
the resulting profound economic and political change. Simply put, twelve
years is not a sufficiently long period of time to assess the impact of the
first major free trade agreement between two strong world economies and
that of a developing country. 2 A considerably longer period of opera-
tion-perhaps twenty-five or thirty years, or even longer-will be neces-
sary before one can begin to draw conclusions with confidence. The pe-
riod must be long enough to allow the developing country to absorb, and
adjust to, the shocks felt in its economic, social, and political systems as
a result of the agreement.
Notwithstanding these limitations, one must attempt at least a pre-
liminary evaluation of the apparent effects of NAFTA on Mexico, if for
no other reason than because the United States is in the process of broad-
ening its use of the concept by entering into similar agreements with
other developing countries. s3 Twelve years after NAFTA's implementa-
tion, one can unequivocally say that its provisions regarding free trade in
goods and services, foreign direct investment, labor, and the environment
have affected Mexico significantly. Most of these effects have been di-
rectly economic, but, as a result of its impact on the economy, NAFTA
has also brought about significant social and political change in Mexico.
This Article assesses some of NAFTA's most significant effects on
Mexico from several vantage points. First, official statements-one jointly
issued by the three NAFTA parties and a second by the United States
Migration in North America: The Role of NAFTA, 11 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 327, 340 (2005).
82 Harvard University economics professor Benjamin M. Friedman has stated that in
the last twenty-five years some developing economies, including that of Mexico, have suc-
ceeded to such an extent that the label of "developing country" no longer suits, and that
Mexico's membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"), long regarded as a "rich countries" club, is important in determining whether
Mexico remains closer to a "developing country" than a "developed" one. BENJAMIN M.
FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 326 (2005). Nonetheless,
while Mexico's socioeconomic and political posture is stable, and arguably even strong
relative to other Latin American countries, Mexico is likely still properly viewed as a de-
veloping country. This is significant for this Article because, as many recognized, a free
trade agreement between the United States, a country with the strongest and most devel-
oped economy, and Mexico, a developing country, was unprecedented, and that, therefore,
NAFTA's effects would be difficult to predict. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 23, at 10.
83 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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alone-are presented. Not surprisingly, these official reports tend to view
NAFTA very favorably, focusing only on NAFTA's successes, rather than
presenting a balanced consideration of NAFTA's effects.
Second, taking into consideration the fact that NAFTA's primary
goals are economic, NAFTA's effect on Mexico is evaluated in traditional
economic terms of effects on trade, productivity, income, and standard of
living. While the data by no means all point in one direction, this Article
tentatively shares the conclusion that, to date, NAFTA has been economi-
cally detrimental to Mexico.
Third, this Article also attempts to evaluate the more indirect effects
of NAFTA: effects on Mexico's society and politics. These important
matters have attracted relatively less commentary, whether official or in
the popular or scholarly press, than have economic concerns. 4 Because
NAFTA's effects in these areas are indirect, and because the data are, once
again, inconclusive, conclusions must be made with caution. Nonetheless,
this Article concludes that NAFTA has been an indirect but significant con-
tributor to the social problems Mexico has experienced in the last twelve
years, particularly with regard to increased crime. With regard to political
changes, this Article concludes NAFTA's effect has been a positive one in
that the economic and social problems Mexicans have had to confront
since NAFTA took effect have resulted in a level of governmental re-
sponsiveness and accountability seldom seen in Mexican history.
Finally, this Article assesses NAFTA's role on the immigration of
Mexican citizens into the United States and concludes that the economic
and social problems Mexico has experienced in the last twelve years, to
which NAFTA has directly or indirectly contributed, have played a signifi-
cant role in the unprecedented wave of (mostly illegal) Mexican immigra-
tion. These social and economic problems, as well as the political turmoil
created by the 2006 Mexican presidential elections,85 might result in in-
creased numbers of Mexican professionals legally immigrating into the
United States through NAFTA's temporary immigration provisions.
A. The Official View
Predictably, the official position of the government representatives
of the three NAFTA countries is that the agreement has delivered sub-
stantial net benefit. As NAFTA neared its tenth anniversary, trade officials
from the United States, Mexico, and Canada issued a joint statement out-
lining what they saw as NAFTA's successes and reporting on ongoing
efforts to expand NAFTA's role.8 6 While one can anticipate that trade offi-
14 This statement precludes discussion of labor rights and environmental concerns,
which are topics beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 66.
11 See supra note 45.
86 Press Release and Joint Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, NAFTA Partners Celebrate
Tenth Anniversary of Trade Agreement (Oct. 8, 2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/ dis-
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cials will have an interest in reporting positive outcomes, one must pre-
sume that the figures and concrete factual assertions reported in the official
report are accurate.
87
Trade officials proclaimed NAFTA to be "an outstanding demonstra-
tion of the rewards that flow to outward-looking, confident countries that
implement policies of trade liberalization as a way to increase wealth, im-
prove competitiveness and expand benefits to consumers, workers and busi-
nesses."8 8 The officials stated that NAFTA had been instrumental in mak-
ing North America one of the most active trading regions in the world. In
the first ten years under the agreement, three-way trade among NAFTA
partners reached $621 billion, more than double pre-NAFTA levels. For-
eign direct investment among the three NAFTA partners also more than
doubled to reach $299 billion in 2000.89 The annual combined gross do-
mestic product of the three countries in October 2003 was $11.4 trillion,
which at that time made North America the world's largest free trade area,
encompassing about one-third of the world's total GDP, which is significant-
ly larger than that of the European Union.9
The officials further reported that Mexican trade with its NAFTA
partners expanded significantly since the agreement took effect. Mexico's
play.html?p = washfile-english&y = 2003 &m = October&x = 20031008164448rellims0.4990
198 [hereinafter "NAFTA Partners Celebrate Tenth Anniversary"]. Representing each
country were Robert Zoellick, Trade Representative for the United States; Pierre Pettigrew,
Canadian Minister for International Trade; and Fernando Canales, Mexican Secretary of
Economy. Id.
1 One commentator observes:
Hard as it may be to believe, in economic matters the executive branch has tradi-
tionally succeeded at hewing to the ideals of objectivity and nonpartisanship. Un-
der Republicans and Democrats, in good times and bad, the Commerce Depart-
ment and the Labor Department have produced reliable numbers, even when those
numbers have made sitting Presidents look worse .... On the whole, ... good
economics has trumped politics.
James Surowiecki, Hail to the Geek, NEW YORKER, Apr. 19, 2004, at 70. However, Mr.
Surowiecki notes that "Presidents have tried to put their spin on the data, of course, and
there have been notable episodes of deliberate manipulation," a category of offense in
which he gives the Bush Administration relatively low marks. Id.
88 NAFTA Partners Celebrate Tenth Anniversary, supra note 86, at 1.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 6. By comparison, the gross domestic product ("GDP") of the European Union
in 2003 was 9755.4 billion Euros, or approximately $8.8 trillion, using September 2003
exchange rates. Europa, The European Union at a Glance, Key Facts and Figures, http:// eu-
ropa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/tradeandeconomy/production/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2007). It should be noted that the European Union has expanded its membership since the
representatives issued their statement, supra note 86. By 2006, the member states of the
European Union were Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The 2005 estimates of the European Union's GDP were $12.18 trillion (using purchasing
power parity) and $13.31 trillion (using official exchange rate). CIA, European Union, in
THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2005), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
geos/ee.html.
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imports from the United States more than doubled, to $107.2 billion from
$51.1 billion, and imports from Canada, while small in comparison to
U.S. imports, reached $1.6 billion. Mexico's exports to its NAFTA part-
ners increased even more dramatically than did imports. Exports to the
United States grew by an outstanding 234%, reaching $136.1 billion, and
exports to Canada also more than tripled, to $8.8 billion. Stated differ-
ently, when NAFTA took effect Mexico faced a trade deficit of over $10 bil-
lion in its trade with the United States; ten years later, Mexico enjoyed a
trade surplus with the United States of $28.9 billion.9' More recent data
would have made the trade officials' point even stronger. In 2006, Mexi-
can exports to the United States exceeded $165 billion, and its trade sur-
plus with the United States averaged nearly $4.5 billion per month.9 Mex-
ico's less important trade with Canada exhibited similar trends, resulting
in a trade surplus of $6.2 billion. 93 These impressive trade figures were
not just the result of worldwide, or American, economic growth. Under
NAFTA, Mexico became a relatively more important trading partner for
the United States and Canada. For example, while Mexico accounted for
6.8% of U.S. exports in 1993, by 2002, that figure had jumped to 11.6%. 9'
The trade officials also credited NAFTA with stimulating record lev-
els of foreign direct investment. 95 In 2000, FDI in the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico from NAFTA members reached $299.2 billion, more
than double the $136.9 billion registered in 1993. Further, as of October
2003, the NAFTA countries accounted for 23.9% of global inward FDI
and 25% of global outward FDI.96
The officials were similarly optimistic concerning the North Ameri-
can Agreement of Environmental Cooperation and the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which entered into effect on January 1,
1994. The officials asserted that "[tihese successful agreements have helped
to ensure that the economic integration promoted by the NAFTA is ac-
companied by better environmental performance and efforts to improve
working conditions." 97
9, NAFTA Partners Celebrate Tenth Anniversity, supra note 86.
92 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, U.S. Trade Balance with Mexico,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html#2006 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
Another source reports that between 1993 and 2001 U.S. exports to Mexico rose from
$47 billion to $91 billion, and U.S. imports from Mexico rose from $45 billion to $131 bil-
lion. NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, Jan. 2004, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?
id=2991 0_20 [hereinafter NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS].
93 NAFTA Partners Celebrate Tenth Anniversary, supra note 86, at 7.
94Id.
95 Id. at 8.
96 Id.
97 Id. Disagreement with the official viewpoint is widespread. Much has been written
arguing that the increased free trade and foreign investment brought about by NAFTA have
significantly worsened both the environment and the conditions of workers in all three
countries. See, e.g., Scott Vaughan, The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever? Measuring the
Environmental Impacts ofAgricultural Liberalization, in NAFTA's PROMISE AND REALITY,
supra note 37, at 61; John Cavanagh & Sarah Anderson, Happily Ever NAFTA?, FOREIGN
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The NAFTA country representatives indirectly indicated their opti-
mism about the future of NAFTA by outlining seven measures designed
to strengthen and expand the scope and conceptual framework of NAFTA.
Brief consideration of these measures-which include, but go far beyond
free trade-provide some insight into the broad importance of NAFTA and
its effect on the signatory states.
Four of the seven measures directly affected trade. In each one, the
officials sought to broaden the concept of free trade. Two of the proposals
related to specific industries, including steel98 and textiles.99 In addition,
the officials proposed (1) a study to determine whether harmonization of
the most-favored-nation tariffs between the NAFTA partners might fur-
ther promote trade by reducing export-related transactional costs, 10° and
(2) that the NAFTA countries adopt a goal of further liberalization of the
NAFTA rules of origin.'
The three non-trade provisions related to foreign investment, visas,
and professional credentials of accountants. First, the officials agreed to
review and adopt the recommendations of the Investment Experts Group
(IEG), designed to enhance the transparency and efficiency of NAFTA's
Chapter 11, relating to investor-state arbitration and dispute settlement.
Chapter 11 is a controversial part of NAFTA, because while it provides in-
vestors from NAFTA countries with protection from legal changes that
imperil their investments, 0 2 this protection arguably comes at the cost of
tying the host country's hands, thus preventing desirable improvements in
domestic law. 1°3 Critics of Chapter 11 argue that it goes too far in its protec-
POLICY, Sept. 1, 2002, at 58; Timothy Wise & Kevin P. Gallagher, Foreign Policy in Focus,
NAFTA: A Cautionary Tale, Oct. 24, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/2002/
1024caution.htm; TIMOTHY WISE, AM. PROGRAM, INTERHEMISPHERIC RES. CTR., NAFTA's
UNTOLD STORIES: MEXICO'S GRASSROOTS RESPONSES TO NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION,
(2003), http://americas.irc-online.org/reports/2003/0306globalization.html; Hagen, supra
note 18; McCaffrey, supra note 66. See generally CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION, supra
note 69. In fact, the negative effects of free trade on workers, particularly those in develop-
ing countries, are said to rise to the level of human rights violations. See generally HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 313-16 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2006).
98 The officials called for establishing the North American Steel Trade Committee to
foster increased cooperation among the NAFTA partners' steel industries. NAFTA Partners
Celebrate Tenth Anniversary, supra note 86, at 4.
99 The officials proposed to liberalize the international textile and apparel trade and to
consider possible measures to prepare the industries of the NAFTA partners for increased
global market competition. Id. at 2.
100 Id. at 4.
101 Id.
102 The IEG's recommendations were based on input from interested stakeholders, in-
cluding those made at the NAFTA Trilateral Multi-stakeholder Consultations meeting, held
in Montreal in May 2003, the Council of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
and the Joint Public Advisory Committee. Id. In July 2001, the three NAFTA parties signed a
clarification letter regarding fair and equitable treatment in the dispute settlement mecha-
nisms established under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97, at 3.
103 In July 2001, the three NAFTA parties signed a clarification letter regarding fair and
equitable treatment in the dispute settlement mechanisms established under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA. Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97, at 3.
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tion of foreign investors, in that, for example, beneficial changes in envi-
ronmental regulations, equally applicable to foreign and domestic busi-
nesses, can trigger Chapter 11 and force the host government to pay sub-
stantial damages to the foreign investors and even to abandon-or never
to promulgate-such regulations."° Second, the officials agreed to the
addition of actuaries and plant pathologists to the list of 'professionals eligi-
ble to temporarily immigrate into the United States, in accordance with
the recommendation of the NAFTA Temporary Entry Working Group.'05
Finally, the officials agreed to accept the Mutual Recognition Agreement
signed by the accounting professions of the NAFTA partners, designed to
facilitate the recognition of credentials within the three NAFTA countries.1
0 6
104 One case to which critics have pointed is Metalclad v. United Mexican States, 40
I.L.M. 36 (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf. The
case involved Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. company that bought a Mexican toxic-waste
company and planned to build a large waste depository in the State of San Lufs Potosi, in
central Mexico. The Mexican government denied the company permission to operate, as-
serting that the site in which the toxic-waste dump was to be operated was environmentally
sensitive and that geological and hydrological studies had concluded that the area was
unsafe. Prior to this decision, local discontent was evident, and protests, sometimes vio-
lent, had led the company, at least temporarily, to cease operations at the site. Metalclad
argued that the Mexican government was changing the rules and undermining Metalclad's
investment, and sought damages pursuant to Chapter 11. The arbitration panel ordered the
Mexican government to pay $16 million, but the award was partially reduced by a Cana-
dian court. See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 494-95.
In addition to the "hand-tying" effect of Chapter 11, critics cite the Metalclad case as
an example of Chapter 11 and NAFTA, generally, undermining local rights, national sover-
eignty, and governments' ability to regulate the activities of private businesses to protect
the environment and health of their citizens. See Fernando Bejarano Gonzdlez, Investment,
Sovereignty, and the Environment: The Metalclad and NAFTA's Chapter 11, in CONFRONT-
ING GLOBALIZATION, supra note 69, at 17 (arguing that the Metalclad case has grave re-
percussions for the future of municipal and state sovereignty, in Mexico and the Western
Hemisphere as a whole, because similar provisions protecting investors under the FTAA
have been proposed and because democracy is undermined when a foreign corporation can
override the efforts of elected governments to protect the health of its citizens and the in-
tegrity of the environment); see also Murphy, supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the effect that globalization undermines
the role of the nation-state as the sole determinant of a society's well-being); Stiglitz, su-
pra note 39, at 2-3 (reporting that as of January 6, 2004, suits and claims had been filed in
excess of $13 billion).
Critics have also attacked the arbitration process for its lack of transparency. See WISE,
NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 97, at 5; see also Cavanagh & Anderson, supra
note 97, at 3; NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93, at 2.
On the other hand, one might argue that Metalclad demonstrates why Chapter 11 is a
desirable feature of NAFTA. A defender of Chapter 11 might point to the arbitration deci-
sion as an indication that the government was responding to noisy local critics rather than
to sound scientific evidence in denying the company permission to operate and suggest that
exposing governments to the prospect of paying damages for unwarranted regulatory ac-
tions is an excellent way of assuring that the three governments treat foreign companies
fairly. Such fair treatment will give foreign companies confidence to undertake investments
that will generally prove beneficial to the host country.
10 The new categories were to be added to NAFTA's Appendix 1603.D.1. NAFTA
Partners Celebrate Tenth Anniversary, supra note 86, at 4-5.
1
0
6 Id. at 5.
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In November 2003, one month after the NAFTA trade representatives
issued their proposals, the U.S. Trade Representative issued a related fact
sheet. This one-page report reiterated the official view that NAFTA has
helped the Mexican economy by expanding Mexican exports, increasing
wages, decreasing poverty, increasing foreign investment, and strength-
ening the agricultural industry.0 7 The report highlighted that Mexican
exports to the United States and Canada were more than twice as large in
2001 as in 1993, and had grown twice as fast as its exports to non-NAFTA
countries."' 8 This growth amounted to over half the increase in Mexico's
real national income during that period. 109 Exports played an important
role in Mexican employment, as "[o]ne of every five Mexican workers is
employed in export-oriented jobs, and fully half of the 3.5 million new
jobs created in Mexico [from 1995 to 2000] were a result of NAFTA and
export growth.""10 These gains extended to the farm sector as well. Mexico
exported twice as many farm exports in 2001 than in 1993, creating a
small agricultural trade surplus."'
In March 2006, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued an-
other fact sheet reporting that trade and investment flows among the
NAFTA countries had increased substantially."2 Specifically, the fact sheet
stated that trade between the NAFTA countries increased 173% over its
1993 level, to $810 billion in 2005.113 The fact sheet also reports real GDP
growth for NAFTA partners from 1993 to 2005 as: U.S. growth: 48%; Mex-
ico's growth: 40%; and Canada's growth: 49%.114
Thus, the official position seems clear: NAFTA is beneficial to all sig-
natories, and the sweeping NAFTA approach-encompassing trade and
more-is worthy of consolidation and expansion.
B. Assessment of NAFTA's (Mostly Negative) Economic Effects
on Mexico
A more objective evaluation suggests that the official reports discussed
in the preceding section are unduly optimistic. Significant disagreement
exists regarding the impact NAFTA has had on Mexico, but most private
analyses of NAFTA have concluded that NAFTA has not propitiated the
I" Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Myth: NAFTA was a Failure for Mexico
(Nov. 1, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrarylFact-Sheets/2003NAFTA-at 10
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economic benefits that were anticipated and certainly has not delivered
the benefits that NAFTA's supporters hoped for."5 It is too early to assess
the full impact of NAFTA, but even an optimist would concede that the ex-
pectation that Mexico's economy would be significantly strengthened by
NAFTA has not yet been fully realized." 6
In addition to NAFTA, several other factors are potentially responsi-
ble for NAFTA's failure to meet observers' expectations in Mexico. The
change from a government-controlled to a free-trade economy is a major
factor."7 For almost seventy years prior to NAFTA, Mexico was under
the political control of the same party," 8 whose economic policies of pro-
tectionism did not prepare Mexico for the changes it would experience as
a result of its membership in a trilateral free trade agreement with two
economies stronger than its own. 119 In the early to mid-1980s, however,
Mexico began to liberalize its economy using two main components: pri-
vatization of government-owned industries and domestic deregulation. 2 °
Regrettably, these changes were not sufficient to provide the requisite
preparedness for the major changes NAFTA would bring about. There-
fore, it seems that while NAFTA has significantly helped Mexico con-
tinue the economic liberalization initiated in the early 1980s, it has not
helped the public and private sectors respond to the economic, social,
political, and environmental impacts of trading with two of the biggest
economies in the world.' 2' Problems in Mexico's infrastructure, which
inhibit economic growth, might also have caused some of the problems
(and would have done so whether or not NAFTA existed).'22 Finally, the
lack of economic growth might be due in large part to the lack of sufficient
capital for banks to give loans to small businesses. Whereas large trans-
national firms could rely on foreign investment as a source of capital,
smaller domestic firms relied on the Mexican banking system, which was
largely unable to lend in periods of growth. With this shortage of capital,
I" See, e.g., Stephen Herzenberg, Calling Maggie's Bluff: The NAFTA Labor Agree-
ment and the Development of an Alternative to Neoliberalism, CAN.-AM. PUB. POL'Y, Dec.
1, 1996, at 1-39.
116 At the same time, objective analyses recognize that NAFTA has helped Mexico in at
least some ways. See, e.g., Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97; Stracke, supra note 30;
Stiglitz, supra note 39; WISE, NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 97; Wise & Galla-
gher, supra note 97.
"7 ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 382-85.
8 From 1929 to 2000, Mexico was ruled by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
("PRI") [Revolutionary Institutional Party]. Although opposition political parties have been
recognized in Mexico for many years, the PRI maintained control for 70 years prior to the
victory of the Partido Acci6n Nacional ("PAN") [National Action Party] in 2000, with the
election of Vicente Fox. The 2006 presidential election was again won, though not without
controversy, by the PAN candidate, Felipe Calder6n. See supra note 45.
"9 ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 380, 383.
120 Id. at 380.
121 John J. Audley, Introduction to NAFTA's PROMISE AND REALITY, supra note 37, at
5, 6-8.
122 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 2; see also infra notes 231-234.
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While the apparent effects of NAFTA on Mexico's economy have
been mixed, on balance, NAFTA has done more economic harm than good
in its first twelve years. The remainder of this section will discuss impor-
tant economic indicators that reflect trends in the Mexican economy since
NAFTA took effect.
1. Economic Growth
Mexico's economy recorded slower growth in the past quarter cen-
tury than it had in earlier decades, and this slowing seems to have wors-
ened since NAFTA took effect in 1994.124 Per capita growth has been quite
low and negative at times. 125 These figures are discouraging in the abso-
lute and when compared to the robust growth rates of other emerging
economies, most notably China.2 6
In a report published by the Carnegie Institute for International
Peace evaluating the impact of the first ten years of NAFTA on jobs, wages,
and productivity,'27 Sandra Polaski argued that to evaluate the impact of a
123 Matthew Davis, Mexico's Problems: Don't Blame NAFTA, NBER DIG., Sept. 2004,
at 2, 2, available at http://www.nber.org/digest/sep04/w 10289.html.
'24 STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 1, at 23; see also infra note 125.
125 Reported growth figures are not entirely consistent. One respected source reports
that from 1948 to 1973, Mexico's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 3.2%, while be-
tween the early 1980s and 2000, during which the Mexican economy liberalized significantly,
Mexico's GDP grew at an average rate of 0.48% annually; in 2001, an alarming negative
growth of 0.3% was recorded. Wash. Office on Latin America, NAFTA at 10, RIGHTS AND
DEV., Mar. 2004, at 4, available at http://www.wola.org/economic/rights and dev-march
2004.pdf [hereinafter "NAFTA at 10, RIGHTS AND DEv."]. This source puts per capita an-
nual growth from 1994 to 2004 at 1%. Id. Timothy Wise and Kevin Gallagher, who have
written extensively about the effects of NAFTA, report that "[e]conomic growth has been
slow in Mexico-less than one percent per capita per year from 1985-1999-compared
with 3.4% from 1960-1980." Wise & Gallagher, supra note 97, at 2. More ominously, writing
in 2003, Christian Stracke reported overall economic growth of 2.7% per year since NAFTA
took effect in 1994 but balanced this against an increase in the workforce of 2.8% per year,
indicating that workers in Mexico are essentially standing still. Stracke, supra note 30, at
2. Following a 6% decline in 1995, annual growth in per capita GDP was only 2.1% from
1996 to 2003. MARK WEISBROT, ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, GETTING
MEXICO TO GROW WITH NAFTA: THE WORLD BANK'S ANALYSIS 3 (2004), available at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/nafta 2004_i0.pdf. Since NAFTA went into ef-
fect, Mexico has averaged 1.8% real per capita GDP growth. Id. By contrast, throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico had per capita GDP growth frequently exceeding 4% and, in
some years, 7%. Id. In January 2006, the Mexican government predicted a 3% growth rate
for 2006. Jane Bussey, Mexico's Industries Finding It Hard to Compete with China's Low
Wages, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 2006, at G1, G10 (citing the Mexican National
Statistics Institute as a source for the anticipated growth rate).
126 Dr. Stiglitz states that Mexico's per capita growth during the first ten years of
NAFTA was "a bleak 1 percent .... By contrast, in the 10 years of NAFTA, even with the
East Asian crisis, Korean growth averaged 4.3 percent and China 7 percent in per capita
terms." Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 1; see also NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note
83, at 1; infra notes 148-157 and accompanying text.
127 See Polaski, supra note 37.
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free trade agreement on a country's quality of life, one must examine job
loss, job growth, and the quality and wages of those new jobs attributable
to the free trade agreement. Effects on employment are crucial because
employment is the main source of income for most individuals in every
country.'28 Immediately before NAFTA entered into effect, Mexico's la-
bor force was 32.3 million; in 2002, it was 40.2 million; 129 and in 2005, it
was 43.4 million. 3 The rapid growth in the labor force was caused by
two factors: natural growth attributable to Mexico's traditionally high birth
rate, and the growing number of women entering the labor force. Unfor-
tunately, although NAFTA's first decade saw millions of jobs created in
Mexico, this job creation was insufficient to satisfy the country's needs.'
31
This has resulted in more unemployment and underemployment today
than when NAFTA took effect.132 NAFTA has been the subject of criti-
cism in this regard, but it seems equally reasonable to credit NAFTA with
significant job creation, without which the situation would be much worse,
even if such creation was not sufficient to meet the growing demand.
3
Finally, as the following discussion indicates, NAFTA's effects on employ-
ment vary markedly from one sector of the Mexican economy to another.
1
21 1d. at 11.
129 Id. at 14 (citing analyses of data obained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Geografla e Informdtica ("INEGI") [Mexican National Institute of Statistics, Geography,
and Informatics] and the Secretaria de Trabajo y Provisidn Social ("STEPS") [Ministry of
Employment and Social Insurance]).
130 Eighteen percent of the labor force is found in agriculture, 24% in industry, and
58% in services. CIA, Mexico, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2005), available at https://www.
cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mx.html.
131 "Approximately one million new workers enter the labor force annually; however,
the Mexican economy typically creates only about half as many new jobs." LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, MEXICO PROFILE 16 (2005), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cslprofiles/
Mexico.pdf.
132 The 2005 unemployment rate was estimated at 3.6%, and the estimated underem-
ployment rate was 25%. CIA, Mexico, supra note 130. However, Mexico's unemployment
rates are deceptively low. Two factors explain this situation. First, Mexican figures exclude
persons who would be counted as unemployed under the method followed in the United
States. Second, Mexico's definition of "employed" includes a large number of people
working in the informal economy, who have unstable, marginal jobs, such as street vending
or non-remunerated work in family businesses in which they may work only a few hours
per day or per week. Fleck & Sorrentino, supra note 40, at 3-4; see also Gary Martin,
Employment and Underemployment in Mexico in the 1990s, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov.
2000, at 3, 4-11.
131 It is also entirely possible that NAFTA is less important, for good or ill, than other
economic factors in the creation or loss of jobs. For example, the emergence of China as an
economic giant has affected Mexico's economy significantly because, to a considerable
degree, China has displaced Mexico as a preferred location for low-cost labor and produc-
tion. See infra note 151.
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a. Manufacturing Employment
During NAFTA's first twelve years, Mexico has seen significant growth
in its manufactured exports, 34 but manufacturing employment has fallen
short of expectations.'35 Relevant statistics are published by the Mexican
government, but their value is somewhat limited because they do not in-
clude small employers in an increasingly important sector of the Mexican
economy: the informal sector. 3 6 The situation is further complicated be-
cause the Mexican government tracks manufacturing activity, including
employment, by means of two separate data surveys. M These government
surveys indicate that non-maquiladora manufacturing employment in
Mexico fell by approximately 100,000 jobs from 1994 to 2003, excluding
employment in the informal sector.'38 This decline in manufacturing em-
ployment was triggered, at least in part, by a recession in the United States,
because business cycles in the United States significantly affect Mexico's
economy. 9
However, the rise in employment in maquiladoras more than offset
this decline in non-maquiladora employment. This was a surprising and
favorable development, given that some had expressed concern that ma-
quiladoras might decline in importance as the special tariff advantages
these border producers had enjoyed were extended to the entire country
114 Mexico's exports, including manufacturing exports, have grown in absolute terms
and as a share of total world trade. See Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid et al., NAFTA and the
Mexican Economy: A Look Back on a Ten-Year Relationship, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 997, 1003-10 (2005); Geraldo Vdzquez G6mez, The Liberalisation of Financial Ser-
vices in Mexico and its Relation with NAFTA, MEFTA AND GATS, 11 L. & Bus. REV. AM.
49, 64-65 (2005) (discussing the increase in volume of trade from Mexico to the United
States and Canada); see also NAFTA at 10, RIGHTS AND DEV., supra note 125, at 4;
STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 1, at 23.
'35 See Bussey, supra note 125; see also STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 1, at 23.
136 Polaski, supra note 37, at 14 (scope of government surveys). One recent study, pub-
lished as part of the U.S. Library of Congress' Country Study series, describes the workers
of the informal sector as follows:
Informal-sector workers are self-employed or work in small firms (during 1993,
businesses with one to five employees accounted for 42 percent of the urban work-
force). They face considerable job instability, and, unlike those in the formal sec-
tor, are effectively excluded from IMSS [Social Security] benefits. The informal
sector includes street vendors, domestic servants, pieceworkers in small estab-
lishments, and most construction workers.
Dennis M. Hanratty, The Society and Its Environment, in MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY 77,
101 (Tim L. Merrill & Ram6n Mir6 eds., 4th ed. 1997). See infra notes 183-191 and ac-
companying text for additional discussion of informal sector employment.
"I One report, which accounts for the bulk of industrial production, covers large and
medium-sized manufacturing employers but excludes maquiladoras, which are covered in
a separate survey. Neither survey, of course, covers the informal economy. Polaski, supra
note 37, at 14 n.5 (citing INEGI and Encuesta Industrial Mensual [Monthly Industrial
Survey]).
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by NAFTA.'" Maquiladoras created about 800,000 jobs between 1994
and 2001, after which the Mexican economy slowed. Nonetheless, in No-
vember 2003 maquiladoras employed approximately 550,000 more workers
than they did before NAFTA.141 While these figures are encouraging, this
employment growth should not be attributed entirely to NAFTA. The de-
valuation of the peso in 1994-1995 may have had a more significant im-
pact on the growth of Mexican exports of manufactured goods to the
United States than all NAFTA-related tariff changes combined.
42
The sharp growth in manufactured exports, 43 accompanied by com-
paratively slow growth in manufacturing employment is difficult to un-
derstand, and productivity gains provide only a partial explanation. Be-
cause productivity measures the output per unit of labor, sharp increases
in production can be achieved without corresponding increases in employ-
ment and can even be sustained in the face of declining employment if
40 The maquiladora sector of the Mexican economy may yet decline. Dr. Polaski
wrote in 2003 that "[miany observers expect maquiladoras' share of Mexico's manufac-
tured exports to continue to decline over time." Id.
"I' Id. at 15-16. Other sources report that job growth after 1996 reached its highest
level in 2000, as employment in maquiladoras attributed to NAFTA reached 1.3 million.
NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93, at 1. However, because many maquilado-
ras at the border, particularly those involved in textiles and apparel, moved to China,
300,000 of the 700,000 new maquiladora jobs created during NAFTA's first seven years
were eliminated between 2000 and 2003. Id. Developments in 2005 relating to China's
position as a major exporter of textiles and apparel may help Mexico in this regard, how-
ever. After facing decades of international quotas imposed on its garments, China enjoyed
a period of a few months of unrestricted access to its richest trading partners. In January
2005, the WTO ended all quotas that restricted developing countries' exports of textiles
and apparel. Analysts predicted that China (and a few other countries) will dominate the
global market within a few years. Press Release, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace,
Despite Quota Expiration, Vulnerable Developing Countries Can Compete in the Apparel
Industry (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=17536&prog=zgp&proj=zted. China's unrestricted access to the
United States has ended, however, at least temporarily. After months of negotiations, on
November 8, 2005, the United States and China signed an agreement restricting Chinese
clothing and textile exports to the United States until 2008. Mei Fong, China, U.S. Sign
Three-Year Pact on Textile Trade, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2005, at A14.
142 Polaski, supra note 37, at 16 (citing U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF
TRADE AGREEMENTS: EFFECT OF THE TOKYO ROUND, U.S.-ISRAEL FTA, U.S.-CANADA FTA,
NAFTA AND THE URUGUAY ROUND ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (2003), available at http://www.
usitc.gov/3621/pub3621.pdf). The findings of the USITC's study indicate that tariff cuts
under NAFTA may account for the addition of 250,000 jobs in maquiladora and non-
maquiladora export manufacturing, and that the devaluation of the peso, lower transporta-
tion costs, and other factors may account for the rest of the growth. Id.; see also Chiang-
feng Lin, Investment in Mexico: A Springboard Toward the NAFTA Market-An Asian
Perspective, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 73, 79-81, 81 nn.34-35 (1996). Mr. Lin
explains that in response to the increasing current account deficit and the decreasing inflow
of capital, which was making Mexico's economy even more vulnerable than it already was
in 1994, the Mexican government decided to devalue the peso to adjust account deficits.
The goal of devaluation was to reduce imports of goods and services by making them more
expensive, and, at the same time, to increase exports of Mexican products by making them
cheaper and thus more attractive abroad. Id.
143 See NAFTA Partners Celebrate Tenth Anniversary, supra note 86 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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the labor force's productivity is increasing. However, while productivity
gains would limit job growth, the productivity growth experienced in
Mexico in the 1990s was rather modest and cannot fully explain the slow
growth of manufacturing employment."
A significant part of the explanation for the seemingly inconsistent
trends in manufacturing exports and manufacturing employment may come
from the nature of Mexican enterprises in the chain of production. Export
manufacturing in Mexico tends to be based on a production model in which
component parts are imported to Mexico for processing or assembly and
then re-exported. This model provides only limited benefit for the econ-
omy at large because the Mexican businesses that might have been ex-
pected to be manufacturing and supplying these component parts and mate-
rials are, in fact, not part of the export manufacturing process. This fact
limits the "multiplier effect" of any growth in exports. 45 This problem is
particularly severe in the maquiladora manufacturing sector, in which 97%
of component parts are imported and only 3% are produced in Mexico,
but it is found in non-maquiladora manufacturing as well. 46 If Mexico
could shift its export manufacturing production to a model in which Mexican
businesses represented a more significant part of the chain of production, the
gains from growth in the manufacture of goods for export would spill over
into other areas of the economy and create substantially more employ-
ment for Mexicans.
The question is not merely how beneficial, or how detrimental, NAFTA
has been to overall manufacturing employment. NAFTA cuts both ways,
and affects different industries quite differently. Even if NAFTA has re-
144 Polaski, supra note 37, at 16; see also WISE, NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES, supra note
97, at 2.
145 Polaski, supra note 37, at 16. The economic principle of the "multiplier" explains
the chain reaction or magnified impact of a component of a process. For example, if money
is invested for the construction of a building, that investment will benefit not just the par-
ties directly connected to the transaction, such as architects, engineers, construction com-
panies, material suppliers, and their employees. These recipients of the initial investment
will spend money themselves, which will benefit those from whom they purchase goods or
services. So, the initial level of investment benefits others at secondary and tertiary levels,
and thus is "multiplied." ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED:
EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW THE ECONOMY WORKS AND WHERE IT'S
GOING 96-97 (1998). Applying this principle to the model of export manufacturing pro-
duction followed in Mexico, the exports manufacturing sector of the economy does not
reach secondary and tertiary levels of employment because Mexican manufacturers of compo-
nent parts, who would employ additional workers, are left out of the manufacturing proc-
ess.
146 For example, during 2002, maquiladoras produced $78 billion in exports, nearly
two-thirds of which was from American parts assembled in Mexico and re-exported to the
United States. NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93, at 1. This export manufac-
turing model in Mexico can generate only limited employment for unskilled/low-skilled
workers and even less for higher-skilled workers, such as researchers, engineers, designers,
and accountants. In 2000, the proportion of skilled workers in the manufacturing sector
was only 9.9%, less than the 13.9% average share of skilled workers in the overall econ-
omy. "Skilled" for these purposes denotes a worker with at least thirteen years of formal
education. Polaski, supra note 37, at 16-17.
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suited in a net improvement in manufacturing employment in Mexico,
some products manufactured in Mexico before NAFTA have been dis-
placed by imports, and in such instances Mexican manufacturing jobs
have been lost.147
The United States' decision to enter into free trade agreements with
other developing countries is likely to negatively impact Mexico's manu-
facturing sector. When Mexico entered into a free trade agreement with
the United States, Mexico was in the unique position of being the first
low-wage, developing country to do so. Since then, the United States has
signed (or has initiated negotiations for) free trade agreements with sev-
eral other low-wage countries in and outside the Western Hemisphere.
48
These free trade agreements can be expected to hurt Mexico because they
dilute the advantage of Mexico's low wages.
The admission of more countries into the World Trade Organization
("WTO") will also negatively affect Mexico. In this regard, the WTO's 2001
admission of Chinaa 9 -which has wages even lower than those of Mex-
ico'l--is of great significance. China's membership in the WTO has cre-
ated tremendous competition for Mexico's manufactured exports,'51 par-
ticularly in sectors that are labor-intensive, such as textile and clothing.5 2
Mexico has already seen the effects of competition from China for
low-wage jobs. The U.S. recession experienced during 2000 and 2001
resulted in a downturn in maquiladora production and increased unem-
1
47 Id. at 17.
148 Since 2001, the U.S. Congress has approved free trade agreements with twelve coun-
tries: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Singapore. In addition, the United States
has initiated free trade agreement negotiations with the following countries: Botswana,
Ecuador, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Malaysia, Namibia, Panama, South Africa, Swaizi-
land, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Opening Markets for Growth: The U.S. FTA Agenda, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document
Library/FactSheets/2006/asset uploadfile289_9645.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
19 Joseph Kahn, World Trade Organization Admits China, Amid Doubts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2001, at A16.
150 YaVonda Smalls, U.S., China Tied in Growth; Speakers Focus on Convergence of
Nations' Economies, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Ind.), Nov. 10, 2006, at CIO ("In the United
States, the average hourly wage is about $16. In Mexico, it's $4. In China, it's an average
of 50 cents.").
"I In 2004, China displaced Mexico as the second-ranking exporter to the United
States, and trade experts predict that China will replace Canada as the number one supplier
to the United States by 2007. Bussey, supra note 125, at GI. In 2003, China became Mex-
ico's second-largest trading partner, after the United States, but China and Mexico have
one of the most unequal trade relationships in the world. For example, in 2004, China ex-
ported $14 billion worth of goods to Mexico, but it bought only $400 million of Mexican
goods. China is also a significant competitor with regard to foreign investment, as is evi-
denced by the significant number of companies that have set up (or moved from Mexico)
their operations to China because wages in China are about one-fourth of what they are in
Mexico. Id. at G10; see also infra note 153 and accompanying text. The head of the Asian
trade relations department of the Mexican Ministry of the Economy has stated that while
NAFTA gave Mexico an advantage for some time, the high point of Mexican exports was
in 2000. Id.; see also Polaski, supra note 37, at 17.
152 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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ployment. When production levels were restored, the production had been
relocated to China and other countries. In many cases, this meant that
jobs were permanently lost with the closure of maquiladora plants-particu-
larly those manufacturing clothing and textiles.153
At least two factors have contributed to this situation. First, in 2005,
wages in Mexican maquiladoras were much higher (paying approximately
$2.00 to $2.50 per hour) than for similar work in China. Second, inefficien-
cies in Mexican manufacturing processes, such as a high degree of em-
ployee turnover, could not be overlooked since the peso began to appre-
ciate in 1999, which has led to effective production cost increases of up
to 30%.154 Thus, although almost 800,000 maquiladora jobs were created
from 1994 to 2001, the more important indicator for the future may be the
loss of 280,000 jobs (a 21% drop) between 2000 and 2002. "1 Nobel lau-
reate Joseph Stiglitz argued that the difficulties Mexico is experiencing
are not surprising because problems in its infrastructure prevent it from
meeting the intense competition from China. 56 Regrettably, resolution of
these problems in the short term seems unlikely. In giving a rather pessi-
mistic (but realistic) assessment, Dr. Stiglitz argued that Mexico's low
tax base, low investment in education and technology, and high degree of
economic inequality make it difficult for Mexico to compete with China. 157
In summary, two things can be said about Mexican manufacturing
employment since 1994. First, employment has increased under NAFTA,
a favorable development aided by NAFTA, but for which NAFTA may
not be the principal cause. Second, the future of the sector does not seem
bright, at least in the near term, but NAFTA seems to bear little or no blame
for this problem.
b. Agricultural Employment
While NAFTA may be responsible for an increase in manufacturing
employment, it seems almost certain that it is responsible for the loss of
"I See, e.g., NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93, at 1; Cavanagh & Ander-
son, supra note 97, at 6 (noting that nearly 500 maquiladoras closed between January 2001
and March 2002, in part because their operations were relocated to Asia). See generally
Xinchen Sofia Lou, Challenging China's Fixed Exchange Rate Regime: An Analysis of U.S.
Options, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 455,459-60 (2005).
'14 Ellen Israel Rosen, The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade Organization and the
Race to the Bottom, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 261, 267-68 (2005).
151 Id. at 267; see also NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93; Cavanagh &
Anderson, supra note 97; Polaski, supra note 37, at 16; ROBERT MANNING, CTR. FOR IM-
MIGRATION STUDIES, FIVE YEARS AFTER NAFTA: RHETORIC AND REALITY OF MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2000), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/
naftareport.pdf.
156 Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 2.
"I Id. Dr. Stiglitz argued that while NAFTA gave Mexico a trading advantage, it did
not help Mexico in becoming an independently producing economy. Id. See also Bussey,
supra note 125, at G10.
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millions of jobs in the agricultural sector since 1994,58 which is significant,
considering that almost 20% of the Mexican population still works in
agriculture.'59 In 1993, the year before NAFTA entered into force, 8.1
million Mexicans were employed in agriculture; by the end of 2002, the
number had declined by more than 15% to 6.8 million, a loss of 1.3 mil-
lion jobs."6 When NAFTA took effect, agriculture employed one Mexi-
can worker in four; by 2002, the figure was closer to one in six. 16' Mexico
ran a net trade deficit in agricultural products with the United States for
several years preceding NAFTA; under NAFTA, the deficit has increased
in dollar terms but has fallen sharply as a percentage of the total volume
of trade.162 One scholar argues that such a trade deficit runs counter to the
generally accepted proposition that agricultural liberalization is good for
a developing country that has entered into a free trade agreement with a
developed country.
163
A number of factors contributed to create this loss in agricultural
jobs, including Mexico's trade liberalization through free trade agree-
ments besides NAFTA and the stabilization of the peso following the de-
valuation crisis of 1994- 199 5 ."6 However, it seems that NAFTA is the
158 Although an accurate figure is difficult to report, the consensus is that millions of
farmers have lost their jobs since NAFTA became effective. Estimates range from 1.5 mil-
lion, NAFTA at 10, RIGHTS AND DEV., supra note 125, to over 2.8 million, Maria Dickerson,
Placing Blame for Mexico's Ills, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at C l (citing Mexican govern-
ment statistics). Thus, according to the Mexican government, Mexico has lost more than
four times as many agriculture jobs since 1994 as it has gained in export manufacturing
jobs, which translates to 30% of its farm jobs. As a result, 2.8 million farmers and their
dependents have left their fields and have moved to cities in Mexico or have migrated to
the United States. Id.
159 See CIA, Mexico, supra note 130.
160 Elaine Levine, Integration From Below: Mexicans and Other Latinos in the U.S.
Labor Market, 47 PAPELES DE POBLACI6N 28, 34 (2006) (Mex.). It is difficult to estimate
the number of agricultural jobs lost since NAFTA took effect because a consistent survey
for the whole period is not available. Mexico's Encuesta Nacional de Empleo [Survey of
National Employment] for 1991 to 1998 reports a decrease of 372,390 jobs, and the survey
for 1993 to 2003 reports a decrease of 728,630 jobs. These surveys include employment
activity in the fishing industry as well. Robert A. Blecker, The North American Economies
after NAFTA: A Critical Appraisal, 33 INT'L J. POL. ECON. 5, 7 n.14 (2005).
161 Agricultural workers amounted to 25.7% of the labor force in 1993 but only 17.3%
in 2002. Polaski, supra note 37, at 24. In 2005, the agricultural sector employed 18%. CIA,
Mexico, supra note 130.
162 In 1993, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico amounted to $3,618.3 million and U.S.
agricultural imports from Mexico to $2,718.5 million, thus creating a trade deficit for Mex-
ico of $899.8 million. In 2005, the figures for the same trade indicators were $9,362.3 million
and $8,333 million, respectively, thus creating a $1,029.3 million deficit for Mexico. Mex-
ico is the second-largest agricultural market for the United States, and the United States is
Mexico's largest agricultural market. Two-way agricultural trade between the United States
and Mexico increased 150% from $6.3 billion in 1993 to $15.7 billion in 2005. See U.S. Dep't
of Agric., Benefits of NAFTA PowerPoint Presentation (May 2005), http://www.fas.usda.
gov/itp/policy/nafta/nafta.asp (scroll down and select View a Benefits of NAFTA PowerPoint
Presentation).
163 Polaski, supra note 37, at 17.
164 Initially, the 1994-1995 peso devaluation helped Mexico's trade position because
Mexican exports became cheaper (in dollars or other foreign currencies) and Mexican imports
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most significant factor, in large part because Mexico reduced its agricul-
tural tariffs for the United States much more than it did for other trading
partners. 6 In addition, NAFTA's agricultural trade liberalization has made it
difficult for Mexican farmers to compete with American agricultural prod-
ucts, which are more efficiently produced and are also highly subsidized
by the U.S. government.' 66
Whatever the economic reality, the important political effect is that
hundreds of thousands of Mexican farmers who have lost their jobs place
the blame entirely on increased competition from the United States, which is
made possible by NAFTA. As a result, Mexico has seen more farmer un-
rest in the last twelve years than it had in a long time. Farmers have pro-
tested against a variety of agricultural imports from the United States and
have demanded a renegotiation of NAFTA's agricultural trade provi-
sions. 167 Mexican farmers' discontent with NAFTA became evident as far
back as January 1, 1994, the day NAFTA entered into force, r16 and continues
today. Mexico's national organization of basic grain farmers ("ANEC")
and the State Coalition of Coffee Producers of Oaxaca ("CEPCO") 169 are
two of the most vocal farmer groups that have called for a renegotiation
of NAFTA's agricultural provisions. 70
Although these two groups are affected by free trade in different ways,
they have united forces.7' to protest the job losses farmers have experi-
enced and the resulting impoverished conditions under which they live.
became more expensive (in pesos). This enabled Mexico to achieve a surplus in agricul-
tural trade with the United States in 1995 and agricultural employment increased. Once the
peso stabilized, however, the trade relationship reverted to a deficit, and agricultural em-
ployment again declined. Polaski, supra note 37, at 20. For a discussion of the impact of
the peso devaluation on employment as whole, see Lin, supra note 142.
165 Polaski, supra note 37, at 20.
66 Id. at 17; WISE, NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 97, at 2.
167 Mexican demonstrators have blockaded the border, put cows in front of the Mexi-
can Congress, and rode horses into it. Allan Wall, NAFTA Negatives: American Agribusi-
ness Displacing Mexican Peasants, (Jan. 14, 2003), http://www.vdare.com/awall/nafta.htm.
168 See Vargas, supra note 76 and accompanying text. The severe poverty that provoked
the Chiapas Rebellion on January 1, 1994, continues today. Imports of agricultural prod-
ucts have driven prices of crops in Chiapas to alarming lows, particularly for corn and
beans. At the same time, government crop subsidies and supports have decreased. As a
result, farmers in Chiapas must spend more to grow crops like corn than they can make
selling them. Therefore, most farmers now farm only a small section of their land to grow
sufficient corn and beans to survive. To earn cash they work for farmers in the region who
are better off than they are or migrate to northern Mexico or the United States. James
McKinley, Jr., Where Poverty Drove Zapatistas, the Living is No Easier, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2005, at 12.
169 Oaxaca is a state in the southwest of Mexico and is home to many of Mexico's cof-
fee growers.
70 WISE, NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 97, at 2. Although farmers have not
won the battle concerning the renegotiation of NAFTA's provisions on agriculture, their
movement has resulted in increased commitments to rural development by the Mexican
government. Id. at 4.
171 The membership numbers of each of these associations are significant: 180,000 grain
farmers and 30,000 coffee growers. Id. at 2.
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NAFTA affects grain farmers more significantly, because they produce prin-
cipally for the domestic market and are, therefore, more directly affected
by imports of American agricultural products. Coffee farmers, by contrast,
produce for export and do not face competition from American coffee.7 2
Mexican growers of grain, particularly corn, have been most affected. 73
This is unfortunate because production of basic grains is crucial to Mexi-
can farmers. Corn is particularly important because it is the key ingredi-
ent in the Mexican diet, and it is also the principal source of subsistence
for millions of Mexicans. 174 Between 1999 and 2001, Mexican corn was sold
in Mexico at prices 30% or more below production costs because of compe-
tition from imported American corn, which between 1993 and 2000 had an
eighteenfold increase.'75 The view of the U.S. trade representative is that
U.S. exports of corn to Mexico should not create a problem for Mexican
farmers because most corn sold by the United States to Mexico is yellow
corn, which is used predominantly as livestock feed, while white corn,
which represents the majority of corn grown by Mexican farmers, is used
for human consumption. 7 6 Over the last few years, this has resulted in
large demonstrations by farmers who advocate the exclusion-or at least
the restriction-of imports of corn and beans, for which no tariffs will exist
by the year 2008.'17 Because corn and beans are staples in the Mexican
diet, farmers argue that increased imports of these products will exacerbate




174 See Josefina Aranda Bezaury, Peasant Farmers in the Global Economy: The State
Coalition of Coffee Producers of Oaxaca, in CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION, supra note
69, at 149; Olivia Acufia Rodarte, Toward an Equitable, Inclusive, and Sustainable Agri-
culture: Mexico's Basic Grains Producers Unite, in CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION, supra
note 69, at 129.
75 Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97, at 2. American corn exports to Mexico tri-
pled from 1996 to 2006 and in 2006 amounted to one-fifth of the corn consumed in Mex-
ico. Monica Campbell & Tyche Hendricks, Mexico's Corn Farmers See Their Livelihoods
Wither Away, Cheap U.S. Produce Pushes Down Prices Under Free Trade Pact, S.F CHRON.,
July 31, 2006 at A4.
176 See Myth: NAFTA was a Failure for Mexico, supra note 107.
177 Laura Carlsen, NAFTA Minus (May 9, 2003), http://www.irc-online.org/content/1854
(describing tariff reduction schedule); Scott Bury, Maize Farmers Unhappy with NAFTA's
Price, TRIO: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE N. AM. COMM'N. FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, Winter
2004, available at http://www.cec.org/trio/stories/index.cfm?ed= 12&ID=143&varlan=
english (writing about a 2002 farmer demonstration in Mexico City in which protesters
carried signs saying "NAFTA Equals Death" and declared that they were participating in
the demonstration out of desperation, because they were poorer then than they had ever
been before); Sara Miller Llana, Battle Escalates Over Cheap U.S. Corn Popping into Mexico,
USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2006, at 6B.
1
7 8 But cf NORBERT FIESS & DANIEL LEIDERMAN, MEXICAN CORN: THE EFFECTS OF
NAFTA (World Bank Group Trade Note No. 18, 2004) (arguing that NAFTA is not respon-
sible for the poverty reflected in subsistence agriculture because the decline of Mexican
corn prices was a long-term trend that preceded NAFTA, and that the price differential in
the U.S.-Mexico corn producer price did not change significantly after 1994), available at
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In summary, NAFTA's net effect on agricultural employment in Mexico
appears to have been significantly negative. Poor farmers have become
poorer as subsidized American agricultural products have flooded the Mexi-
can market, lowering the price of domestic agricultural products. 7 9 Rural
communities, which employ about 25% of the population of Mexico 8 '
and are home to approximately 75% of Mexico's poor,'8 ' have been dev-
astated. '82
c. Service Employment
As workers in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors have become
unemployed, they have sought jobs in other economic sectors. Unfortu-
nately, because the population of working-age Mexicans exceeds the number
of available jobs, many of these displaced workers have been unable to find
jobs locally and have had to seek jobs elsewhere. Millions have immi-
grated into the United States seeking (and finding) jobs. Other displaced
workers work principally in low-pay, low-productivity jobs in the Mexi-
can service sector, such as domestic work, street vending, and personal
services and repairs.'83 As a result, the informal sector of the Mexican econ-
omy'84 has grown significantly and may keep growing, as more and more
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/TradeNote 18.pdf;
Bury, supra note 177 (arguing that Mexico's corn crisis can be traced to the country's ac-
cession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986, when policies that had
ensured a basic price support for corn were dismantled).
"9 STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 1, at 23.
180 Id. at 24; see also NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93.
'1 STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 1, at 24. Ejidos (communal farms) constitute
56% of arable land and 70% of the forests in Mexico (103 million hectares). Until 1992,
land in the ejidos could not be sold, which precluded land investments that could have
increased productivity. This resulted in significant rural poverty throughout the 29,162 ejidos,
but in 1992, the Mexican Constitution was amended to permit privatization of communal
land holdings. NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 93, at 1. Regrettably, this ejido
reform was not sufficient to help Mexican farmers meet the challenges created by NAFTA's
free trade. MANNING, supra note 155, at 11-12. Although more private ownership of land
may be seen in 2006 than prior to 1992, it is impossible for Mexican farmers to compete
with imports of American agricultural products because most Mexican farmers work their
land and produce crops by using methods and equipment American farmers used in the early
nineteenth century. The result is impoverished conditions for Mexican farmers.
182 The fate of small subsistence farmers in their own local markets in developing coun-
tries as a result of global trade has not been discussed in recent trade negotiations. Sandra
Polaski, In Agricultural Trade Talks, First Do No Harm, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECH., Fall
2005, at 27, available at http://www.issues.org/22.1/p-polaski.html. Polaski argues that
this question is probably the most important factor in the ultimate determination of
whether trade negotiations result in growth and opportunity for poor farmers in developing
countries instead of increased poverty. Id. Finally, she concludes that it is in the interest of
the United States and other wealthy countries to address this question because the need for
global stability and security, the perspective of the international community of the benefits
of globalization, and the economic self-interest of wealthy countries are at stake. Id.
83 Polaski, supra note 37, at 15.
114 See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a description of the informal em-
ployment sector in Mexico.
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marginal, unskilled workers lose their jobs. While it is encouraging that
these displaced workers have found a way to make at least a marginal
living, their contribution is not very helpful to the Mexican economy be-
cause the unskilled work available in the informal sector consists of low
value-added jobs that do not increase productivity rates. Low productiv-
ity rates tend to keep wages down, which, in turn, prevent Mexicans from
having sufficient disposable income to become active consumers and to
stimulate the economy.
NAFTA's direct impact on service employment has been limited. In
contrast to manufactured and agricultural goods, the types of services pro-
vided by the vast majority of service workers are not traded across na-
tional boundaries to a significant degree.185 NAFTA's effect on service sector
employment in Mexico has been primarily indirect in that this sector has
absorbed most of the agricultural workers whose jobs have been elimi-
nated 18 6 because of, or at least since, NAFTA's enactment in 1994.
The benefit to the national economy of this shift in employment has
been limited. First, many of the new service workers are displaced agri-
cultural workers with few skills, all of which are tied to agricultural work.
When these workers are displaced, they must fill some of the lowest-skilled
jobs in the service sector, at correspondingly low pay. Second, the increase
in service employment reflects, in large part, the absence of a system of
unemployment compensation. Persons who become unemployed thus have
a high incentive to find some sort of work, and the informal, unskilled
service sector provides substantial possibilities, such as domestic work,
washing cars, or selling wares in the streets.'87
' The dollar volume of internationally traded services is great relative to the impact
of international trade on service jobs because the services most involved in international
trade are predominantly those with high value added, such as law, banking, accounting,
engineering, architecture, and telecommunications. By contrast, employment in low-skill
jobs with low value added, such as washing cars, is virtually never the subject of interna-
tional trade. Unfortunately, most Mexican service workers are in low-skill jobs.
On the other hand, the economic policies that NAFTA helped to solidify, including the
economic policies of neo-liberalism adopted by the Mexican government in the early
1980s, seem to have directly contributed to the significant growth of the informal economy,
which includes service employment. Specifically, the principal components of Mexico's
policy of economic restructuring-privatization of industries fully or partially owned by
the government, movement toward a free-market economy, and reduction in subsidies and
other domestic regulation-directly or indirectly resulted in millions of Mexicans losing
their jobs. See John C. Cross, Co-optation, Competition, and Resistance: State and Street
Vendors in Mexico City, LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES, Mar. 1998, at 41, 41-43; see also ZAMORA
ET AL., supra note 47, at 380 (describing Mexico's economic policies during the 1980s).
Regrettably, the Mexican economy was not prepared for the number of economic disloca-
tions these policies created and has been unable to provide sufficient job growth to meet
the demand created by the millions of people who have become unemployed. See supra
note 131-132 and accompanying text.
186 Polaski, supra note 37, at 24.
187 Analysts disagree as to the reasons for the tremendous increase of street vendors in
the last ten to twelve years. Free market economists argue that Mexico has not gone far
enough in opening and reforming its economy despite the removal of trade barriers
throughout the Western Hemisphere. Opponents of globalization, by contrast, argue that
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Because many service jobs are in the informal economy, one of the
effects of NAFTA has been the growth of the already large informal econ-
omy. The growth of this sector-which now appears to account for at
least a third of the jobs in Mexico'88-is problematic. For the millions of
individuals who work in the informal economy, the wages tend to be low and
social benefits, such as health care or pensions, are nonexistent. From the
government's perspective, a huge fraction of the economy is off the books,
which results in at least two significant adverse consequences: a decrease
in tax revenues 89 and more opportunities for official corruption. 190
free trade agreements have destroyed farmlands and forced a mass migration of Mexicans
from rural areas to the cities, in search of any work they can find. Maria Dickerson, Mex-
ico's Boom All on the Sly, SEATTLE TIMES, May 25, 2002, at A22. Regardless of the force
driving the significant increase in street vendors, unemployed Mexicans view street vend-
ing as an option to make a living, the way their ancestors probably did. The practice of
street or sidewalk vending started in Mexico during pre-Colombian times, when indige-
nous farmers and merchants came from afar to sell their wares in open-air markets in the
ancient capital city of Tenochtitlan, now Mexico City. Robert M. Kossick, Jr., Modernizing
Mexico's Tax Administration: The Development, Implementation and Impact of the E-SAT,
10 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 81, 107 (2004) [hereinafter Modernizing Mexico].
188 Levels of employment in the service sector are particularly difficult to quantify with
precision because such a large percentage of service workers is in the informal economy.
Nonetheless, 2003 estimates ranged from 33%, CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION, supra note
69, at 2, to 46%, Polaski, supra note 37, at 21. Reports published in 2005 indicate that an
estimated 500,000 street vendors operate in Mexico City, and that the number of street
vendors rose 40% from 2000 to 2003 to more than 1.6 million. The Mexican government
estimates that more than 11 million Mexicans, about one-fourth of the workforce, work in
the informal economy. Dickerson, supra note 187. Also in 2005, one of the three major
Mexican newspapers reported that the "underground economy," which includes street ven-
dors, accounted for 30% of Mexico's GDP and is the sole source of income for almost one-
fourth of the population of Mexico. The newspaper also reported that up to 25 million
street vendors operate throughout Mexico, of which more than 1.25 million are in Mexico
City. Street Vendors Pledge to Pay One Mexican Peso a Day to Stay in Business, EL UNI-
VERSAL, July 25, 2005, at A11. In fact, between 2000 and 2004, the underground economy
was responsible for all of Mexico's employment growth. Maria Dickerson, Mexico Runs on
Sidewalk Economy, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at I [hereinafter Sidewalk Economy].
189 The government is hampered by its substantial inability to tax the large informal
economy. Mexico has been compared to Sri Lanka with regard to its collection of revenue
to pay for basic public services, education, and infrastructure. This situation significantly
hurts Mexico's global competitiveness, notwithstanding the fact that it has one of the
world's fifteen largest economies. Dickerson, supra note 187. It is estimated that 55% to
57% of Mexico's economically productive workers participate in the informal economy.
Very few of these individuals pay taxes, which undermines the government's ability to
provide such significant services as education. The OECD has described Mexico's informal
economy as a "major complicating factor" in the administration of Mexico's tax system.
Modernizing Mexico, supra note 187, at 108-09. The Mexican government loses an esti-
mated 61 billion pesos (approximately $5.5 billion) annually in tax revenue to the informal
economy. In addition to administrative difficulties in taxing the informal economy, the
government has encountered political obstacles as well. Robert M. Kossick, Jr., Mexico's
Emerging E-Government Program: The Role of the Internet in Promoting Economic De-
velopment, Democratic Governance, and the Rule of Law, 8 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 141,
153 n.44 (2003) [hereinafter Mexico's Emerging E-Government].
190 The growth in the number of street vendors as a segment of the Mexican economy
arguably has been made possible by political decisions of the Mexican government. Some
argue that the government has condoned this situation for decades by being indifferent to
the growing numbers of participants in the informal economy, particularly street vendors,
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In summary, service sector employment has grown significantly, at
least in part due to NAFTA, but this growth is not entirely beneficial to
Mexico. When coupled with the modest, and perhaps temporary, gains in
manufacturing employment, and the significant and likely permanent
losses in agricultural employment-both of which are, to a considerable ex-
tent, likely attributable to NAFTA-the overall employment picture is not
encouraging. Of particular concern is the large percentage of the Mexi-
can workforce employed in the service sector'9 ' and in the informal econ-
omy as a whole. This employment sector prevents economic growth, be-
cause most individuals participating in the informal economy are low-skilled
or unskilled workers. This economic state of affairs results in low productiv-
ity, low wages, low consumer consumption, and, overall, low economic
activity.
2. Real Wages and Productivity
a. Disappointing Figures During NAFTA's First Twelve Years
A consideration of the closely related matters of productivity and real
wages in the Mexican economy is crucial in any evaluation of NAFTA.
While productivity has seen some growth since 1994, perhaps as a result
of NAFTA, real wages for Mexicans have not increased as was hoped. Real
wages, in fact, were lower in 2003 than in 1994, but the peso crisis of 1994-
1995, not NAFTA, may have triggered this decline. 9 2 Yet, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the unprecedented growth in trade as a result of
NAFTA has had a favorable impact on at least some manufacturing wages,
particularly those tied to exports.
193
The gains anticipated by those who supported NAFTA's formation
have not fully materialized. Proponents of NAFTA argued that freer trade
would help solidify the modernization and liberalization of the Mexican
and being unwilling or unable to enforce its regulations. Cross, supra note 185, at 41. Dr.
Cross explains that the economic phenomenon of Mexico's informal economy is an old phe-
nomenon that the government has chosen not to regulate because it views the informal econ-
omy as a way to alleviate the effects of poor economic performance and as a substitute for
the social welfare program. By permitting the informal economy to continue to exist, the
government gives this sector of the economy "hidden" subsidies by, for example, permit-
ting its participants to evade regulations and taxes. Thus, while the informal economy may
represent a threat to the state's efforts to bring about order in society, the government per-
mits the informal economy to continue to exist to appease angry groups of unemployed
individuals. Id. at 42. Andr~s Manuel L6pez Obrador, former mayor of Mexico City and
2006 presidential candidate, has credited the underground economy with softening the
blow of the failure of the formal sector to create the one million jobs per year necessary to
keep pace with population growth. He writes: "Why hasn't there been a social explosion in
Mexico? The escape valve has been the informal economy, migration, and drug trafficking."
Sidewalk Economy, supra note 188.
191 See supra note 130.
92 Audley, supra note 121, at 6.
'9 See generally Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97.
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economy initiated in the early 1980s, thereby furthering productivity. 94
While productivity of Mexican workers has improved, this gain has been
considerably less than might have been hoped. 195 NAFTA, however, was
expected not only to increase the number of jobs in the Mexican econ-
omy, but their earnings as well through real wage gains attributable to
hoped-for increased productivity of Mexican workers and reduced con-
sumer prices. 96 This has not happened. For example, real wages in Mex-
ico were lower in 2003 than they were when NAFFA entered into force. 197
One study reports an 11% decrease in real wages in the manufacturing
sector between 1994 and 2001, notwithstanding a 50% growth in produc-
tivity. 98
These figures are surprising because NAFTA proponents expected
that NAFTA would promote foreign direct investment in Mexico and thus
the transfer of technology and skills. In turn, NAFTA proponents expected
that this "value added" investment would significantly improve labor
productivity and raise real wages.' 99 In particular, NAFTA was expected
to improve the condition of Mexico's numerous low-skill workers, be-
cause the expected increase in manufactured exports was supposed to
increase both employment and real wages for manufacturing workers
(which, in turn, would have exerted upward pressure on wages in all sec-
tors as employers competed for laborers).2" As is the case with other
194 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
195 See generally infra notes 207-224.
196 MANNING, supra note 155, at 3.
197 Polaski, supra note 37, at 24; see also NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note
97, at 1 (reporting that real wages in Mexico were lower in 2001 than in 1994 even though
Mexico's productivity rate grew during that time). Real wages are reported to have fallen
at the rate of 0.2% per year between 1993 and 2003. Stiglitz, supra note 39, at A23. Other
figures indicate that wages have declined nationally and that real wages have done so
significantly. The real minimum wage is reported to have declined 60% between 1982 and
1992. Twenty-three percent of this decline occured after NAFTA entered into force, during
which time manufacturing wages also dropped 12%. Wise & Gallagher, supra note 97.
'91 Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97, at 58 (citing a study by Mexican economist
Carlos Salas for the Global Policy Network, and asserting that even in nominal dollar value
terms manufacturing wages were the same in 2000 as they were in 1994, which, in turn,
were considerably lower than in 1981, before Mexico's neoliberal reforms were initiated).
19 As a leading example, President Clinton predicted that the effect of NAFTA would
be the spread of good jobs across Mexico, not just along the northern border. MANNING,
supra note 155, at 10. On September 13, 1993, the day NAFTA's side agreements on labor
and environment were signed, President Clinton said:
NAFTA means an even more rapid closing of the gap between our two wage rates.
And as the benefits of economic growth are spread in Mexico to working people
.... [t]hey'll have more disposable income to buy more American products and
there will be less illegal immigration because more Mexicans will be able to sup-
port their children by staying home.
Id. at 3.
200 As discussed throughout this Article, it must be remembered that many non-NAFTA
factors influenced Mexico's economic performance. Thus, it may be incorrect to place all
the blame on the treaty. With regard to real wages, specifically, it has been noted that the
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economic indicators, it must be remembered that many factors other than
NAFTA influenced the poor showing in Mexican real wage growth, and
thus it may be incorrect to blame the agreement. With regard to real wages,
specifically, it has been noted that the two periods of peso devaluation
(1980 and 1994-1995) significantly influenced the downturn of wages.20
At a minimum, however, it can be observed that, to date, NAFTA has not
proved sufficient to ensure an increase in real wages in Mexico.
While changes in productivity rates since 1994 have been mixed,2°2
the anticipated growth in real wages has not occurred. On the contrary,
real wages for production workers in the manufacturing sector, and includ-
ing even those manufacturing goods for export, are still below pre-NAFTA
levels,2 °3 as are real wages in non-manufacturing sectors.2 4 Daily minimum
wage figures are not encouraging. In 1993, the daily minimum wage for
Mexican workers was the equivalent of $4.62; in 1999, it was $3.44, which
represented a decline of 25.5 %,205 and the daily minimum wage that took
effect in January 2006 ranges between roughly $4.51 and $4.86, depend-
ing upon the region of the country where the job is performed.
21
In summary, although not consistently so, productivity rates have in-
creased in the last twelve years, perhaps as a result of NAFTA but not as
two periods of peso devaluation (1980 and 1994-1995) significantly influenced the down-
turn of wages. Polaski, supra note 37, at 21.
201 Id. at 21.
202 Productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked, was negative in the years 1994
through 1997. ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD FACTBOOK 2006: ECONOMIC,
ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SOCIAL STATISTICS 51 (2006), available at http://oberon.sourceoecd.
org/pdf/fact2006pdf/02-03-Ol.pdf. This included a catastrophic negative 8.63% in 1995,
reflecting the peso crisis of 1994-1995; this was the worst one-year performance in the
fourteen-year period ending in 2004 for any of the 29 national economies covered by the
OECD report. Id. Then, from 1998 to 2001, Mexico posted solid gains in productivity,
topped by a 7.28% increase in 2000, the third-best single year for any country in the fifteen
years reported. Id. Productivity again turned negative in 2002, a loss that was substantially
offset by gains in 2003-2004. Id.
As compared to most OECD countries, this was not only an overall poor performance,
but a particularly volatile one. In contrast, the United States never had a negative year, had
a gain of at least 1.3% in twelve of the fourteen years, and in its best year, 2004, advanced
3.16%. Id.
Productivity has fared relatively well in certain areas of Mexico, such as the manufac-
turing centers around Monterrey and Puebla, which have been helped, in part, by foreign
investments and loans. Stracke, supra note 30, at 31.
203 Polaski, supra note 37, at 24.
204 See generally THE WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 28612-ME, POVERTY IN MEXICO: AN
ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS, TRENDS, AND GOVERNMENT STRATEGY 85, 129-32 (2004)
[hereinafter POVERTY IN MEXICO]. See also infra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
205 MANNING, supra note 155, at 9.
206 Mexico's Minimum Wage the Most Eroded in Latin America, MEXICAN LAB. NEWS
AND ANALYSIS, Feb. 2006, http://www.ueinternational.org/Mexico-info/mlna-articles.php?
id=98#530. Mexican salaries are set in three categories, reflecting the country's three main
regions. The daily minimum wage is highest in Zone A, which covers more developed
urban areas, including, for example, Mexico City; the minimum wage is lowest in rural areas,
which are designated as Zone C; and Zone B areas are in between. See id.
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much as had been hoped. Real wages, by contrast, have dropped significant-
ly.
b. Changes in the Mexican Labor Force as Partial Explanations for
Disappointing Results in Productivity and Real Wages
The unexpected combination of increased productivity and falling
real wages over the past twelve years warrants further investigation be-
cause even a modest increase in productivity is expected to yield an in-
crease in real wages, and, thus, in real income and purchasing power.
20 7
Demographic changes in Mexico in the last thirty years, in the form of
increased population and thus an increased labor supply, may provide a
partial answer. Because wages are determined both by the supply of and the
demand for labor, a surge in the supply of labor may provide a partial an-
swer for why increased productivity has not led to higher wages.
In recent decades, Mexico has experienced both a rapidly growing
population and socio-economic changes that have expanded its labor supply.
From 1970 to 2000, Mexico's overall population increased significantly,
from 52.8 million in 1970 to almost 100 million in 2000.208 In 2006, the
population was almost 107.5 million. 2° This population increase, taken
alone, would have placed the economy under significant stress. However,
in addition, the labor force increased much more rapidly, from almost
13 million in 1970210 to 39.8 million in 2000.211 The most recent figures
estimate the labor force in 2005 at 43.4 million.21 2 Two factors account
for the increase in the labor force significantly outrunning the growth in
the overall population. First, notwithstanding the significant population
growth reflected by the above figures, as Mexico has become more urban,
the birth rate has fallen,2 1 3 so that a lower proportion of the population is
207 Many who have written about NAFTA's effect on Mexico are puzzled about this un-
expected situation. See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 155, at 9-11; Cavanagh & Anderson,
supra note 97, at 58-59; Polaski, supra note 37, at 24-26; NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION
NEWS, supra note 93. Yet, at least one writer has concluded that Mexican worker produc-
tivity gains have been alarmingly low, and that it is this sluggish productivity that has re-
sulted in real wages being lower in 2003 than when NAFTA entered into force. See gener-
ally Stracke, supra note 30.
208 U.S. Census Bureau, 1DB Summary Demographic Data for Mexico, http://www.census.
gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum.pl?cty=MX (last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
209 See CIA, Mexico, supra note 130.
210 The exact figure was 12,955,100. Int'l Labor Org., LABORSTA Internet Database,
http://laborsta.ilo.org (select Mexico; select a data range including 1970; select Table ID) (last
visited Feb. 13, 2007).
211 Worldpress.org, Mexico Profile, http://www.worldpress.org/profiles/Mexico.cfm (last
visited Dec. 29, 2006).
212 See supra note 130.
213 The Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo [Interamerican Bank of Development] es-
timates that Mexico's annual rate of population growth fell from 3.1% in the 1960s to
1.9% in the 1990s, with a further decline to 1.5% projected for the present decade. MAN-
NING, supra note 155, at 4. A population growth rate of 1.16% is estimated for 2006. See
supra note 130.
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made up of children. In 1970, 51% of the population was of "working
age," in the sense of being fifteen years of age or older;21 4 by 2000, that
number had increased to over 67%,215 and in 2006 to 69%.216
Second, a much greater proportion of adults desire employment than
was the case a generation ago because women have entered the labor force
by the millions. This development is tied to social phenomena such as ur-
banization, falling birth rates, and greater acceptance of women working
outside the home,2 17 and to economic factors, the most important of which
was the economic crisis triggered by the 1994-1995 peso devaluation.
21
The World Bank estimates that in 1980, women accounted for 28% of the
total labor force, in 1990, for 31%, in 2000, for 34%, and in 2004, for
35%.219 In 2004, women comprised over 42% of workers aged fifteen to
sixty-four years. 220 In 2006, the World Bank reported that women's par-
ticipation in the labor force of each of the major economic sectors was as
follows: agriculture, 5%; industry, 20%; and services, 75%.221 Adding to
the economic stress from the rapidly expanding workforce was the fact that
many of the women seeking outside employment for the first time were
uneducated and had been reared with the expectation that they would spend
their adult lives in the home. With limited job skills, these women could
only earn the low wages paid to unskilled workers. Many of these women
worked, and continue to work, in low-skill, low-pay jobs at assembly plants.
214 Stracke, supra note 30, at 30. Stracke puts all Mexicans 12 years of age or older in
the "pool of potential workers" but then reports data for those 15 years or older. Id. The
figure is overinclusive in that while it recognizes an age below which almost everyone is
too young to work, it fails to recognize an age at which almost everyone is too old to work.
By contrast, the CIA, which publishes The World Factbook, distinguishes between those
aged 15 to 64 and those aged 65 and older. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
215 Stracke, supra note 30, at 3.
216 The reported age structure is 63.6% of individuals 15 to 64 years old and 5.8% of
individuals 65 years old and over. See CIA, Mexico, supra note 130.
27 Mexican culture has traditionally favored stay-at-home wives and mothers, but the
economic crises Mexico has faced in the last twenty-five years have forced women to seek
jobs outside the home.
218 The 1994-1995 peso devaluation resulted in a 7% decline in GDP and a 20% de-
cline in wages. Stracke, supra note 30, at 30.
219 The World Bank Group, Summary Gender Profile for Mexico, http://devdata.world
bank.org/genderstats/ (select Mexico and Summary Gender Profile) (last visited Jan. 5,
2007). It seems likely that the increased participation of women in the Mexican labor force
will be permanent. First, the social and economic phenomena that led to the increase of
women in the workforce are likely to be of long duration. Second, it seems that once women
enter the labor force, they tend to remain there even if the conditions that led them to enter
it are no longer fully present. An example of this outcome is the millions of women who
had to enter the American labor force during World War II and continued to work even
after the war ended.
220 THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS tbl.2.2 (2006), avail-
able at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section2.htm.
221 Id. at tbl.2.3.
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Indeed, maquiladoras in northern Mexico, which generally pay low wages,
tend to be staffed mostly by women.
2
A rapidly growing population of working age Mexicans and the en-
try of women into the labor force, therefore, resulted in an average of one
million workers entering the Mexican labor force each year since NAFTA
took effect.223 The excess of labor market supply relative to the demand
for labor in most sectors of the economy caused low wages in Mexico.
24
In sum, changes in the size and skill level of Mexico's workforce ac-
count for a significant part of the disappointment in productivity and real
wages over the first twelve years of NAFTA. Mexico's modest improve-
ments in labor productivity by its traditional workforce have not been
sufficient to offset the downward pressure on wages brought about by the
mushrooming labor supply.
c. Other Factors Affecting Productivity and Real Wages in Mexico
Changes in the size and composition of Mexico's labor force are not
the only factors contributing to the disappointing figures for productivity
and real wages. Other causes may be classified in three broad categories:
unwise policy choices, unmanageable domestic factors, and, perhaps most
importantly, global economic factors largely beyond Mexico's control.
i. Unhelpful Domestic Policies
A number of internal policies may contribute to the problem of low
productivity and real wages in Mexico. This Article considers four. First,
although Mexico began a vigorous program of privatization in the early
1980s, 2 5 significant industries-notably petroleum 226 and electricity-
222 MANNING, supra note 155, at 11.
223 Id. at 4.
224 Polaski, supra note 37, at 15. See generally Binford, supra note 9.
225 In 1982, the Mexican government held total or partial control of 1155 entities.
These included important industries such as petroleum, but the government also owned and
managed airlines, hotels, railroads, shipping companies, and commercial movie theaters.
ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 381. The process of selling state-owned industries began
in the early 1980s and privatizations reached the highest level of activity during the presi-
dency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). By the end of his administration, the
number of state-owned entities had decreased to 213, and in 2002 there were 203 enter-
prises. Id.
226 The petroleum industry is not likely to be privatized. Because oil has played a
significant role in the development of Mexican history and self-identity, Mexico has in-
sisted on maintaining its sovereignty over its oil industry. Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican
Constitution declares subsurface minerals to be the inalienable property of Mexico. Ewell
E. Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 Tax. INT'L
L.J. 75, 76 (2001). This principle has been reinforced by key events in the history of the
petroleum industry. In 1925, the Petroleum Law required all foreign investors to acknowl-
edge Mexican sovereignty in all land concessions that preceded the 1917 Constitution; in
1938, Mexico's PEMEX monopoly was created; and, in 1960, Mexico terminated all exist-
ing contracts or concessions to foreign investors and declared that none would be granted
2007]
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continue to be operated by the state. As is the case with government-
operated enterprises in many countries, managers and rank-and-file em-
ployees alike lack incentives to significantly improve their productivity.
The most obvious solution to this problem is privatization. Mexico has
taken significant steps in this direction by privatizing a number of indus-
tries, including its telecommunications industry,227 and has signaled that
it is open to the possibility of more privatization by promoting foreign
investment through the numerous free trade agreements into which it has
entered, the most important of which is, of course, NAFTA. Privatization
of more industries will tend to cure the problems of low productivity and
low real wages by creating incentives on the part of owners to operate the
firm efficiently, and therefore profitably. Such efficiency, if attained, is
likely to reflect increased productivity from the firm's employees, who
would now see personal advantage to increasing their contribution to the
firm; such increased productivity, in turn, would typically lead to higher
wages for those employees.
A second set of internal policies that contributes to low wages in
Mexico are the country's weak labor laws, coupled with weak and fre-
quently corrupt unions. 228 These legal and institutional factors may retard
growth in productivity and hinder workers' efforts to translate productiv-
ity gains into wage increases. However, some critics contend that the
Mexican government's desire to remain competitive in attracting foreign
investment has led to suppression of worker attempts to improve wages
and conditions. For example, in June 2000, in Rio Bravo, a city in the
northern State of Tamaulipas across the border from McAllen, Texas, female
employees who demonstrated in favor of forming an independent union
were reportedly beaten by police. Ultimately, by this account, the em-
ployees did not vote for the union because they were denied a secret bal-
henceforth. Stacy L. Middleton, Note, How the Petroleum Addict Negotiates with the Dealer:
Challenges to the Bush Administration's North American Energy Policy, 1 1 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 177, 195-96 (2003).
227 In 1990, the Mexican government began privatization of its national telephone com-
pany, Telffonos de M6xico ("Telmex") by relaxing the rules governing foreign investment
in telecommunications services and restructuring telecommunications regulatory entities.
When Mexico became a member of NAFTA in January 1994, the telecommunications equip-
ment and service sectors were among the primary beneficiaries, because NAFTA provides
essentially free entry into Mexico for telecommunications products and services. By May
1994, Telmex was completely privatized. Stephen I. Glover & JoEllen Lotvedt, The Mexi-
can Telecommunications Market: The Interplay of Internal Reform and NAFTA, 3 NAFTA:
L. & Bus. REV. AM. 23, 24-25 (1997). Although at the time of its enactment NAFTA was
seen as an important privatizing force in Mexico's telecommunications industry, some have
argued that it actually had little impact on the industry's privatization, but that, instead,
market forces led to its privatization. See Sergio E. Alem~n, NAFTA and Its Impact on the
Privatization of Mexico's Telecommunications Industry, 7 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 5, 5 (2001).
228 Middleton, supra note 226, at 195. Polaski, supra note 37, at 16. See generally
McCaffrey, supra note 66, at 461-65, 469, and Hagen, supra note 18, at 923-24, for a
discussion of corruption in Mexico.
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lot and forced to vote openly in the presence of management officials. 229
While one could argue that weak labor laws are necessary to attract capi-
tal, toleration of corrupt union officials is not.
A third, and closely related, problem is official corruption. 20 Payoffs
to government officials represent money that otherwise might fund higher
wages. Alternatively, such payoffs cut profits and the willingness of en-
trepreneurs to invest in productivity-increasing capital. While the Mexi-
can government recognizes that corruption hurts society in many ways,
including economically, it is far from eradicating the problem, notwith-
standing significant efforts to do so, particularly since President Fox took
office in 2000.
Fourth, Mexico's investment in infrastructure and, above all, in hu-
man capital is far less than optimal. Although in recent years the Mexican
government has allocated significant portions of its budget to educa-
tion, 23 1 tens of billions of dollars could be well spent improving Mexico's
system of education.232 It is not, however, apparent from where this money
will come. An effective system of taxation of all sectors of the economy,
including the informal sector, would contribute significantly to the budget.
2 33
Another partial solution would be to continue to implement systems that
229 Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97, at 58-59.
230 For additional discussion of corruption in Mexico, see infra notes 273-288 and ac-
companying text.
231 In 2002, for example, 50.8% of the social spending budget was allocated to educa-
tion. POVERTY IN MEXICO, supra note 204, at 118.
232 See STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 1, at 23; Blecker, supra note 160, at 18;
POVERTY IN MEXICO, supra note 204, at 117-25. It has been said that when one talks about
human capital formation, one realizes that education and job training is like nutrition: one
has to think about it every day, and the earlier one begins to feed the mind the better. David
Brooks, Of Love and Money, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at A27.
233 Enforcement of tax laws and collection of taxes have been endemic problems in
Mexico, in part because of cumbersome procedures that are often overwhelming for the
majority of potential taxpayers. In addition, it has been suggested that lack of intra-agency
communication and coordination, internal corruption, inefficient use of human and infor-
mation resources, and skepticism about collection policies and practices have also contrib-
uted to the problem. Modernizing Mexico, supra note 187, at 82-83. A report published by
the OECD on the tax system in Mexico noted that Mexico's tax-to-GDP ratio has remained
relatively unchanged, and perhaps has even declined over the past two decades, which
seems to reflect the administrative and operational problems of the Mexican federal tax
agency. Id. at 85 (citing Thomas Dalsgaard, The Tax System in Mexico: A Need for Strengthen-
ing the Revenue-Raising Capacity (Org. of Econ. Cooperation and Dev. Econ. Dep't Work-
ing Paper No. 233, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l4/ll1/1884584.pdf). To
illustrate, figures of tax revenues as a percentage of Mexico's GDP in recent years are as fol-
lows: 1990, 10.7%; 1995, 9.3%; 2000, 10.6%; and 2002, 11.6%. POVERTY IN MEXICO,
supra note 204, at 112. A tax revenue of 11.6% of GDP is unusually low for a country with
Mexico's income level. Id.
During the Zedillo Administration, 1994-2000, the Mexican government began the
process of developing and implementing a system of information and communications tech-
nology ("ICT") as a component of its overall regulatory and administrative reforms. This
ICT began the process of moving government information and services online, which cul-
minated with the implementation of the Sistema Nacional e-Mexico [e-Mexico National
System] (http://www.e-mexico.gob.mx) during the Fox Administration, 2000-2006. A signifi-
cant goal of this ICT system was to improve collection of taxes. Id. at 88-89.
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will enable the government to tax upper-class Mexicans more heavily and
more equitably."'
ii. Unmanageable Domestic Economic Problems
Mexico's problems with productivity and real wages are due, in part,
to difficult domestic economic problems that cannot be easily addressed
by the Mexican government, at least in the foreseeable future. One such
economic problem is the minimum wage.235 A number of commentators con-
tend that wage growth in Mexico has been restricted by a governmental
policy of holding down the minimum wage to keep Mexico attractive in the
global market. The decision affects almost all wage rates, which tend to be
set as multiples of the minimum.236 While there is reason to be critical of
the government's policy concerning the minimum wage, it is doubtful that a
political decision to raise the minimum wage would necessarily lead to
increased real wages. It seems at least equally likely that an increase in
the nominal minimum wage would result in increased inflation, negating
the effect of the increase. In addition, increasing the labor costs of law-
abiding employers would be expected to reduce the number of workers they
would employ. One possible result of an increase in the official minimum
wage, therefore, would be that workers unable to find employment from
law-abiding employers would be forced to work in the largely unregu-
lated informal economy, where they would be unlikely to experience a
real improvement in earnings.
Another problem is that presented by the tourism industry. Tourism
is a bright spot in the Mexican economy237 because it is one of the three
largest revenue producing sources in Mexico.23 However, some important
economic sectors do not readily lend themselves to significant productiv-
ity growth, and tourism is one such sector. Like the employees in maqui-
ladoras, hotel and restaurant workers tend to have low skills and work in
234 See infra notes 251-270 and accompanying text concerning the unequal distribution
of income in Mexico; see also Blecker, supra note 160, at 18.
235 See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
236 Polaski, supra note 37, at 25-26.
237 But see infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text (discussing unrest over 2006
Mexican presidential election significantly hurt tourism).
238 The other two source are the oil industry and remittances sent home by Mexican
citizens who live outside Mexico, mostly in the United States. See, e.g., B. LINDSAY LOWELL,
IMMIGRANT REMITTANCES: TRENDS AND IMPACTS, HERE AND ABROAD (2004), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/news-and-conferences/conferences-and-events/files/financial_
access-for immigrants_lowell.pdf; Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Mar. 21,
2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.comTRANSCRIPTS/0503/2l/ldt.01.html ("Remit-
tances, as they're called, are expected to become Mexico's primary source of income this
year, surpassing the amount of money that Mexico makes on oil exports for the first time
ever.").
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low-value-added jobs, with similar limited opportunities for productivity
improvement.
239
Perhaps the most important factor holding down the overall level of
productivity in the Mexican workforce has been the growth of the infor-
mal sector, which has been fueled by the displacement of low-skill work-
ers, particularly agricultural workers. 240 With the growing number of
workers in the informal sector, the informal sector's expanding role in the
Mexican economy, and its effect of holding down growth in productivity
and real wages, no attractive alternative seems available in the foreseeable
future. It is certainly better for Mexico and its economy that these mar-
ginal workers have employment of some type rather than being unem-
ployed, and the formal economy at present will not absorb their numbers.
As discussed earlier, Mexico does need to invest more in infrastructure
and human capital, and effectively taxing all sectors, including the in-
formal economy, would be a major step in this direction.
iii. Global Economic Conditions
While policy choices internal to Mexico have played some role in
restricting growth in productivity and real wages, it seems likely that, at
least in the present global economy, economic developments beyond the
control of Mexican policymakers are even more important. For example,
international free trade developments unrelated to NAFTA have played a
significant role in depressing productivity and real wage growth. Mexican
wages have been held down not only by an oversupply of Mexican labor,
but by the fact that foreign investors are increasingly attracted to other
countries with even lower costs. The continuing emergence of China,
241
and particularly its admission to the WTO in 2001, have had a profound
and negative effect on the ability of Mexican workers to obtain increased
real wages. Many American companies appear to view China as an attractive
source of even cheaper labor, notwithstanding the higher transportation
costs attributable to its distance from the United States, and the fact that
the applicable tariffs when conducting business with China are less fa-
vorable than those Mexico offers through NAFTA.
242
Low productivity growth and low wages mean that Mexico is far from
being a workers' paradise and, consequently, explains the attractiveness
of migration to the United States. However, two additional factors deserve
particular attention because they relate directly to the interrelation of the
Mexican and American economies and to the immigration of Mexicans
into the United States. First, emigration from Mexico may itself hold
239 See Polaski, supra note 37, at 24.
m See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 149-157 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 149-157 and accompanying text.
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down productivity growth in Mexico. As relatively skilled and motivated
workers migrate to the United States in search of better opportunities,
Mexico loses a disproportionately productive portion of the Mexican la-
bor force.243 Second, and of crucial importance for the immigration of
professionals using TN visas,2 4" real wages of even the most skilled levels
of the Mexican workforce have been falling since NAFTA took effect.
Polaski concludes that even for skilled workers in the manufacturing sec-
tor, real wages have decreased since 1993, except along the border.245 Mexi-
can workers with university and even postgraduate degrees received lower
real wages in 2000 than in 1993.2 6 In part, Mexico's most skilled work-
ers are penalized by the country's partial success in achieving a more
educated populace as the supply of university-educated workers is out-
pacing the domestic demand for their labor, which suppresses their in-
come.247 Clearly, for individuals who have invested years in developing
their human capital through education, falling real wages in Mexico make
ever more appealing the robust market in the United States.
Under Mexican constitutional principles, the Mexican government
cannot prevent its citizens from leaving Mexico, if they so choose.248 There-
fore, apart from trying to improve economic opportunity within Mexico,
it is unclear what Mexico realistically could or should do to restrict the
emigration of millions of Mexicans. Initially, one must remember that coun-
tries that restrict emigration, such as the former Soviet Union and East Ger-
many, are normally viewed as improperly having restricted human rights.
Second, while Mexico may lose some of its best workers, immigration helps
Mexico by serving as a safety valve for general discontent with conditions
in Mexico and, increasingly more importantly, as a source of remittances
to family members left behind.249 Finally, although the governments of the
United States and Mexico have had numerous discussions about Mexico
243 See Stracke, supra note 30, at 31-32.
244 See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
245 Polaski, supra note 37, at 24; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
246 Polaski, supra note 37, at 24.
247 Id; see also POVERTY IN MEXICO, supra note 204, at 176 (arguing that due to the
educational expansion in Mexico in the last twenty years, Mexico has seen a gradual in-
crease of individuals with secondary and tertiary education, whose participation in the
workforce rose by 50% and 40%, respectively, between the late 1980s and the late 1990s).
At the same time, Mexico's economic liberalization policies of the early 1980s and the
significant opening of trade and investment propitiated by NAFTA created a demand for
skilled workers, particularly as companies adopted new techniques and modernized inter-
nal and external administrative and operational processes. This, in turn, resulted in large
increases in the relative demand for college graduates in the 1990s, which regrettably de-
clined after 1997. This decline is consistent with the theory that skills matter more during
periods of major changes in production, which, for Mexico, meant the changes required in
the years immediately following the enactment of NAFTA. See id. at 177.
241 Pat M. Holt, Control Immigration? No Excuse for Not Trying, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 4, 1980, at 22 ("Freedom to emigrate is ... guaranteed by the Mexican Con-
stitution.").
249 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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controlling its border with the United States, one wonders how realistic it
will be for Mexico to take the enormously expensive and unpopular step
of attempting to control the border when the United States, which has both
more resources and more political support for doing so, has been unable
to take effective measures to control its border with Mexico.2 0
In summary, it seems that productivity and real wage figures during
the first twelve years of NAFTA have been disappointing, but a myriad of
factors apart from NAFTA have contributed to that result. Some of these
factors are the result of simple economic realities. Others could be at least
partially resolved if Mexico's leaders could obtain both the political will
and the capital to address the problems.
3. Income Disparity
Income distribution plays an important role in determining a coun-
try's economic growth and political stability, and this phenomenon is clearly
reflected in Mexico.251 Because the greater inequality a society has, the
greater the chances for political and social unrest, 5 2 income disparity is a
significant but expected problem in Mexico.
Rates of income disparity are high in Mexico for reasons unrelated
to NAFTA. Income inequality is a condition with which Mexicans have
lived for centuries, certainly since the Spanish conquest in 1519 and proba-
bly going back to the days of the Aztec Empire. Mexico is not unique; other
countries, particularly those whose history includes conquest and coloni-
zation, have experienced income disparity throughout their history as
well. Indeed, income inequality is common throughout the world, even in
many countries whose history does not include a long period of colonial-
ism. Income inequality consistent with growth 53 has been achieved most
often in developed Western nations, of which, of course, the United
States ranks first. In Mexico's case, income disparity among the popula-
tion is the result of hundreds of years of cultural, historical, and societal
phenomena that have tended to direct the benefits of growth to the upper
class and to politicians. Neither NAFTA nor any other economic mod-
ernization policy will swiftly change a centuries-old social, economic,
and political system that has, at its core, a highly stratified society. Ab-
sent revolution, which many in Mexico see as a realistic possibility if
conditions do not improve with the newly elected president,2" the equita-
250 See supra note 1I and accompanying text.
21 FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 325.
252 According to Professor Friedman, mass violence is less likely to occur in countries
with more even income distributions. Id. Because Mexico is far from having an equal dis-
tribution, the possibility of serious unrest is therefore very real.
"I Communist countries, such as the former Soviet Union, may have achieved rea-
sonably good income equality but at a cost of very low growth.
145While a full-fledged revolution of the magnitude of the Revolution of 1910 is
unlikely, a realistic possibility exists that Mexicans, frustrated by the problems that have
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ble distribution of income among Mexicans is a goal that probably can-
not be achieved in a lifetime, and certainly not in twelve years.
While NAFTA cannot fairly be charged with a major role in Mex-
ico's unequal distribution of income, it has not improved the situation
either. Since 1994, only the top 10% of Mexican households have in-
creased their share of the national income.255 It was recently reported that
Mexico's ten richest people have a combined estimated worth of $52 bil-
lion.256 Currently, the wealthiest 10% of the population receives 42% of
the national income, while the poorest 40% receives only approximately
15%.257 Income disparity is seen throughout Mexico, not only in the tra-
ditionally poorer regions.
Using the widely accepted GINI coefficient measure of inequality,
258
Mexico's inequality has been worsening in the last twenty years, 259 and
Mexico now ranks among the most unequal countries in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Some anticipate that income inequality will likely continue to grow
in Mexico as the economy continues to adjust to two important economic
plagued Mexico for years, might take to the streets to protest the government's inaction to
alleviate the dire conditions in which they have lived for so long. Major demonstrations of
popular unrest are not unheard of in Mexico and have taken place in recent years. The
1994 Chiapas Rebellion of the Zapatista movement, see supra notes 76-78 and accompa-
nying text, the July 27, 2004 demonstration of millions in Mexico City, see infra notes 307-
309 and accompanying text, and the thousands of Mexicans that have challenged the re-
sults of the presidential elections of July 2006, see supra notes 45 and accompanying text
and infra notes 300-301 and accompanying text, are only a few examples. Therefore,
significant popular unrest is possible if the Mexican people perceive the new president as
not fulfilling his campaign promises. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 168, at 118 (frus-
trated with the Mexican Congress's failure to fulfill promises made in a 1996 accord, the
Zapatistas unilaterally set up five government centers to oversee what they called
"autonomous municipalities"); McKinley, supra note 168, at 118; see also infra notes 302-
306 and accompanying text.
255 Polaski, supra note 37, at 26; see also Cavanagh, supra note 87, at 3 (citing an In-
ternational Monetary Fund Working Paper in which the authors assert that increased in-
comes at the top explain why inequality in Mexico was higher in 2000 than in any year
since the mid- 1980s).
256 Traci Carl, Mexico Politics Shift, But It's Business as Usual, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, June 11, 2006, at 4G. One of these wealthy Mexicans, Carlos Slim Helu, is ranked
by Forbes as the third wealthiest man in the world, with an estimated worth of $30 billion.
Id.; see also J. W. Elphinstone, Forbes' Top-JO Cash Kings Run from Gates to Ka-shing,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 2006, at 2D.
257 GISELLE HENRIQUEZ & PAJ PATEL, INTERHEMISPHERIC RES. CTR., NAFTA, CORN,
AND MEXICO'S AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 3 (2004), available at http://america.
irc-online.org/reports/2004/0402nafta.html.
25 A GINI coefficient is a commonly used measure of income distribution derived from a
Lorenz Curve, which is the most often used way to present income distribution graphically.
A GINI index of 100 is perfect inequality, and an index of 0 is perfect equality. Thus, the
smaller the index the better income distribution/more equality in that country. KARL E.
CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 435 (3d ed. Prentice Hall 1994).
259 In 1984, Mexico's GINI index was 42.5; in 1994, it was 47.7; and in 2000 it was
48.1. HENRIQUEZ & PATEL, supra note 257, at 3. The figures reported in the 2006 Fact
Book of the OECD are slightly worse for the mid-1980s and mid-1990s than those re-
ported by Henriquez. The GINI coefficient in the mid-1980s was 45.1; in the mid-1990s, it
was 52.0; and in 2000 it was 48. OECD, supra note 202.
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developments: the rapid industrialization in some parts of the country
and the rural migration from poor agricultural areas to cities throughout
Mexico and to the United States. They argue that these migration patterns
will play a larger role in income inequality than the increased free trade
in goods and services that NAFTA has created.
260
Beyond inequality, overall poverty is a significant concern in every
region of Mexico. 26' By some measures, the national poverty rate in 2003
was 31%, the same as in 1994. The poverty rate reached 40% in the mid-
1990s during the 1994-1995 peso devaluation crisis. 112 During a June 2006
Mexican presidential debate, leftist presidential candidate Andrds Manuel
L6pez Obrador repeatedly stated that 80% of Mexicans make less than
$500 per month.263 One 2006 study suggests that approximately half of the
Mexican population should be considered poor.264 The official poverty
rate is calculated by estimating the percentage of the population living in
households with a per capita income that cannot cover basic necessities;
this income level averaged about four dollars per day nationally in 2004.
It is encouraging, however, that the study's figures show that poverty
rates began declining after 1996.265
Remittances from persons living in the United States, the second largest
source of revenue for Mexico, might be a significant cause of the decline
in poverty rates.266 In light of its significant impact, the Mexican govern-
ment has implemented programs through which part of these privately
received remittances can be voluntarily invested in the infrastructure of
communities of the families receiving them. A Wikipedia posting claims
that as of 2005, 300 rural communities were participating, and that the gov-
260 Hollifield & Osang, supra note 81, at 327-39.
261 The southeastern state of Chiapas serves as an effective example of Mexico's pov-
erty. In late 2005, Chiapas was identified as the poorest state in Mexico, as it was in 1990.
McKinley, supra note 168 (quoting Julio Boltvinik, a professor at the College of Mexico
who studies poverty). The extreme poverty that triggered the Chiapas Rebellion by the
Zapatistas in January 1994 has not improved, even though the Mexican government has
built roads, health clinics, and schools, and it has also installed running water systems and
electricity in some communities in recent years. Id. Because agricultural employment has
been the most adversely affected sector of the Mexican economy since NAFTA went into
effect, see supra notes 158-181 and accompanying text, these subsistence farmers (and,
therefore, the state of Chiapas) have been most significantly affected.
262 Polaski, supra note 37, at 26; see also Cavanagh & Anderson, supra note 97, at 6
(stating that World Bank data indicated that the poverty rate in Mexico rose from 51% in
1994 to more than 58% in 1998).
263 Versi6n Estenogrdfica del Segundo Debate Presidential [Stenographer's Version of
the Second Presidential Debate], RAZ6N Y PALABRA (Mex.), June 6, 2006, http://www.razony
palabra.org.mx/publicado/debate.html.
264 MARK WEISBROT & LuIs SANDOVAL, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, MEX-
ICO'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 4 tbl.1 (2006), available
at http://www.cepr.net/documents/mexico-background_2006-06.pdf.
265 Id. (identifying the poverty rate in a given year as 1992, 52.6%; 1994, 55.6%; 1996,
69.6%; 1998, 63.6%; 2000, 53.7%; 2002, 50.6%; and 2004, 47%).
266 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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ernment intends to have more than one thousand communities participate
in the project by the end of 2006.26
Like most of the economic problems discussed, the primary concern
is not that NAFTA has caused income disparity; rather, it is that things
have gotten worse while NAFTA has been in effect. When one considers
the great expectations that the Mexican government's pre-NAFTA pro-
nouncements may have inspired, however, the predictable result is disil-
lusionment with NAFTA. This disillusionment has propitiated significant
social (negative) and political (some negative and some positive) devel-
opments.
In his thought-provoking book exploring the question of how eco-
nomic growth--or stagnation-affects the moral character of a society, Har-
vard University economics professor Benjamin M. Friedman includes a
quotation that appropriately captures the relationship between economic
growth and social and political instability: "The advantage of economic
growth is not that wealth increases happiness, but that it increases the
range of human choice .... The case for economic growth is that it gives
man greater control over his environment, and thereby increases his free-
dom." '68 Economic growth (or lack of growth) is an important factor in
the social and political development of a country. In most societies, eco-
nomic progress acts as a stabilizing force, which tends to solidify or se-
cure the political structure the country has in place.
By contrast, economic decline or economic stagnation often results
in opposition and disapproval of the existing political system.2 69 Social
and political unrest, therefore, are frequently more the direct result of how
dissatisfied a population is with its standard of living and lives in general
than of how dissatisfied it is with the way the government is conducting
business. 2" Thus, the relationship between the lack of economic growth
and income inequality (the cause) and social and political instability (the
effect) seems to explain the significant social problems Mexico has faced
in the last twelve years. It is these social and political problems, in addi-
tion to major economic problems, that have "pushed" (and will continue to
"push") Mexicans to immigrate into the United States. These factors are
discussed in the following section.
C. Social and Political Climate in Mexico Since 1994
Any analysis of NAFTA and other influences on Mexican immigra-
tion into the United States must focus primarily on economic matters.
267 Economy of Mexico, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economy-of Mexico (last visited July 13, 2006).
268 FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 325 (quoting W. ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH 420-21 (1955)).
269 Id. at 320.
270Id. at 322.
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After all, NAFTA is an agreement to promote free trade and foreign in-
vestment, and economic factors are the predominant motivation for Mexi-
cans to migrate to the United States. Yet such an analysis would be lack-
ing if it were limited to economic concerns, because Mexico is facing
serious social and political problems that directly or indirectly influence
the decisions of Mexicans to seek haven in the United States through le-




Official corruption and common crime are problems for every soci-
ety in every age, but the magnitude of these problems varies from place
to place and from time to time. Corruption in Mexico is an ingrained so-
cial institution whose origins can be traced to colonial times. 272 Because
corruption has plagued Mexico throughout much of its history, Mexico is
frequently thought of as a society in which laws are routinely circumvented
or ignored by corrupt government officials. While this perception may be
exaggerated, the discrepancies between the written law and its applica-
tion must be understood in the context of the several factors that make up
the Mexican legal culture: Mexico's history before, during, and after the
Spanish conquest; its evolving jurisprudential history; its legal institu-
tions; and its social and cultural norms and traditions. These can illumi-
nate the social, political, economic, and cultural factors that impact the
effectiveness of the enforcement of the law.
273
Corruption in Mexico is found at many levels and is very costly. In
2003, a national survey "estimated that Mexicans spend $1.6 billion on
bribes a year-involving an estimated 100 million corrupt transactions-
just to obtain public services. '274 A traffic stop frequently ends not with
an official citation but with a mordida [bite]-a bribe paid to the police offi-
cer, who uses the payment to supplement his meager salary. 275 At the other
271 Two related social factors of immense economic importance-the falling birth rate
and growing acceptance of women working outside the home-have already been dis-
cussed. See supra notes 213-224 and accompanying text.
272 Bonnie J. Palifka, Trade Liberalization and Bribes 11 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished pa-
per, available at http://homepages.mty.itesm.mxbpalifka/customs.pdf).
273 ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at vii-viii. The author of this Article does not con-
done the rampant corruption that, regrettably, has been an endemic problem for Mexico
and that has been a significant barrier to Mexico's socioeconomic and political develop-
ment. This brief commentary about corruption has the purpose of highlighting the complex
convergence of factors that has made corruption possible in Mexico for centuries.
274 Mary Jordan, The Bribes that Bind Mexico--and Hold It Back, WASH. POST, Apr.
18, 2004, at B 1. Corruption is reportedly so pervasive that several Mexico City high school
students reported that they knew of teachers who took bribes in exchange for awarding top
grades to students. Id.
275 See id. (describing a scene from a short film that the federal Mexican government
has been showing in cinemas to reduce public tolerance of corruption).
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extreme is a $2 million bribe (in the form of a "gift" of a house) allegedly
paid by the oil workers' union to former President Jos6 L6pez Portillo.
276
Interestingly, NAFTA may have had an unanticipated secondary ef-
fect of reducing corruption among customs officials by reducing the op-
portunities for bribery. Specifically, because NAFTA significantly reduced or
removed tariffs from a number of goods, customs officials can no longer
extract bribes from entities in lieu of payment of tariffs. In addition, the
Mexican Customs Administration's major modernization, reorganization,
and computerization to increase efficiency and reduce corruption has made
bribes more difficult to obtain as compared to the pre-NAFTA era.
2 77
In recent years, the Mexican government appears to have adopted a
more serious stance against corruption. 278 In 2002, the Mexican Congress
enacted the Federal Transparency Law, which is the first "government
information law" ever adopted in Mexico, to improve regulatory efficiency
and honesty.
27 9
These efforts make economic sense; corruption ultimately serves as
a significant barrier to economic growth and development in Mexico. Every
entrepreneur and investor who has a choice of business locale must take
into account the cost of bribes that will need to be paid-an uncertain cost,
whose size is largely out of the control of the person or company paying the
bribes-in deciding whether to do business in Mexico or elsewhere. 20 A
2001 survey involving 13,790 Mexican respondents suggested that: (1) an
estimated 214 million acts of corruption occurred between 2003 and 2004;
(2) the total estimated value of corruption-related payments was 23.4 billion
pesos (approximately $2.1 billion); and (3) corruption-related payments
276 Marisabel Bras, Government and Politics, in MEXico: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra
note 136, at 229, 250.
277 Palifka, supra note 272, at 8-11. This paper was presented at the October 1997
Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) in Bogota,
Colombia. The paper suggests that bribes are still obtained, just not as easily as they were
before NAFTA. Id. at 13.
278 Part of the challenge in controlling corruption is that much power resides in Mexi-
can states, whose governments in many instances are more corrupt than is the federal gov-
ernment, at least under President Fox. Jordan, supra note 274.
279 ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 47, at 384. The implementation of the Sistema Nacional
e-Mexico, a system to improve the quality and delivery of government services and to
increase government accountability, also has the goal of reducing corruption. Modernizing
Mexico, supra note 187, at 88-89.
While it is encouraging to see these reforms, they present two problems: (1) it is costly to
implement and enforce them; and (2) they will likely not cure corruption. These anti-corrup-
tion measures necessarily result in high cost to the government, which is a problem because
the Mexican government has been undertaking austerity measures for many years due to
the economic crises it has had to face. Therefore, the Mexican government finds itself in the
difficult posture of having to choose between funding anti-corruption measures or allocat-
ing those funds for other problems that may be perceived as more urgent. In addition, be-
cause bribery has always been a component of Mexicans' relationship with their govern-
ment, it may be difficult for the government to actually enforce anti-corruption measures.
Palifka, supra note 272, at 1.
210 Id. at 1.
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amounted to an estimated 6.9% of the average Mexican household budget.2s'
Further, this corruption imposes indirect costs on the Mexican economy
by reducing government efficiency.282 Obtaining any kind of government-
issued document is a long and drawn-out process, in large part because of
government employees' expectation of a bribe to expedite the process.
Those employees expect to supplement their low income through those
bribes.
283
Often, this complexity and uncertainty pushes many into structuring
their business without complying with applicable government rules and
regulations, which adversely affects economic growth.284 Consequently, the
government loses because it does not receive the tax revenue it badly needs
to fund education and development projects.285 The entrepreneur also loses
because the illegal nature of his or her business makes him or her ineligi-
ble to receive the government benefits that are available to lawfully in-
corporated business enterprises.
286
For those who are considering emigrating from Mexico, official cor-
ruption is one more factor in favor of leaving. Potential emigrants from
Mexico's middle class-particularly professionals and others who hope to
be entrepreneurs rather than employees-might view the cost, frustration,
and uncertainty that attaches to a system with endemic official corruption
as a significant "push" factor.287 This group is the segment of the population
that Mexico values most because of the group's industry and human capi-
tal. At the same time, this group is the subset of potential immigrants to
whom legal entry to the United States is likely to be the most important,
and, as discussed below, NAFTA facilitates their legal immigration.
288
2. Crime
Unlike official corruption, ordinary crime-particularly crime against
the person-traditionally has been less prevalent in Mexico than in many
societies. Unfortunately, in recent years Mexico has seen a marked increase
in crime, including violent crimes such as murder, rape, and, perhaps the
most destabilizing, kidnapping. Kidnapping is a large and growing prob-
281 Mexico's Emerging E-Government, supra note 189, at 153.
282 See id.
283 Id.
214 Id. at n.39.
285 Id.
286 Mexico's Emerging E-Government, supra note 189, at 153.
287 But see Jordan, supra note 274 ("[M]any businesspeople and citizens who have
mastered the bribe system don't want it to end .... Handing over a briefcase full of cash
for a factory building permit is simpler than a year-long review process.").
288 See infra notes 351-365 and accompanying text; Jordan, supra note 274. Resigna-
tion to corruption is probably a more typical response. "Corruption is so common that
people have stopped being upset about it. According to Eduardo Bohorquez, the director of
Transparency Mexico,... surveys confirm that Mexicans tolerate corruption. That's under-
standable, he said, given their lack of trust in the legal system." Id.
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lem2 89 in Mexico that frequently involves official corruption.290 Kidnappers
appear to be shifting focus from the more affluent, traditional victims to
younger men and women of relatively modest means, presumably because
the criminals regard them as readily available "soft" targets-those with-
out the protection of bodyguards and armored cars.2 91
Other crimes-street muggings, residential and commercial burglar-
ies, and auto thefts-also are sharply on the rise, in large part because of
police corruption. Members of the police force, from the top levels to the
street cop, not only accept bribes to turn a blind eye, but frequently are
themselves the perpetrators. The administration of former Mexican Presi-
dent Vicente Fox took significant steps in its effort to eradicate corrup-
tion, 92 but the problem continues to be extremely serious.
One can argue that NAFTA has contributed to the crime problem to
some degree. First, to the extent that NAFTA has made economic condi-
tions worse (a debatable point discussed at length throughout this Arti-
cle), NAFFA may have pushed some displaced honest workers to crime out
of desperation. Second, even if NAFTA did not make conditions worse
overall, it has destabilized the economy and thus the society. This creates
conditions that may allow some people to use crime as a new and easier
path to get money.
Possibly even more than corruption, crime is a significant "push" factor
to emigrate. In contemporary Mexico, this is particularly true for the up-
289 Although the accuracy of available data is questionable, see infra note 290, avail-
able figures are very disturbing. A recent report from the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations indicated that kidnapping incidents doubled in Mexico between 2001
and 2002, from 245 to 464, respectively. Eliza Barclay, Kidnappings Still Plague Mexico,
UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 9, 2004. Figures provided by a private-sector organization indi-
cate that between 1970 and 1976, 32 kidnapping victims were killed by their captors and
between 2000 and 2005, 43 of 199 victims were killed in 2005. Id.
290 It is difficult to estimate the scope of this crime with any precision because only a
relatively small percentage of kidnappings is reported to the police. Given that current and
former police officers are believed to be involved in many kidnappings and are also be-
lieved to provide protection for kidnapping gangs, families of kidnapping victims do not
want the police involved in their negotiations with the kidnappers. Mexico Kidnappings
Deadliest in Latin America (NBC television broadcast Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://
www. msnbc.msn.com/id/10546934/from/RL.1/%20***. Numerous studies indicate that over
90% of kidnappings are not reported to the police because many (perhaps most) Mexicans
believe that doing so is a futile exercise, in view of the known complicity of the authorities
in kidnappings. Barnard R. Thompson, Kidnappings Are out of Control in Mexico, MEXI
DATA.INFO, June 14, 2004, http://www.mexidata.info/id2l7.html.
291 Mexico's kidnapping problem has created a billion-dollar-a-year private security indus-
try, which provides wealthy families and large businesses with bodyguards, armored cars,
training to prevent kidnappings, and even kidnap negotiators. Gretchen Peters, Kidnapping
Thrives in Mexico, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 2002, available at http://www.csmoni
tor.comI2002/0917/p06s02-woam.htm. Demonstrating the severity of the problem, automobile
manufacturers, such as Volkswagen, have begun introducing bullet- and fire-proof models
in the Mexican market. Id.
292 In April 2004, for example, an entire police force of 550 officers in the State of Mo-
relos was suspended based on allegations that a significant number of the officers were serving
as escorts for planeloads of cocaine into Cuernavaca, the state capital and a weekend resort
near Mexico City. Jordan, supra note 274.
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wardly mobile middle class. Such people may worry that the future is one in
which they work and save for years only to lose the fruits of their labor
overnight, when the worker or a family member is kidnapped. Thus, es-
pecially in the case of the professionals who qualify for temporary immi-
gration through NAFTA, a move to the United States should prove to be
an attractive alternative.
3. Political Unrest
Unemployment and underemployment, low wages, income disparity,
a poor national economy, corruption, and crime have created much po-
litical unrest throughout Mexico, but particularly in Mexico City. NAFTA
seems to have indirectly contributed to this unrest because the economic
dislocations propitiated by NAFTA have bred much discontent among the
populace.
The major protests that have erupted since NAFTA took effect, whose
magnitude has not been seen in over thirty years, reflect Mexicans' frus-
tration with the problems that have plagued Mexico for years. The Chia-
pas Rebellion of 1994293 was only the beginning of the disturbance. Farmers
throughout Mexico have continued protesting the importation of Ameri-
can agricultural products and continue to seek the renegotiation of NAFTA's
agricultural trade provisions. 94 The serious problems of corruption295 and
crime 296 led to the June 27, 2004 demonstration in which hundreds of thou-
sands of Mexicans marched to the National Palace to demand that the
government implement heightened security measures.2 97 Since June 2006,
protesters in the State of Oaxaca have taken over the downtown area seeking
to remove the governor, whose election the protesters allege was rigged, and
also demanding a wage increase for teachers. This protest has reduced
tourism in the capital city of Oaxaca by 75%, costing the city more than
$45 million. 298 Fighting between drug gangs in the border town of Nuevo
Laredo and Acapulco have led to street gun battles and executions. Clashes
between miners' unions and police in April 2006 resulted in at least two
deaths before the employer steel company backed down after a four-month
strike.
299
293 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 273-288 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 289-292 and accompanying text.
297 See infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text.
298 loan Grillo, Tourists Staying Clear of Mexican Town as Unrest Fears Mount, Asso-
CIATED PRESS, July 22, 2006.
299 David Luhnow & John Lyons, Disorderly Conduct: As Mexico Awaits Vote Deci-
sion, Social Upheaval Is on the Rise-Calder6n, the Likely President, Will Face Mass Pro-
tests, Challenge to State Authority-Radical Takeover in Oaxaca, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
2006, at A1, A6 (deaths referenced in infographic appearing only in print copy).
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Political unrest reached almost unprecedented levels after the July 2,
2006 presidential election when business-oriented Felipe Calder6n defeated
leftist candidate Andrds Manuel L6pez Obrador. On September 1, 2006,
President Fox was prevented from entering the Mexican Congress build-
ing to give his last state-of-the-union address when leftist lawmakers
stormed the stage protesting the disputed presidential elections and de-
manding a complete recount.3°° After months of anticipation, the Mexican
electoral court handed down its decision on September 5, 2006. The court
ruled that no fraud had occurred in the July 2 election process and de-
clared Felipe Calder6n to be Mexico's president-elect due to take office
on December 1, 2006. Although L6pez Obrador vehemently stated that nei-
ther he nor his supporters would recognize the new government, Felipe
Calder6n was sworn in as the next President of the United Mexican States as
scheduled.3 10
When coupled with the significant economic problems that Mexicans
have faced in the last twelve years, the resulting social and political un-
rest that has been brewing during the same period created strong "push"
factors. It is reasonable to predict that serious concern (perhaps even fear)
about the uncertainty of Mexico's economic, social, and political future will
result in more emigration, including that of professionals.
D. Increased Governmental Responsiveness to Public Discontent
The social and political unrest described in the preceding section is
certainly a cause for concern, but its impact has not been altogether nega-
tive. Perhaps the most encouraging sign now coming from Mexico is the
fact that the these demonstrations are pressuring the government to re-
solve the economic and non-economic problems described above, and
that the government is responding not by force, but by reconciliation. Here,
NAFTA's contribution seems ironic and almost perverse. By making the
economic situation worse, or, at least, being blamed for doing so and, there-
fore, contributing to instability, NAFTA has energized the populace toward a
positive end. Indeed, one of the most frequently stated demands of protest-
ers is for renegotiation of NAFTA. Thus, it can be argued that NAFTA is
slowly transforming the Mexican government into one that is more account-
able to the people. The very fact that the Mexican economy has not im-
proved in the last twelve years, NAFTA notwithstanding (many would say
because of NAFTA), has resulted in significant social and political devel-
opments. This Section discusses some of them.
100 Julie Watson, Protests Stop Mexican President's Final State-of-Nation Speech, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 2006, at 7A.
'0' Noticiero con Joaquin Lrpez Ddriga (GalavisionlUnivision television broadcast Sept.
5, 2006); see also James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexico's Presidential Elections Pits Promise
Against Fears, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A3.
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One significant development has been heightened citizen activism,
evidenced by rebellions and demonstrations. In the past twelve years, such
demonstrations of popular discontent-on a level not seen in Mexico since
the 1970s-have become common. In at least some instances, these de-
velopments can be tied rather directly to NAFTA. Most notably, the Chiapas
Rebellion erupted on the day NAFTA became effective. The rebellion was
an important event in directing Mexico toward democracy, not only be-
cause of the size of the rebellion but also because it sent a message to the
Mexican government that the people were no longer willing to sit quietly
and do as they were told. The indigenous groups that participated in the
Chiapas Rebellion had a number of demands, one of which was that
NAFTA's agricultural provisions be renegotiated.30 2 Negotiations and com-
promises between the Mexican government and these indigenous groups
gave birth to "Mexican ethnic law," laws passed by the Mexican Congress
recognizing the rights of various Mexican indigenous groups.3 °3 Large dem-
onstrations by the indigenous population and farmers have continued to
erupt frequently. These protests have mobilized farmers to demand agrar-
ian reform.3°4
The Mexican government has taken notice of these demonstrations
and adopted measures designed to appease these indigenous groups.3 5
Given that Mexico's recent past has included bloody repression of dem-
onstrations, 30 6 the government's restraint is an encouraging sign.
NAFTA has not been the sole focus of popular discontent. For example,
on June 27, 2004, more than 450,000307 Mexican citizens marched to the
National Palace to demand that the government adopt more stringent meas-
ures to combat crime and corruption. As a result of this carefully planned
demonstration, the Mexican government responded swiftly by proposing
measures meant to address crime and corruption.3 8 Also, within weeks of
302 See Vargas, supra note 76; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
303 Id.
304 See generally WISE, NAFTA's UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
305 Id.
306 Perhaps the most infamous incident of violent repression during the PRI's lengthy
reign was the Tlatelolco Massacre. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
307 Televised newscasts in Mexico City stated that 450,000 participants demonstrated
on the Zocalo, the plaza in the center of downtown Mexico City facing the National Palace,
itself, but that as many as one million people participated, with tens of thousands packing
every street leading to the Zocalo. The breadth of participation was also felt when, at ex-
actly 1:00 p.m., vehicles in the neighboring areas stopped, their drivers got out, and "eve-
ryone," even those watching the demonstration on television, sang the Mexican national
anthem, as a sign of solidarity. Noticiero con Joaquin L6pez D6riga (Galavision/Univision
television broadcast June 28, 2004).
308 Some of these measures are: (1) establishment of an open dialogue between citizens
and the government through a program referred to as the Apertura [opening]; (2) official
recognition of "Citizens Committees," which were to communicate citizen demands to the
government and an establishment of a time frame within which the government should rea-
sonably be expected to respond; (3) lowering the age of majority for purposes of criminal
prosecution from eighteen to fifteen years of age, so that young criminals could be tried as
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the demonstration, the Mexican government implemented the Megaop-
erativo [Megaoperation] program as part of the government's overall strat-
egy to more efficiently combat crime and instability."9
The Mexican Congress's approval of President Fox's request for one
billion pesos (approximately $90 million) in the 2005 national budget for
enhanced security provides another example of the government's new
responsiveness. This appropriation would fund, among other things, the
Centro Nacional de Acopio de Informaci6n [National Center for Informa-
tion Gathering]. This high-tech center enables authorities to track indi-
viduals who become victims of crimes through a micro-chip embedded
under their skin. This program thus aims to aid authorities to find victims
of crime, particularly in kidnapping cases.31 0
An unprecedented step in governmental accountability occurred when a
former president was made the subject of a serious criminal investiga-
tion. The investigation sought to determine the role and possible culpabil-
ity of Luis Echeverrfa Alvarez in the Tlatelolco Massacre on October 2,
1968, and the Corpus Cristi Massacre on June 10, 1971. During these
events dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of student demonstrators were killed
by police allegedly following the orders of Echeverrfa, who was Secre-
tario de Gobernaci6n [Secretary of the Interior] in 1968 and President of
Mexico in 1971. Following a long succession of rulings, the Mexican courts
concluded that President Echeverrfa could not be brought to trial for his
role in either the Tlatelolco Massacre or the Corpus Cristi Massacre.3
adults and incarcerated in adult penitentiaries rather than youth detention facilities; and
(4) prohibition of cell phones in prisons, in an effort to prevent members of organized
crime rings from continuing their business (kidnapping operations, for example) from prison.
In addition, citizens were to have "free access" to non-confidential government informa-
tion concerning any criminal activity that may further endanger the security of Mexicans, a
"voice and a vote" on measures to be taken by the government to prevent crime, and the
right to attend, unannounced, the daily morning meetings held at the office of the mayor of
Mexico City. Noticiero con Joaqufn L6pez Driga (Galavision/Univision television broad-
cast July 12, 2004). It is unclear whether some of these measures were announced only to
appease the Mexican citizenry rather than actually being measures the government was
committed to implementing. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Mexicans are demanding
government action and accountability rather than assuming that change is impossible, and
that the government is responding not with force but with, at least in appearance, answers.
309Noticiero con JoaquIn Ldpez D6riga (Galavision/Univision television broadcast July
24, 2004).
3l0 Because the chip was to be implanted under the skin and the procedure costs the in-
dividual $200, it is not known how many people have actually used this security measure.
Mexico's Attorney General and government officials led by example by having the micro-
chip implanted. Id.
311 During his campaign President Fox, the first president who was not a member of
PRI, the party that had ruled Mexico for over seventy years, had promised in his campaign
to investigate human rights abuses by his predecessors. After his inauguration, he appointed a
special prosecutor to conduct such an investigation. The statute of limitations for ordinary
homicide had expired, but the special prosecutor sought to avoid this by charging Echever-
rfa with genocide. In 2004, however, a Mexican federal judge ruled that Mexico's longer,
30-year statute of limitations for genocide had also expired. The special prosecutor then
argued that Mexico's genocide statute of limitations did not apply, based on an international
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Nevertheless, the important fact remains that Echeverria was the subject
of a serious federal criminal investigation for the possible violation of the
law while he was discharging his duties as Secretary of the Interior and
President of Mexico- unthinkable in the recent past.
Finally, perhaps the most telling step in this series of post-NAFTA
increases in government openness and accountability occurred when the
one-party system that had dominated political life since the Revolution of
1910 gave way to free elections. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional
("PRI") candidate had won every presidential election through 1994 but
lost the presidency in 2000 and finished third in 2006.
All of these government actions cannot be attributed entirely to citi-
zen discontent, nor can that discontent be attributed entirely, or even
principally, to NAFTA. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that NAFTA has
been an important factor in motivating and activating the Mexican popu-
lace, and that the government has responded to the emboldened citizenry
in unprecedented ways. While one may regard these developments as
either more or less important than Mexico's poor economic performance,
they clearly should not be overlooked in making an overall assessment of
the state of affairs in Mexico over the past twelve years.
IV. NAFTA's ROLE IN IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO
Over the past two years, immigration has emerged as a top-rung po-
litical issue in the United States. Although Congress has taken some action
in the last year,3 1 the debate about illegal immigration and the policies
the United States must adopt will continue. As noted at the outset of this
Article,3"3 one of the important considerations in the NAFTA debate was
its expected effect on Mexican immigration into the United States. This
Part evaluates that complex effect, both on immigration since 1994, and,
more speculatively, looking to the future. First, the unrealistically opti-
mistic public pronouncements of the officials who negotiated the treaty are
presented. Whether or not these statements reflected the actual thinking
of the officials and governments involved, these statements had the effect
treaty Mexico signed in 2002. The judge held that the provisions of the international treaty
could not be applied retroactively. In February 2005, the Mexican Supreme Court affirmed
the ruling. In June 2005, however, the Supreme Court revived the case against Echeverria
holding that the statute was tolled in the 1971 Corpus Cristi Massacre until he left office in
1976. Thus, the charges against him had been brought within the thirty-year statute of
limitations for genocide. The prosecution's victory, however, was short-lived. On July 26,
2005, a federal judge ruled that Echeverrfa-then eighty-three years old--could not be
tried for genocide because the evidence did not support the legal requirement that the ac-
tions be directed at a particular national or ethnic group. While the judge found suffi-cient
evidence of homicide, the statute of limitations for that charge had expired in 1985, and
that decision cannot be appealed. Ronald L. Ecker, The Tlatelolco Massacre in Mexico,
http://www.hobrad.com/massacre.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
312 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006).
313 See supra notes 65, 73 and accompanying text.
2007]
Harvard Latino Law Review
of creating unrealistic expectations and thus sowed the seeds for future disil-
lusionment. Second, consideration is given to the reasons for immigration in
general and for the recent tide of Mexican immigration into the United
States in particular. Third, this Part differentiates the short-term and long-
term effects of NAFTA on Mexican immigration into the United States. It
considers the possibility that the treaty may lead to large-scale immigra-
tion for twenty or thirty years but lay the groundwork for considerably
lower levels of immigration, particularly of illegal immigration, in the
long-term. Finally, the TN visa provisions-the one aspect of NAFTA
most directly affecting immigration-are briefly described and evaluated.
A. High Expectations
On the basis of economic theory, the governments of the United States
and Mexico predicted that increased free trade in goods and services,
increased foreign direct investment, and overall economic integration cre-
ated by NAFTA would accelerate job creation and wage increases in Mexico
and would, therefore, reduce incentives for immigration into the United
States. For example, when NAFTA's side agreements on environmental
and labor issues were signed at the White House on September 14, 1993,
then-President Clinton said that NAFTA would help close the gap be-
tween wages in the United States and Mexico, resulting in less illegal
immigration into the United States.3 14 Also in 1993, then-U.S. Secretary
of State Warren Christopher said, "As Mexico's economy prospers, higher
wages and greater opportunity will reduce the pressure for illegal immi-
gration into the United States." '315 This expectation arose, in part, from the
supposition that labor-intensive jobs in the United States would be re-
duced as jobs and industries that traditionally relied on Mexican workers
moved their operations to Mexico.
16
At least publicly, the Mexican government shared the optimistic
view of the Clinton Administration. Then-President Carlos Salinas de Gor-
tari often emphasized that the goal of NAFTA was "to export goods, not
people."3 7 In a 1993 speech to the International Industrial Conference in
San Francisco, Salinas expressed the Mexican government's hopes for
NAFTA in these terms:
It is trade that will provide us with the opportunities to produce
more, to create more opportunities for Mexico ... [Those] Mexi-
cans who come to the United States looking for jobs take risks
... and are very talented. That is why we want them in Mexico
314 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
315 NAFTA at 10, MIGRATION NEWS, supra note 155.
316 See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
117 MANNING, supra note 155, at 1.
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... so they will not use their courage, ability, and risk-taking will-
ingness for the development of another country.318
It is understandable that Presidents Clinton and Salinas wanted to
put the best possible face on NAFTA, to sell the agreement before ratifica-
tion, and to claim political credit for what they no doubt viewed as a signifi-
cant achievement. In retrospect, both presidents' portrayal of NAFTA as
both extremely important and beneficial created a situation where the
eventual reality would be disappointing. Unrealistically high expectations,
particularly in Mexico, about NAFTA's effect on the Mexican economy,
and, therefore, on Mexican immigration, almost ensured that any negative
economic developments or any increase in immigration would be blamed
on NAFTA.319 Regrettably, expectations about NAFTA's effect on immi-
gration have not been realized. To the contrary, millions of Mexicans have
immigrated into the United States in the last twelve years.
B. Immigration in General
1. The Scope of Mexican Immigration Since 1994
United Nations' figures rank the United States as the country with
the highest rate of immigration and Mexico as the country with the high-
est rate of emigration.32 ° Although Mexican immigration into the United
States is nothing new, the United States has witnessed an important so-
cial phenomenon in the unprecedented wave of legal and illegal Mexican
immigration over the last twelve years. The numbers seen during this period
are unprecedented even in the 1800s and early 1900s, when millions of
European immigrants passed through Ellis Island. During the period from
1995 to 2004, almost 1.6 million Mexicans immigrated into the United
States legally, and more than double that number came illegally.321 Esti-
mates of the Mexican population currently living in the country illegally
range between 6.0 and 6.2 million,3 2 of these, approximately two-thirds
318 Id.
319 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, The Shifting Expectations of Free Trade and Migra-
tion, in NAFTA's PROMISE AND REALITY, supra note 37, at 39.
320 POPULATION DIv., UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, WORLD
POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2004 REVISION, VOLUME M: ANALYTICAL REPORT 90 tbl.V.2
(2006); Philip L. Martin, Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA, 3
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFFAIRS 419 (1998).
321 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2004 YEAR-
BOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 12, tbl.3 (2006); Gary C. Hufbauer & Yee Wong, Secu-
rity and the Economy in the North American Context, 29 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 53, 56 (2003)
(reporting that 2.5 million Mexicans lived in the United States illegally in 1995 and about
4.5 million in 2000).
322 HOEFER ET AL., supra note 9 (reporting 6 million Mexicans living in the United
States illegally); Passel, supra note 9 (reporting 6.2 million Mexicans living in the United
States illegally).
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have been here for ten years or less.323 Both illegal and legal immigration
into the United States, combined with the families that these migrants
start in America, have led to an increasing Hispanic population in the
United States. U.S. Census studies project the population of individuals
of Hispanic origin to represent 44% of the overall population growth in
the United States by the year 2025, and that nearly 60% of that Hispanic
population will be of Mexican origin.
3 24
2. Why Do They Come?
Socioeconomic and political events in the world have historically
triggered immigration into the United States. The Irish Potato Famine
(1845-1850), Russian pogroms against Jews during the nineteenth cen-
tury, the two World Wars, the Russian Revolution (1917), and the rise of
communism in Cuba (1950s) and Vietnam (1970s) are only a few exam-
ples of events that have propelled increased immigration. A web of complex
factors triggers people's desire to emigrate from their native country;
therefore, it is difficult to assess NAFTA's role in the unprecedented
number of Mexicans who have immigrated to the United States in the last
twelve years. Nonetheless, because in the debate leading to U.S. ratification,
both critics and supporters attached considerable weight to the expected
impact of NAFTA on immigration, it is important to consider the degree
to which NAFTA has, in fact, played a role on migration from Mexico to
the United States.
To the degree that the implementation of NAFTA, in particular its
free trade and foreign investment provisions, has caused dislocations in
important sectors of the Mexican economy, NAFTA has been an impor-
tant contributor to Mexican immigration. Although the Mexican govern-
ment attempted to prepare Mexico for the anticipated dislocations that
would result from NAFTA with a number of policies moving toward re-
structuring Mexico's economy, these transition policies were not sufficient
to enable Mexico to face the major economic shocks that NAFTA would
propitiate. Thus, the realities of globalization, reflected in increased eco-
nomic liberalization, integration, and competition, initiated in the early
1980s and solidified by NAFTA, represent significant events in Mexico's
recent economic history that, together, have contributed to increased Mexi-
can immigration into the United States. Other contributing, mainly pre-
NAFTA, economic factors include Mexico's policy of economic protec-
tionism (for example, its use of import substitution industrialization,325 in
323 Dickerson, supra note 158.
324 Bradly J. Condon & J. Brad McBride, Do You Know the Way to San Jose? Resolving
the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States, 17 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 251,
254 (2003).
325 State-led import substitution industrialization ("ISI") was a policy through which
Mexico tried to develop local "infant" industries by protecting them from competition from
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force for most of the twentieth century, but particularly from the mid-1940s
to the mid-1980s) the economic crises of 1982 and the mid-1990s, and
the peso devaluation of 1994-1995.326 The convergence of these factors
has created distressing socio-economic and political conditions in Mex-
ico that have made legal and illegal immigration into the United States an
attractive option for Mexicans." 7
The factors that lead individuals to leave Mexico, "push" factors,
3 28
dictate whether they immigrate legally or illegally. Mexico's economic prob-
lems have affected low-skilled and unskilled workers more significantly than
skilled workers. Those low-skilled and unskilled workers leaving Mexico
principally for economic reasons-seeking jobs that the Mexican economy
has been unable to create-generally are willing to assume the risks in-
herent in immigrating to the United States illegally in order to improve
their standard of living and that of their family in Mexico as soon as pos-
sible. Thus, unemployment and overall poor economic conditions in Mexico
have been important contributors to Mexican illegal immigration.
While Mexican professionals have also been adversely affected by
Mexico's poor economy in that many are unemployed, underemployed,
and underpaid, economic concerns may not be the principal factor that drive
them out of Mexico. For them, Mexico's serious social problems may
"push" them to immigrate to the United States. Although crime and inse-
curity affect everyone in a society, particularly lucrative crimes, such as
kidnapping, disproportionately affect the rich. For various reasons, most
of these professionals are unlikely to opt for illegal immigration if they
decide to leave home. Thus, Mexico's socio-political problems, even more
than its economic problems, will likely contribute to legal immigration.
An important sociological factor that also contributes to increased
Mexican migration is the increasingly important role of "transnational
communities"-communities of immigrants in the United States that main-
tain close contact with communities in Mexico, and which facilitate the
continued migration of relatives and friends-because they lower the bar-
riers that accompany migration to a new country. These transnational com-
munities or networks are no longer located mainly along the border between
the United States and Mexico. They exist all over the United States, and
they play an important role in setting up social structures that facilitate
not only the initial immigration of individuals but also the procurement
of jobs, housing, schools, and other necessities once the immigrants ar-
imports through tariffs, import quotas, exchange rate controls, subsidies, and preferential
treatment of capital imports. Papademetriou, supra note 319, at 58.
326 Id. at 47-48; see also Robert Collier, NAFTA Gives Mexicans New Reasons to Leave,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1998, at Al l (arguing that the adverse economic effects of trade
liberalization caused by Mexico's accession to the GATT in 1986 and the financial crisis in
Southeast Asia and Russia in the late 1990s also contributed to Mexican migration to the
United States).
327 See generally Papademetriou, supra note 319.
328 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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rive.32 9 This factor is probably more important for individuals planning to
immigrate illegally than for those who do so legally.
Thus, it is difficult to assess the separate contribution of NAFTA to
Mexican immigration in the last twelve years. However, Mexico's socio-
political problems, more than its economic problems, may be important
contributors to Mexican legal immigration.
C. Differentiating the Past and Future Effect of NAFTA on Mexican
Immigration into the United States
1. 1994 to the Present
The surge of Mexican immigration has roughly coincided with
NAFTA's entry into force. While NAFTA has played a role, the treaty alone
has not triggered this exodus. It is, therefore, difficult to assess the sepa-
rate contribution of NAFTA to Mexican immigration in the last twelve
years.
This Article has detailed many of the economic problems that Mex-
ico has faced in the past twelve years and has discussed NAFTA's significant
contributions to painful economic dislocations. On the other hand, it is
entirely plausible to argue that NAFTA has forced Mexico to become more
competitive. Precisely by precipitating a shakeout of inefficient produc-
ers, which has undoubtedly been (and still is) painful albeit necessary,
NAFTA may have helped Mexico become more competitive in interna-
tional commerce and more able to create a prosperous future for its peo-
ple.330 Moreover, even if NAFTA had somehow provided the promised
economic bonanza to Mexico without dislocations, it could not realisti-
cally have been hoped that the Mexican economy would absorb the very
high number of new entrants to the labor market while, simultaneously,
closing the enormous gaps in wage rates between Mexico and the United
States that existed prior to NAFTA--certainly not in twelve years. NAFTA,
therefore, may have performed as well as could be expected.
Under any realistic scenario, the attractions of immigration into the
United States would have been very strong over the past twelve years for
several reasons. First, and foremost, is unemployment. It is not surprising
that the Mexican economy's inability to create sufficient jobs has been an
important "push" factor, especially when during the same period a strong
American economy was creating an abundant supply of jobs that paid
significantly higher wages than workers could have earned in Mexico.
Second, crime is an increasingly important "push" factor. Concern
for safety and well-being due to increased crime in general, but particu-
329 N~stor P. Rodriguez, The Social Construction of the U.S-Mexico Border, in IMMI-
GRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 223, 224 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); see also Papademetriou, supra note 319, at 44.330 See generally supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
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larly violent crime, including those related to the drug-trade and kidnap-
ping, is an additional factor that makes Mexicans willing to leave home.
Kidnapping is particularly important to Mexicans in the middle and up-
per classes, who would more likely become kidnapping targets. Crime in
general, by contrast, would be important to all because such crime affects
everyone.
The third "push" factor is an increase in the long-standing popular
distrust of, and frustration with, the Mexican government. The unrealistic
expectations raised by the Mexican government regarding the benefits
NAFTA would bring about, followed by a significant drop in the standard
of living of millions of Mexicans, increased the distrust Mexicans tradi-
tionally had for their government based on its history of corruption and,
until recently, non-responsiveness.33' When this distrust of the govern-
ment is coupled with economic dislocations, crime, and other social prob-
lems, the result has been increased feelings of helplessness and despair.332
A fourth emerging "push" factor is socio-political unrest. Ironically,
as the political system opens to real competition and the government be-
comes more responsive-both desirable trends in the long term-the short-
term effect has been heightened political tension. In particular, the politi-
cal unrest surrounding the 2006 presidential elections is of concern. The
major protests led by L6pez Obrador, his allegations of fraud, and his re-
fusal to recognize the legitimacy of the future government of his oppo-
nent created concern among Mexicans about the country's future.333
Thus, even if NAFTA were performing as well as might have been
realistically hoped, one would see an overall poor quality of life in Mex-
ico due to economic, social, and political problems.
The fundamental reason that underlies Mexican emigration, there-
fore, is a quest for economic opportunity and personal security, which is
consistent with principles of international migration theory. As this Arti-
cle has already proposed, the reasons for international migration are com-
plex and significantly affected by socio-economic and political events in
the sending (for purposes of this Article, Mexico) and receiving (the United
States) countries and, indeed, throughout the world. The "push" factors
identified above as fueling Mexican immigration into the United States
since 1994 seem consistent with the analysis of Dr. Papademetriou con-
cerning immigration in general.33 4
33 See supra notes 273-288, 302-311 and accompanying text.
332 Many young people find that years of hard work in school seem to be leading no-
where. "The lack of options, according to officials, health experts and educators, has con-
tributed to widespread underemployment, crime, drug abuse and rising suicide rates among
young people." Mary Jordan, As Doors Close, a Generation Grows Desperate; Mexico's
Youths Face Dwindling Opportunities in College Admissions, Jobs, and Emigration, WASH.
POST., Oct 4, 2003, at A15.
311 See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
134 See generally Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Immigration Symposium: Reflections on
International Migration and its Future, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 933 (2002) [hereinafter Reflections].
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While people emigrate from their native country for many reasons,
Dr. Papademetriou contends that "enduring causes" underlie most patterns
of international migration.335 He argues that migration's most fundamen-
tal causes are people's desire for personal security and economic improve-
ment, which, in turn, is influenced by a desire to defend oneself and one's
family from personal insecurity33 6 and the dramatic deterioration or com-
plete absence of economic opportunity.337 Of these two causes, the desire for
economic improvement is one of international migration's constants.338
For these two conditions to substantially expand migration flow, how-
ever, Dr. Papademetriou argues that a number of preconditions must ex-
ist, among which the following are most important:
(1) The pre-existence of a long-term political and economic re-
lationship between sending and host societies; (2) an active ap-
preciation by the receiving society's elites of the economic benefits
of migration; (3) the presence of a large, mature "anchor" ethnic
community in the country of destination, which becomes an in-
dispensable 'enabler' of [the immigration of others belonging to
the same group]; and (4) an overall philosophical opposition to
the circumstances migrants are attempting to escape by key con-
stituencies in the prospective destination country.
3 9
Each of these preconditions appears to be met when applied to immigra-
tion from Mexico, which helps one to understand more clearly the impor-
tant social phenomenon of the unprecedented wave of Mexican migration
to the United States in the last twelve years.
335 Id. at 953-55.
336 "Personal insecurity" is a term that applies to situations of political, social, and cul-
tural intolerance, or, at the extreme, gross group-based violations of human and other
rights that amount to persecution. Id. at 953. While the socio-political problems Mexico
has faced in the last twelve years may not neatly fit this definition, Mexicans are, indeed,
concerned about personal insecurity not only due to socio-political unrest and uncertainty
about the future of their country, see supra notes 307-310 and accompanying text, but also
due to the significant economic problems Mexico has had in the last twelve years, particu-
larly those affecting subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector of the economy. See
supra notes 158-181 and accompanying text.
337 The term "dramatic economic deterioration" does not have to reach the level of a
catastrophic situation. Dr. Papademetriou explains that it "encompasses the systematic
failure (some will say willful disinterest) of governments to redress [economic problems]
that economically handicap certain segments of the population." Reflections, supra note
334. However, it would be unfounded and unjust to assert that the Mexican government has
willfully failed to redress Mexico's significant economic problems or that it has shown
willful disinterest about those economic problems. The Mexican government has, in fact,
been more responsive than in the past about addressing concerns of its citizens. See supra
notes 302-311 and accompanying text. Yet, the Mexican government's efforts and policies
have not been sufficient to slow down the deterioration of Mexico's economy in the last
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Mexicans are highly attracted to the United States because of several
powerful "pull" factors. They see that they could have a much better life
in the United States. It is a country that is wealthy, politically free, and
geographically close to Mexico; it has an economy that provides plentiful
jobs at wages significantly higher than those in Mexico; it provides good
schools and government benefits; and it increasingly accepts Spanish lan-
guage and Mexican culture. The crucial factor facilitating massive immi-
gration, however, may be that the United States has found it difficult to
implement effective means to block immigration.34 Under these circum-
stances, the entirely predictable result is that large numbers of Mexicans
have come and will continue to come to the United States, legally and ille-
gally.
It is by no means clear, however, that NAFTA is a principal reason
for this immigration growth. Historically, two constant factors that have
contributed to Mexican immigration into the United States have been labor
market interdependence between Mexico and the United States and the
role of family and social networks of Mexicans already in the United States.
Because available data indicate that these two factors have not been
significantly affected by NAFTA's free trade,34 ' it cannot be said that
NAFTA is the principal cause of immigration from Mexico in the last
twelve years.
2. NAFTA's Effects on Future Immigration
To the degree that NAFTA is a factor in Mexican immigration into
the United States, the effect may vary markedly depending upon whether
we focus on the short term (perhaps twenty-five years) or the long term.
Some economists, notably Dr. Philip Martin, 342 argue that free trade trig-
gers increased immigration in the short run, but results in decreased im-
migration in the long run-the idea of an "immigration hump." '343 By this
line of reasoning, the free trade agreement sets the stage for an improve-
ment in the economy of the weaker partner (Mexico, in the case of NAFTA),
but at the cost of dislocations that trigger increased emigration from the
weaker partner. However, assuming that improvement continues after the
dislocations have passed, the improved economic conditions in the weaker
economy may create more jobs at home and less of an economic "push"
to emigrate a.3 In the case of Mexico, demographic patterns provide an addi-
340 See supra note 1 1 and accompanying text.
341 Papademetriou, supra note 319, at 46.
342 Martin, supra note 320. The ideas advanced in this paragraph draw heavily on Dr.
Martin's analysis.343 id. at 244.
3441 d.; see also Rodriguez, supra note 329 (arguing that to achieve the goal of economic
integration sought by free trade agreements, international borders must, almost by neces-
sity, be less rigid and permit increased immigration through the transnational movement of
workers because the notion of nation-state borders is incongruous with the economic goals
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tional reason to perceive an impending decline in illegal immigration,
even as it continues to increase. As noted earlier, 45 the birth rate in Mex-
ico has dropped precipitously; the average Mexican woman in 1970 bore
6.5 children,346 but her counterpart in 2006 bears only 2.4 children.
34 7
While the high birth rates of the past are still fueling rapid increases in
the size of the labor force, within the foreseeable future (Dr. Martin sug-
gests as early as 2014),34s the falling birth rates will be reflected in smaller
annual increases in the number of Mexicans who need jobs. The combi-
nation of a stronger Mexican economy and a labor force growing at a
slower pace gives a solid basis for believing that the number of Mexicans
seeking employment in the United States-and particularly the number
willing to undertake the uncertainties associated with illegal immigration-
may drop in the foreseeable future, perhaps as precipitously as the num-
bers have risen in recent years.
3 49
This "immigration hump" theory is consistent with a thesis advanced
twenty-five years ago by Gerald L6pez, who argued that when substantial
economic disparity exists between two adjoining countries (such as the
United States and Mexico), and the country with the successful economy
"promotes, de facto or de jure," access to jobs and significantly higher
wages, citizens from the country with the less successful economy will
reasonably come to rely on the continuing possibility of migration (legal
or illegal), employment, and residence, until their home country provides
a competitive economy.
350
of globalization). Contra Papademetriou, supra note 319 (suggesting that free trade has not
been a significant factor in Mexican immigration into the United States).
41 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
346 STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION FROM MEX-
ico: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (2001), available at http://www.cis.
org/articles/2001/mexico/mexico.pdf [hereinafter Immigration from Mexico].
347 See supra note 130.
346 Writing in 1999, Dr. Martin suggested that in approximately fifteen years, immigra-
tion levels would return to the levels that would have existed had NAFTA not been imple-
mented. Martin, supra note 320, at 430.
Dr. Papademetriou has also observed that "the growth in the population of economi-
cally active people-those who are working or looking for work-has peaked." Papade-
metriou, supra note 213, at 46. While the economically active population will continue to
increase, it is expected to do so more slowly in the future, which should open more oppor-
tunities for Mexicans seeking work in Mexico. Id.
349 Id. at 424.
350 Gerald L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration
Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 640 (1981). Professor L6pez's article is not pri-
marily focused on the issue of how many immigrants we can expect from Mexico, and for
how long they will come, but, rather, what obligations we have to those who do come. An
important component of Professor L6pez's argument is the proposition that the United
States has not merely been passive, or inept (in the sense of being unable to control its border),
but has promoted the mass migration of Mexicans to the United States. The central thesis
of Professor L6pez's article is that the United States has a significant moral responsibility
to its undocumented workers, not only because undocumented workers play a valuable role
in the U.S. economy and society, but also because the United States has been a full partici-
pant in developing the policies that have led to the mass migration. "If we are not account-
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NAFTA, alone, has neither caused the wave of Mexican migration
nor will it stop it. Looking to the future, Mexico's success in opening its
political system while maintaining stability and in combating the perva-
sive evils of crime and corruption, will be extremely important. The key
to controlling emigration from Mexico, however, is the Mexican economy.
Legal and illegal Mexican immigration into the United States will con-
tinue on a large scale until the Mexican economy improves to create jobs.
Whatever its short-term effects, if NAFTA makes a long-term contribu-
tion to improving the Mexican economy, it will thereby make a long-term
contribution to curing the problem of immigration from Mexico.
D. NAFTA's Temporary Immigration Provisions and Their Effect on the
Potential Immigration of Mexican Professionals
An increased need for the easy movement of skilled workers across
transnational borders is one of the effects of economic globalization. A
regional economy, such as that created by NAFTA, also benefits if skilled
workers are able to work across national borders because foreign invest-
ment and trade in goods result in the need for more professionals' par-
ticipation in the process of integrating a regional economy. Thus, while
NAFTA was not implemented to promote the immigration of profession-
als (or anyone else), its drafters envisioned the need for professional ser-
vices and included provisions to facilitate the movement of professionals
and business persons with significant human capital among its three member
countries. NAFTA requires member countries to permit the temporary
immigration of individuals whose business and professional expertise will
promote NAFTA's goals of freer trade in goods and services as well as
foreign investment. Because NAFTA liberalizes trade in services, Chap-
ter 12351 and Chapter 16352 of NAFTA contain provisions to facilitate the
movement of service providers within member countries.353 Specifically,
Chapter 16 permits the temporary immigration of four groups of individuals
from any of the three member countries to either of the others. These
four groups are business visitors, traders and investors, intra-company
transferees, and professionals in sixty-three approved professions.35 4 Be-
able for the present condition of undocumented Mexican workers, we are at least responsi-
ble for the commitment implicit in our longstanding relationship. If involvement and
neighborhood matter, undocumented Mexican workers are part of the living and working
community. They are we." Id. at 713.
351 NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1213 Annex 1210.5.
32 NAFTA, supra note 6, app. 1603 § D(l) ("Temporary Entry of Business Persons").
311 See Condon & McBride, supra note 324 at 276-80.
314 Id. Following is NAFTA's list of approved professions: Accountant, architect, com-
puter systems analyst, disaster relief insurance claims adjuster, economist, engineer, graphic
designer, hotel manager, industrial designer, interior designer, land surveyor, landscape
architect, lawyer, librarian, management consultant, mathematician, range manager/range
conservationist, research assistant, scientific technician/technologist, social worker, sylvi-
culturist, technical publications writer, urban planner, vocational counselor, dentist, dieti-
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cause professionals are the group whose potential long-term immigration
is most important, this section discusses the potential effect of NAFTA's
temporary immigration provisions on the immigration of Mexican pro-
fessionals only.
A detailed explanation of the requirements to obtain a TN visa,355 the
process through which Mexican and Canadian professionals may tempo-
rarily immigrate to the United States, is beyond the scope of this Article,
but a brief overview conveys that the process is relatively easy. A Mexi-
can professional working in any of the approved professions and wishing
to come to work in the United States with a TN visa must first secure an
employment offer from an employer involved in professional activities
related to the applicant's profession in the United States.35 6 Once he or
she obtains the employment offer, the applicant must apply for a TN visa
at an American consulate in Mexico, where a consular officer will adju-
dicate the applicant's eligibility. The applicant must present a Mexican
passport as proof of Mexican citizenship;357 he must establish to the satis-
faction of the consular officer that he meets the requisite educational and
licensing requirements;358 he must provide evidence that he will engage
in business activities for an employer in the United States at a profes-
sional level; and he must establish that he meets the criteria to perform at
such professional level.359 When the visa is approved and issued-generally
within a few weeks, and assuming that he is not found to be inadmissible
at the port-of-entry by an immigration officer-the Mexican professional
can enter the United States with his TN visa and practice his profession.
TN visas are issued for one year but can be renewed yearly, apparently
without limit.3" Dependents of TN visa holders may accompany the prin-
tian, medical laboratory technologist, nutritionist, occupational therapist, pharmacist, phy-
sician, psychotherapist/physical therapist, psychologist, recreational therapist, registered
nurse, veterinarian, agriculturist, animal breeder, animal scientist, apiculturist, astronomer,
biochemist, chemist, dairy scientist, entomologist, epidemiologist, geneticist, geochemist,
geologist, geophysicist, horticulturist, meteorologist, pharmacologist, physicist, plant breeder,
poultry scientist, soil scientist, zoologist, college teacher, seminary teacher, and university
teacher. 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(c) (2006); NAFTA, supra note 6, app. 1603.D.1.
155 See 8 C.ER. § 214.6. A TN (Trade NAFTA) nonimmigrant visa is issued to a citizen
from Canada or Mexico who seeks admission to the United States to engage in professional
activities. NAFTA, supra note 6, app. 1603.D.1.
356 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(3)(ii).
357 The United States requires Mexican citizens to obtain passports and visas to enter
the United States, but Canadians do not need a visa and are required to present a Canadian
passport at the port of entry only when entering the United States from outside the Western
Hemisphere. 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(3)(i); see also ROBERT C. DIVINE & R. BLAKE CHISAM,
IMMIGRATION PRACTICE 17-122 (2005).
358 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(3)(ii).
359 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(D)(ii).
360 Because neither NAFTA nor the applicable regulations specify any limit on the
length of time a TN visa holder may remain in the United States, it is possible, at least in
theory, to renew TN visas for an indefinite period of time. An extended stay, even for years,
may be "temporary" as long as there is no immediate intent to immigrate. DIVINE & CHI-
SAM, supra note 357, at 17-134.
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cipal and may enter the United States with a TD visa.36' The most
difficult step in this process may be obtaining an employment offer. Once
the offer is in hand, obtaining a TN visa is relatively easy.
Because this simplified process is relatively new, it may be too early
to say how important NAFTA's TN visas will be in the immigration of
Mexican professionals. However, because a significant number of Mexi-
can professionals have already used TN visas in the last few years, it is
not unreasonable to envision a situation in which a Mexican professional
interested in leaving Mexico might view a TN visa as the quickest and
cheapest way for him to do so because he does not have to pay any fees.362
Admissions to the United States under TN nonimmigrant status in the
last few years are as follows: 363
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
TN 68,354 91,279 95,486 73,699 59,446 66,219 65,010
visas
(total)





Mexi- 1,278 2,059 2,571 1,821 1,269 2,123 4,881
cans
As these numbers indicate, to date TN visas have been used almost
exclusively by Canadians rather than Mexicans. To a considerable degree,
this will continue to be the case because a Canadian, unlike a Mexican, is
not required to apply for a TN visa, have his eligibility adjudicated by a
consular officer, or wait for the visa to be issued. A Canadian professional
can simply arrive at the border, establish his professional credentials, and
be granted a TN visa.3"
361 8 C.F.R. § 214.60); see generally DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 357, at 17-134.
362 An Hi-B nonimmigrant visa is another option available to Mexican professionals.
However, an H1-B visa is not as desirable as a TN visa because Hi-B visas are subject to
annual numerical limits and the employers must comply with a time-consuming process
known as a "Labor Attestation," required by the U.S. Department of Labor. Id. at 17-127.
363 Data provided by the Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland
Security, based on its Form 1-94 collection records (on file with the Harvard Latino Law
Review).
364 Canadian citizens can obtain TN visas by presenting their application to an immi-
gration officer at a Class A port of entry, an airport handling international traffic, or a pre-
flight inspection station. DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 357, at 17-133.
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Nevertheless, it is likely that TN visas will become increasingly im-
portant for Mexicans. The provisions in effect during NAFTA's first ten
years required Mexican TN visa applicants to satisfy a more rigorous proc-
ess.365 In 2004, however, the requirements were relaxed to those described
above, and the rate of growth of TN visas issued to Mexicans grew 67%
from 2004 to 2005 (from 1269 to 2123) and 130% from 2005 to 2006
(from 2123 to 4881). Notably, TN admissions from Mexico in 2006 were
the highest of the past seven years and almost 90% more than the next
highest year. While Mexican TN admissions may never approach those of
Canadian admissions, it seems likely that they may expand considerably.
From the perspective of employers in the United States, more Mexi-
can professionals may be desirable to service the expanding Mexican popu-
lation in this country. This is especially true in dealing with the segment
of the Mexican population that does not speak English. It would be help-
ful, for example, to have a Spanish-speaking doctor in the emergency room
of a typical American hospital. Another factor that will make Mexican
professionals attractive to many employers, although unlikely to be ad-
vertised or even admitted, is that some Mexican professionals may be will-
ing to accept a lower salary than would comparably qualified American
or Canadian professionals.
From the Mexican professional's point of view, the TN visa may of-
fer a way out of the myriad problems he or she faces in Mexico, dis-
cussed at length throughout this Article. Obviously, Mexican profession-
als in Mexico are much better off than displaced agricultural workers trying
to earn a living as street vendors in Mexican cities. Nonetheless, Mex-
ico's economic problems mean that Mexican professionals suffer from
unemployment or underemployment and from relatively poor wages far
more in Mexico than they would in the United States. In addition, as noted
earlier, official corruption and some forms of crime (notably kidnapping)
weigh more heavily on professionals and others in the upper-middle class
or upper class than upon those at the bottom. The political deadlock and
massive civil protests following the July 2, 2006, elections have greatly
affected life and economic activity, particularly in Mexico City, and such
political turmoil may seem more threatening to professionals than to other
workers.
These observations lead to the proposition that NAFTA's most direct
effect on immigration might relate to the immigration of skilled and edu-
cated Mexican professionals, who, concerned with the problems at home,
may want to use the relatively easy process for temporary immigration
365 Before January 1, 2004, Mexican TN visa applicants were required to go through a
"Labor Certification" process through the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), in which the
DOL certifies that the employment of the applicant will not adversely affect the labor con-
ditions or wage structures in the United States The applicant was also required to file an I-
129 petition, similar to that required for Hi-B visas. Finally, TN visas issued to Mexicans
were subject to a 5500 annual cap. See DIVINE & CHISAM, supra note 357, at 17-134.
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into the United States available to them through NAFTA's TN visas."
Although the visas are valid for only one year, for many the stay will be
permanent, either through indefinite renewals or by adjustment of status
to that of a permanent resident by, for example, marriage to a U.S. citizen
or permanent resident.
For several reasons, NAFTA's Chapter 16 is likely to prove increas-
ingly important in shaping immigration, and might have an increasingly
significant effect on the economies of the United States and Mexico. First,
Chapter 16 is the one provision of NAFTA that directly encourages legal
immigration. While the economic dislocations created by NAFTA have
constituted a significant "push" factor encouraging emigration from Mex-
ico, the bulk of that emigration has been illegal. Living and working ille-
gally in the United States is unlikely to prove an attractive option to well-
educated Mexicans, particularly professionals, because that unauthorized
status would prevent them from being licensed to practice in the United
States. For a Mexican physician, for example, illegal immigration into
the United States is technically an option, but an unattractive one, given
that it would be almost impossible for him to practice medicine in the
United States legally. 67 By contrast, a construction worker in Mexico will
likely be able to perform the same work in the United States as soon as
he or she arrives, without the need for any certification or licensure proc-
ess, even if he or she immigrates illegally, which is most often the case
for unskilled or low-skilled immigrants.
Second, NAFTA's Chapter 16 may help increase the pool of Mexican
skilled workers who are already residing in the United States. In 2000,
Mexican immigrants with a college degree constituted about 8% of Latin
American skilled workers living in the United States.
368
Third, through Chapter 16, NAFTA is likely to encourage not just
immigration from Mexico to the United States, but immigration into Mexico
from the United States and Canada.369 While it is not likely that an American
with limited skills would want to immigrate into Mexico, it is entirely
possible that Mexican firms will be quite interested in employing Ameri-
can or Canadian individuals with needed skills at levels of compensation
sufficient to attract them. Even more likely, the many American firms doing
366 The visa provisions of NAFTA are designed to facilitate the relatively easy move-
ment of the specified classes of persons (including professionals) among the three NAFTA
countries. See generally Condon & McBride, supra note 324, at 276-80.
367 Several state statutes criminalize the unauthorized practice of medicine. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-409 (2006); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2264 and 2235 (2006).
See generally Joy Delman, The Use and Misuse of Physician Extenders: Aiding and Abet-
ting the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 249 (2003).
361 B. Lindsay Lowell, Skilled Migration Abroad or Human Capital Flight?, Migration
Info. Source, June 1, 2003, available at http://www. migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.
cfm?ID= 135.
369 Mexico's membership in NAFTA led the Mexican government to establish a formal
process for the admission of professionals. Papademetriou, supra note 319, at 43.
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business in Mexico (and, somewhat less likely, the firms owned by na-
tionals from third countries) may find it convenient to bring managerial,
professional, and technical personnel from the United States. Chapter 16
relieves these firms, and the citizens whom they employ, of burdensome
immigration requirements with which they would have to comply, if these
employees were immigrating by using visas other than NAFTA visas. In
one obvious sense, overriding prior Mexican law to facilitate the employ-
ment of American and Canadian citizens in Mexico can only be helpful
to the Mexican economy. Just as other NAFTA provisions facilitate the
flow of goods generally, Chapter 16 facilitates the flow of services to be per-
formed by skilled workers, which is beneficial to Mexico because eco-
nomic theory suggests that allowing resources to flow freely to their most
valuable use is efficient and increases total societal income.370
Fourth, however, from the perspective of educated Mexicans seeking
good jobs in Mexico, facilitating the employment of American or Canadian
professionals increases the competition for good jobs already scarce in
Mexico. In this sense, Chapter 16 may constitute an additional "push"
factor encouraging educated Mexicans to leave home.37" '
Finally, it is unclear whether Mexico will be harmed by the depar-
ture of those who might immigrate into the United States with a TN visa.
On the one hand, Mexico may suffer from the "brain drain" created by
these professionals' departure. As noted above, those potential Mexican
immigrants to the United States are likely to be industrious and educated
and, thus, of much value to Mexico, assuming the Mexican economy were
able to create sufficient jobs for them. 72 On the other hand, these Mexi-
can professionals are likely to leave family in Mexico, and to send dollars
home. Such remittances are a significant source of foreign exchange for
Mexico,3 73 and, therefore, the Mexican economy might actually be helped
more by the emigration of these professionals than by their contribution
to the economy if they were to remain in Mexico.
V. CONCLUSION
In its Prologue, this Article asks the question of whether we should
love NAFTA or loathe it. The answer, of course, is that the treaty has of-
fered mixed results on all fronts.
The economic picture is bleak. Mexican economic results have not
lived up to the unrealistically optimistic predictions of advocates such as
370 CASE & FAIR, supra note 258, at 301.
371 It is unclear how significant this factor is, however, given that U.S. and Canadian
professionals are likely to be more expensive than Mexican employees. Not only do U.S.
and Canadian professionals earn significantly more in their countries of origin than Mexi-
cans, they would likely demand a premium for the added burden of living abroad.
372 See generally POVERTY IN MEXICO, supra note 204.
171 See supra note 238.
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former U.S. President Clinton and former Mexican President Salinas. Em-
ployment has certainly been a troublesome area. Manufacturing employ-
ment has gained slightly, while agricultural employment has plummeted.
After absorbing most of the displaced agricultural workers, service em-
ployment increased significantly, but this growth is of little benefit to the
economy because most of the gains are in the informal sector, which is
largely composed of unskilled workers who perform low-pay, low-producti-
vity jobs, such as street vending and domestic services. From the gov-
ernment's point of view, the growth of the informal sector is not reassur-
ing because it represents an economic sector that, by its very nature, op-
erates informally and yields little tax revenue. With labor plentiful and
capital relatively scarce, productivity and real wages are stagnant, even in
the manufacturing sector that is enjoying an increase in exports. Low
productivity rates and low real wages may have resulted from the increased
number of women in the workforce, who, like displaced agricultural work-
ers, typically are unskilled. Inequality in Mexico, which was already near
the worst in the Western Hemisphere, got even worse. Therefore, from an
economic standpoint, Mexicans have not seen improvement in the years
since NAFTA took effect, and it is, therefore, not surprising that many of
them have made their way through the porous U.S. border to join the
relatively prosperous U.S. workforce.
While the adverse economic developments in Mexico since NAFTA
became effective are undeniable, the question remains as to whether things
would have been better without NAFTA. With an increasing labor force,
fueled both by the large number of young people reaching working age
and by the rapidly increasing entry of women into the labor force, Mex-
ico must create approximately one million jobs per year just to maintain
current levels of employment. Regrettably, the economic challenges Mexico
has faced have made this impossible. In addition, even as NAFTA was
being implemented, the Mexican economy was under stress from the peso
crisis of 1994-1995 and the emergence of increased competition from
countries with wage scales lower even than those of Mexico, particularly
China. Expectations of rapid job creation and even some degree of parity
with the wage scales in the United States were quite unrealistic. Thus, look-
ing at Mexico's economy, it is plausible to argue that the situation might
have been even worse without NAFTA.
The post-NAFTA devastation in the agricultural sector is a terrible,
but potentially necessary, development. One can only feel compassion and
sympathy for the campesinos forced off the land because the communal
ejidos have not been able to meet the competition of the American agri-
cultural industry. However, life on the ejido almost uniformly meant a
life of significant, and often extreme, poverty. Thus, one can argue that
NAFTA, by the painful process of shaking inefficient producers out of
the market and forcing workers to seek work in a more productive, and
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more modern, economy, will ultimately provide these campesinos and
future generations with a better life.
Social problems in Mexico are significant, and non-economic factors
may prove to be an important "push" factor leading Mexicans to consider
immigrating into the United States. Former Mexican President Fox's ad-
ministration attempted to stamp out corruption, but corruption remains a
serious problem. Meanwhile, street crime, particularly the destabilizing
crime of kidnapping, has expanded significantly. NAFTA probably bears
little responsibility for these developments, although it may have directly
or indirectly driven some displaced honest workers to crime. Corruption
and crime, coupled with the recent political unrest, may, therefore, be signi-
ficant reasons for all Mexicans (and particularly those in the upper levels
of the socioeconomic heirarchy) to emigrate.
In the political arena, NAFTA might be credited with helping Mex-
ico to achieve enhanced transparency of its democratic institutions. NAFTA
is unpopular with a large number of Mexicans, who (in part because of the
unrealistic fanfare with which the agreement was ushered in by the Mexican
government) view it as an important, if not the key, cause of the country's
economic troubles of the past twelve years. These economic problems
may have emboldened the populace to forcefully voice its disapproval of
the government and to demand more government accountability. The gov-
ernment has responded with unprecedented interest and policies that permit
more open and democratic popular participation. For example, the PRI,
Mexico's dominant party that held the presidency without interruption
for over seventy years, allowed itself to be ousted from power by a free
election in 2000 and was relegated to a third-place finish in 2006.
From the perspective of the United States, the primary effect of Mex-
ico's economic hardships has been an unprecedented wave of immigra-
tion from Mexico, topping even the peak immigration era of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. NAFTA has taken much of the blame,
but it is important to recognize that NAFTA is not an agreement about
immigration; it is an agreement about free trade in goods and services
and transnational investment. It is quite likely that the immigration surge
was fueled by economic forces stronger than the agreement. It is even possi-
ble to argue that NAFTA has not created the immigration problem and
that it may ultimately provide part of the solution. Some economists ar-
gue that a free trade agreement such as NAFTA will trigger a temporary
increase in immigration until the weaker partner's economy adjusts to the
competition and begins to offer workers more jobs and better wages. Cer-
tainly, this could happen in Mexico, as the economic adjustments converge
with anticipated demographic changes in which fewer Mexicans will be
entering the labor force. Whether immigration actually decreases may de-
pend almost as much on the country's success in combating the non-
economic problems of crime, corruption, and political instability as on
improving its economy.
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Finally, NAFTA's one provision that relates directly to immigra-
tion-the TN provision-may prove increasingly important with regard
to legal immigration. This provision allows professionals to temporarily
immigrate to the United States to practice their profession for one-year
periods that can be renewed seemingly indefinitely. These professionals
are unlikely to immigrate illegally because they could not then practice
their profession. Notwithstanding the fact that they are members of the more
affluent classes in Mexico, these professionals have also been significantly
affected by the economic, social, and political problems that have beset
Mexico in the last twelve years (although for them a concern for their safety
and that of their famililies is probably an even more significant concern
than economic issues). For this reason, this group could potentially in-
crease the population of Mexican citizens who have immigrated into the
United States legally.
Let us hope that these twelve years of a much troubled "gestation
period" will one day culminate in the happy birth of a new, economically,
socially, and politically stable-perhaps even strong-Mexico.
